Sheehan v. Broadband Access Servs., Inc.

889 F.Supp.2d 284

Zachariah SHEEHAN, Plaintiff

v.BROADBAND ACCESS SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

C.A. No. 12–404–ML.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Sept. 6, 2012.

Bernard P. Healy, Law Offices of Bernard P. Healy, Pawtucket, RI, for Plaintiff.

Neal J. McNamara, Steven M. Richard, Nixon Peabody LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendant.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

MARY M. LISI, Chief Judge.

The Plaintiff in this case, Zachariah Sheehan (“Sheehan”), seeks damages for an alleged violation of Rhode Island General Laws § 28–6.5–1 (“Urine and Blood Tests as a Condition of Employment”) by his employer, Broadband Access Services, Inc. (“Broadband”). The matter is before the Court on Sheehan's motion to remand the case to the Rhode Island Superior Court. Broadband opposes the motion on the ground that Sheehan's claim is preempted by the Federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (“FOTETA”), 49 U.S.C. § 31306 (2006).

I. Factual Summary and Procedural History

Sheehan worked as a senior foreman for Broadband, which provides services to cable companies. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Obj. Mot. Dismiss (“Pl. Mem.”) 1. On or around April 25, 2012, Sheehan was working “in the bucket” of one of Broadband's trucks with a crew “lashing up fiber.” Pl. Mem. 1. According to Sheehan, there was a miscommunication which resulted in an accident. Pl. Mem. 1–2. In the confusion, fibers were pulled out of the case that Sheehan was hanging, and the case was damaged. Id. After the accident, Broadband suspended Sheehan and required him to undergo drug testing. Complaint ¶¶ 5, 8. Sheehan tested positive for marijuana. Complaint ¶ 9. Broadband continued Sheehan's suspension and advised Sheehan that, if he completed a substance abuse treatment program, he would be reinstated. Complaint ¶¶ 10, 11.

On or about May 17, 2012, Sheehan filed a complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court against Broadband. In his complaint, Sheehan alleged that, by requiring him to submit to drug testing, Broadband violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 28–6.5–1. ¹ Complaint ¶ 12. Sheehan also maintained that “he has not used controlled substances in a fashion which has impaired his ability to perform his job” and that he has no need to enter a treatment program. Complaint ¶ 13.

On May 29, 2012, Broadband removed the case to this Court, asserting jurisdiction based on diversity ² and the existence of a federal question under the Federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31306 (2006). Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1, 7, 9. On June 13, 2012, Sheehan filed a motion to remand the action to state court. Docket # 9. Broadband has objected to Sheehan's motion. Docket # 10. Following a hearing on August 9, 2012, the Court granted Sheehan's motion and advised that it would issue a written Memorandum and Order.

II. Standard of Review

Removal of a state-court action to federal court is proper only if the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1347, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (question is “whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court.”). Absent diversity jurisdiction, a federal question must be present in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (noting that, generally, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”).

If subject matter jurisdiction is challenged by a party, the Court “should resolve that question before weighing the merits of a pending action.” Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2002). The case must be remanded to state court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is upon the party who removed the case to federal court. BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, IAMAW Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir.1997) (noting that “removing party bears the burden of persuasion vis-à-vis the existence of federal jurisdiction.”).

Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). Ambiguities “as to the source of law relied upon by the [...] plaintiffs ought to be resolved against removal.” Rossello–Gonzalez v. Calderon–Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2004). See also Franquicias Nativas, Inc. v. Cleridel Corp., No. 11–1934(MEL), 2012 WL 1575723, at *1 (D.P.R. May 3, 2012) (“When plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, ‘all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.’ ”) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court's analysis is generally limited to the face of the complaint to determine whether a federal question has been pleaded. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425;BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, IAMAW Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d at 831 (“The gates of federal question jurisdiction are customarily patrolled by a steely-eyed sentry—the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule’—which, in general, prohibits the exercise of federal question jurisdiction if no federal claim appears within the four corners of the complaint.”). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the plaintiff is “master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425.

By pleading a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 28–6.5–1 as his sole cause of action, Sheehan's claim is exclusively based on a state law. Broadband, on its part, asserts that Sheehan's claim is preempted by FOTETA, 49 U.S.C. § 31306, and it maintains that, on this basis, the Court has federal jurisdiction over the claim. In order to determine whether the Plaintiff is merely dressing a federal claim in state-law colors, the Court will look beneath the face of the complaint to discover the true nature of Sheehan's claim. BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, IAMAW Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d at 831.

A state claim may be re-characterized as a federal claim establishing federal question jurisdiction in “only two circumstances—when Congress expressly so provides, such as in the Price–Anderson Act [...] or when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete preemption.” Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). A third exception may exist when a complaint raises a substantial question of federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (“case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.”) See also Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. KG., 510 F.3d 77, 93 (1st Cir.2007) (apart from complete preemption, “a claim might be considered to ‘arise under’ federal law for jurisdictional purposes if ... an adjudication of the state-law claim necessarily will involve the determination of a ‘substantial federal question,’ ”) (citing Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.2000)).

a. Express Preemption

Express preemption “results from language in a statute revealing an explicit congressional intent to preempt state law.” Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. Rhode Island Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 472 (1st Cir.2009) (finding preemption under the Natural Gas Act). The court must look to the ordinary meaning of the congressional language “with the qualification ‘that the historic police powers of the States were not [meant] to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (2002) (internal citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003).

By example, under the Price–Anderson Act, public liability claims arising out of nuclear accidents are unequivocally within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and any action filed in state court may be removed to the district court. Price–Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). The language is absolute and explicit.

In contrast, the ordinary meaning of the congressional language contained in FOTETA does not show an “explicit congressional intent to preempt state law.” Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. Rhode Island Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d at 472. FOTETA's preemption language states as follows:

(g) Effect on State and local government regulations.

A State or local government may not prescribe or continue in effect a law, regulation, standard, or order that is inconsistent with regulations prescribed under this section. However, a regulation prescribed under this section may not be construed to preempt a State criminal law that imposes sanctions for reckless conduct leading to loss of life, injury, or damage to property. 49 U.S.C. § 31306(g) (emphasis added).

As such, the preemption language of FOTETA solely proscribes state laws that are inconsistent with the federal law; it follows that FOTETA provides for preemption only if there is a conflict between state and federal law. Preemption under FOTETA, if it exists, may be used as a defense to state law claims, but it does not, by itself, confer...