Shaw v. Dist. of Columbia

ANTOINETTE SHAW, Plaintiff v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-00738 (DLF/RMM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

February 8, 2019

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case arises from administrative proceedings that Plaintiff Antoinette Shaw ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Shaw") brought against the District of Columbia ("the District"), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., to challenge the District of Columbia Public Schools' ("DCPS") provision of a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") for Plaintiff's minor child S.S. ("S.S." or "the Student). See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, Ms. Shaw challenges certain findings made in a February 1, 2017 Hearing Officer Determination ("HOD") issued by the District of Columbia's Office of the State Superintendent of Education and asks the Court to reverse the HOD and remand for further proceedings.

In the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, which Ms. Shaw filed on behalf of her daughter, S.S., Ms. Shaw alleges that the Impartial Hearing Officer ( "Hearing Officer") erred in four ways: (1) by failing to provide an adequate remedy for her finding that DCPS denied S.S. a FAPE by failing to conduct any new assessments as part of its triennial review of S.S.'s needs; (2) by failing to find that DCPS denied S.S. a FAPE by including inadequate plans for S.S.'s transition out of high school in the individualized educational plans ("IEPs") prepared after S.S. turned sixteen; (3) by failing to find that DCPS denied S.S. a FAPE by excluding Ms. Shaw from certain aspects of S.S.'s educational planning; and (4) by failing to find that DCPS denied S.S. a FAPE by prematurely graduating her from high school despite her significant academic shortcomings and failing to give Ms. Shaw adequate prior written notice of S.S.'s upcoming graduation. See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ J. ("Pl.'s Mot."), ECF No. 10. The District has cross-moved for summary judgment and contends that the HOD should be affirmed because the applicable law and the record developed during the administrative proceedings support the Hearing Officer's rulings. See Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Opp'n"), ECF No. 12. Having considered the relevant filings¹ and the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Statutory Framework

The IDEA was enacted "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To that end, local school districts must ensure that "[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State . . . regardless of the severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special education and related services, are identified, located,and evaluated." Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). A FAPE includes "special education and related services that — (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with [a child's] individualized education program." Id. § 1401(9).

The IDEA "requires the school district to create and implement an [individualized education program]" for disabled children who are eligible for special education services. Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This IEP is "the means by which special education and related services are 'tailored to the unique needs' of a particular child." Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (noting that Congress "envision[ed] the IEP as the centerpiece of the statute's education delivery system for disabled children"); Lesesne, 447 F.3d at 830; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). The IEP is "[p]repared at meetings between a representative of the local school district, the child's teacher, the parents or guardians, and, whenever appropriate, the disabled child." Honig, 484 U.S. at 311 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1988)). The final product "sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Id. Once a child reaches age sixteen, the IEP must include "appropriate measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition assessments" and explainthe transition services necessary to help the student reach those goals. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII).

The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 999. The IEP also must comply with the IDEA's requirement that students "be educated in the least restrictive environment possible." Leggett v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2015). After the IEP is developed, the school district must provide the child with an appropriate educational placement that comports with the IEP. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(2); Hinson ex rel. N.H. v. Merritt Educ. Ctr., 579 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D.D.C. 2008).

Parents who disagree with the IEP or believe that a school district has violated other IDEA requirements may file a due process complaint. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). If the parties are unable to resolve the complaint within thirty days, the parents are entitled to a due process hearing before the local education agency. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1), (g). Either party may appeal an adverse ruling to a federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

II. Factual Background

The events pertinent to this case occurred between the 2012-2013 school year and the 2015-2016 school year. At that time, S.S. was a student eligible for special education services based on an IDEA classification of Intellectual Disability. AR 6; AR 111 (Final Eligibility Determination Report).

A. Overview of S.S.'s Disability and Anacostia High School's Services for S.S.

S.S. was a student at Anacostia High School, where she received special education services based on her Intellectual Disability. AR 6; AR 950 (Test. Of Latisha Chisholm("Chisholm Test.")). S.S. had an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation on August 27, 2012, shortly before she began ninth grade. AR 4; AR 33-47 (Comprehensive Psychoeducational & Clinical Evaluation). Although S.S. was eligible to remain in school until she turned twenty-two years old, she was scheduled to graduate in four years on the high school diploma track. AR 6; AR 700-01 (Test. of Twilah Anthony ("Anthony Test."). Throughout her tenure at Anacostia High, S.S. was adamant about graduating and worked diligently toward accomplishing her goal. AR 6; AR 661 (Test. of S.S. ("S.S. Test."); AR 706 (Anthony Test.). As part of her special education, S.S. received accommodations from her teachers to help her complete assignments and examinations. AR 6; AR 942 (Chisholm Test.).

S.S. had a team of teachers and administrators who developed annual IEP goals for her education. See AR 6; AR 50, 86, 207 (IEPs dated 2/24/2015, 9/21/2015, and 4/25/2016). The IEPs pertinent to this litigation were performed on February 24, 2015, September 21, 2015, and April 25, 2016. See AR 50-73, 86-110, 207-27. Several parties provided input for the IEPs, including S.S., her teachers, and Ms. Shaw. See AR 8, 50-73, 86-110, 207-27. Objective tests such as the Brigance Transition Skills Assessments and Casey Life Skills Test also informed the development of the IEPs. Id. The IEPs included goals for mathematics, reading, written expression, and adaptive/daily living skills. Id.

Beginning in February 2015, S.S.'s IEPs included goals for her transition out of DCPS. For example, one goal was for S.S. to contact a post-secondary educational program that she was interested in attending after graduating high school, and to ask questions about the program. AR 8, 70-71, 105-08, 223-27. The IEPs also anticipated that S.S. would contact a workforce development center to ask questions about a program she hoped to work in after high school. Id.

S.S. had opportunities to participate in several outside programs that school officials believed would help prepare S.S. for future training or employment. In December 2015, S.S. was accepted into the Competitive Employment Opportunities Exercises in Transition Academy ("CEO EXIT") Program, which was designed to help students navigate and manage the expectations of postsecondary training or a workplace setting. AR 9; AR 136 (CEO Exit Acceptance Letter). In March 2016, S.S. applied to CVS's Workforce Development Program, which is designed to provide workplace assistance and placement to adults with disabilities. AR 9; AR 137-140 (CVS Workforce Application). S.S. expressed interest in becoming a CVS pharmacy technician. AR 137. A transition specialist at Anacostia High School provided some travel training with S.S., including drawing a map to S.S.'s assigned CVS store and traveling the route with her. AR 9-10; AR 1001 (Anthony Test.). In addition, On the Move provided travel training to S.S. through its partnership with DCPS. AR 10; AR 1002 (Anthony Test.). Ultimately, S.S. did not attend either program because her mother expressed concerns...