Sheffield v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

329 So.3d 114

Mary E. SHEFFIELD, etc., Petitioner,

v.R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Respondent.

No. SC19-601

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 18, 2021

David J. Sales and Daniel R. Hoffman of David J. Sales, P.A., Sarasota, Florida; and Melvin B. Wright and Lisa Ann Thomas of Colling, Gilbert, Wright & Carter, LLC, Orlando, Florida, for Petitioner

William L. Durham II and Val Leppert of King & Spalding, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; Troy A. Fuhrman and Marie A. Borland of Hill Ward Henderson, Tampa, Florida; and Charles R.A. Morse of Jones Day, New York, New York, Jason T. Burnette and Brian Charles Lea of Jones Day, Atlanta, Georgia, and Noel J. Francisco of Jones Day, Washington, District of Columbia, for Respondent

John S. Mills of Bishop & Mills, PLLC, Jacksonville, Florida, Courtney Brewer and Bailey Howard of Bishop & Mills, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida; and Bryan S. Gowdy, on behalf of Florida Justice Association, Jacksonville, Florida, for Amici Curiae Florida Justice Association and Citizens Against Cigarette Manufacturers

Scott A. Chesin of Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae Philip Morris USA Inc.

CANADY, C.J.

This case presents a question concerning the application of a statutory provision enacted to impose certain limitations on the award of punitive damages. In 1999, as part of a broader tort reform act, the Legislature amended section 768.73, Florida Statutes, to among other things presumptively preclude an award of punitive damages against a defendant in a civil action if "punitive damages have previously been awarded against that defendant in any state or federal court in any action alleging harm from the same act or single course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory damages." Ch. 99-225, § 23, at 1417, Laws of Fla. The Legislature made the amendments applicable "to all causes of action arising after" October 1, 1999. Id. § 23, at 1418; see id. § 36, at 1428 (setting the effective date for the act). The certified conflict issue is whether the amendments apply to Engle progeny¹ wrongful death actions in which the smoking-injured decedent died after October 1, 1999. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Petitioner, Mary E. Sheffield—as personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband, Valton Sheffield, who died in 2007 as the result of lung cancer diagnosed in 1994—seeks review of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield , 266 So. 3d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the 1999 amendments applied to her Engle progeny wrongful death action against Respondent, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (Reynolds), on which "numerous prior punitive damages awards" had been imposed previously. Id. at 1232. The Fifth District generally reasoned that "arising" is synonymous with "accruing," that a wrongful death "cause of action" accrues upon death, and that because Mr. Sheffield died after October 1, 1999, the cause of action here necessarily accrued or arose after that date. Consequently, the Fifth District concluded that the 1999 amendments, by their plain terms, applied. Id. at 1233-34.

The Fifth District certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen , 228 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Evers , 232 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Konzelman , 248 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), each of which applied the pre-amended version of the statute in similar wrongful death actions. Allen , Evers , and Konzelman all effectively held that Engle progeny cases are "different" and that the wrongful death actions related back to the Engle class action, which began in 1994.

Mrs. Sheffield's main argument for why we should quash Sheffield is a non- Engle -specific one, namely that when a personal injury action (or potential one) becomes a wrongful death action, the "causes of action" remain the same—i.e., that the causes of action here are Mr. Sheffield's and that they arose in 1994 when he was diagnosed with lung cancer. Because our caselaw weighs against Mrs. Sheffield, and because Allen , Evers , and Konzelman fail to justify an Engle -only exception to the 1999 amendments, we approve the result in Sheffield and disapprove Allen , Evers , and Konzelman .

We begin by reviewing the relevant statutory amendments. We then briefly review Engle . Next, we address the certified conflict cases. Then we review the background of this case. Lastly, we explain our conclusion that the wrongful death action here is covered by the 1999 amendments.

1999 AMENDMENTS

Chapter 99-225, Laws of Florida, added the following underlined language to section 768.73 :

(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), punitive damages may not be awarded against a defendant in a civil action if that defendant establishes, before trial, that punitive damages have previously been awarded against that defendant in any state or federal court in any action alleging harm from the same act or single course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory damages....

(b) In subsequent civil actions involving the same act or single course of conduct for which punitive damages have already been awarded, if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the amount of prior punitive damages awarded was insufficient to punish that defendant's behavior, the court may permit a jury to consider an award of subsequent punitive damages.... Any subsequent punitive damage awards must be reduced by the amount of any earlier punitive damage awards rendered in state or federal court.

Ch. 99-225, § 23, at 1417-18, Laws of Fla. The chapter law also provided that the amendments "shall be applied to all causes of action arising after the effective date of th[e] act," id. § 23, at 1418, which was set as October 1, 1999, id. § 36, at 1428.

The amendments may have been a response to W.R. Grace & Co.–Conn. v. Waters , 638 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994). There, this Court "acknowledge[d] the potential for abuse when a defendant may be subjected to repeated punitive damage awards arising out of the same conduct," but concluded that it was "unable to devise a fair and effective solution." Id. at 505. Regardless of whether Waters was the impetus for the amendments, the purpose of the amendments is clear—to presumptively bar successive awards of punitive damages against a defendant based on "the same act or single course of conduct." § 768.73(2), Fla. Stat.

ENGLE

Engle v. Liggett Group., Inc. , 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), involved a class action lawsuit filed in 1994 "seeking compensatory and punitive damages against major domestic cigarette companies and two industry organizations ... for injuries allegedly caused by smoking." Id. at 1256. The class was eventually certified and defined as follows: "All [Florida] citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine." Id. In 1998, the trial court issued a three-phase trial plan, Phase I of which was "to consider the issues of liability and entitlement to punitive damages for the class as a whole." Id. Phase I ended with "a verdict for the Engle Class and against [the defendants] on all counts," id. at 1256-57, including a punitive damages award of $145 billion, id. at 1257. The defendants appealed, and the Third District reversed "with instructions that the class be decertified." Id. at 1258.

On discretionary review, this Court quashed the Third District's decision in all respects except for the reversal of the punitive damages award. Id. at 1254. That award, according to this Court, was premature and in any event excessive. Id. at 1262-65. In otherwise quashing the decision, this Court "conclude[d] that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class," id. at 1267, and that "the cut-off date for class membership" would be November 21, 1996, id. at 1275, with "[t]he critical event" being "when the disease or condition first manifested itself," rather than diagnosis, id. at 1276. This Court also held that certain Phase I common liability findings against the defendants could "stand," id. at 1255, but "that continued class action treatment" was "not feasible," id. at 1268. Accordingly, this Court decertified the class but established a one-year period for "plaintiffs within the class," id. at 1277, to bring "individual damages actions," id. at 1269, at which the approved Phase I findings—and only those findings—would be "given res judicata effect," id. at 1277. Those individual actions are commonly known as Engle progeny cases.

ALLEN , EVERS , AND KONZELMAN

In Allen , which originated as an Engle progeny personal injury action, the First District began its analysis of the 1999 amendments by noting that "[t]ypically, the applicable version of a statute is the one ‘in effect when the cause of action arose.’ " Allen , 228 So. 3d at 689 (quoting D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice , 863 So. 2d 311, 314 n.9 (Fla. 2003) ). Allen then treated the terms "arise" and "accrue" as synonyms, noting that "[i]n many wrongful death actions, the cause of action accrues on the date of a decedent's death." Id. But Allen concluded that " Engle -progeny cases are different," reasoning that because the decedent's injury "manifested" before the Engle class cut-off date, the decedent was entitled to "the res judicata benefits of the Engle class." Id.

Allen next explained that when the decedent died, the personal representative was "allowed to proceed in the same suit." Id. at 690 (citing Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 116 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2013) ). From there, Allen cited In re Engle Cases , 45 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2014), for the proposition that "[j]ust as the wrongful death action was...