Sheffield v. State

JAMAL SHEFFIELD v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 1944-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland^[**]

February 21, 2023

Circuit Court for Prince Georges County Case No. CT961449X

Arthur Kehoe Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned).

OPINION ^[*]

RAKER J.

On October 10, 1997, appellant Jamal Sheffield was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and related firearm offenses. Appellant was sentenced to a total term of life plus 50 years. Following post-conviction proceedings, on February 1, 2022, appellant was resentenced to a term of life.

This case raises the question of whether the court erred in failing to order a competency evaluation prior to resentencing, failing to determine whether appellant was competent prior to resentencing, and failing to stay resentencing until finding appellant competent. Before this Court, the State and appellant agree that a criminal defendant has a right to competency at sentencing.^[1] We agree with both parties and shall hold on nonconstitutional grounds, that the trial court erred in failing to order a competency evaluation before resentencing appellant.1

Because we shall hold that under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article, (when the issue of competency is raised or when the trial court has reason to question competency), the trial court is obligated to determine whether the defendant is competent at sentencing, we do not address the remaining issues raised by appellant.

I. Procedural History

This is a case with a lengthy and complex procedural history. We provide some context to frame this opinion.

1997 Prince George's County Circuit Court Trial

On October 10, 1997, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, appellant was convicted of attempted murder, second-degree murder, and two counts of use of a handgun in connection with a felony or crime of violence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant displayed some indications of mental illness prior to his criminal actions. Appellant's counsel, however, did not request an evaluation for appellant's possible mental illness or argue that it was a mitigating factor during sentencing. Originally a notice of appeal was filed; however, in July 1998, appellant's counsel filed a notice to dismiss the appeal.

First Post-Conviction Hearing and Transfer to Clifton T. Perkins

On December 27, 2018, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, appellant filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief along with a motion seeking transfer to Maryland's mental health facility, Clifton T. Perkins Hospital. The petition presented seven grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel failed to raise competency at sentencing and the defense of not criminally responsible by reason of mental illness, (2) that trial counsel failed to properly and adequately prepare and investigate the case, (3) that trial counsel should not have requested the introduction of post-Miranda silence of defendant, (4) that trial counsel failed to request a mistrial, (5) that trial counsel elicited harmful and prejudicial evidence, (6) that trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of Ms. Ward, and (7) that appellate counsel failed to pursue any appeal. The motion for transfer to Perkins contained a report from Dr. Solomon Meltzer, a psychiatrist in private practice who is board certified in general and forensic psychiatry. Dr. Meltzer diagnosed appellant with schizophrenia. The report contained the following synopsis:

"Based on review of all available information it is evident that Appellant currently exhibits psychotic symptoms. He endorsed beliefs in extensive delusional system. He also demonstrated disorganized and illogical thought processes on examination. For these reasons I have diagnosed Appellant with Schizophrenia."

In his report, Dr. Meltzer included an "Assessment of Trial Competence." Dr. Meltzer's report came to the following conclusion, "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as the defendant is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, he is not competent to stand trial."

In a hearing on appellant's motion for post-conviction relief and his motion for transfer, on July 5, 2019, the Prince George's County Circuit Court found appellant incompetent to proceed and ordered him transferred to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital. The court ordered him to remain there until he was either found competent to assist in his postconviction proceedings, or his mental illness was deemed permanent.

On July 26, 2019, the Maryland Department of Health (MDH) appealed the order granting appellant's motion to transfer to Perkins. On July 29, 2020, this Court held in Maryland Dep't. of Health v. Sheffield, 247 Md.App. 154, 156 (2020) that because appellant's 2018 post-conviction petition was a civil proceeding, the trial court lacked the statutory authority to transfer appellant for restoration to competence in the post-conviction proceedings. The trial court's order committing appellant to Perkins was vacated. Appellant was then housed at Western Correctional Institution.

Second Post-Conviction Proceedings

In July of 2021 in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, appellant and the State filed a Joint Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief. The petition sought a resentencing to remedy appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, seeking relief on two grounds: First, for failure to raise the issue of competence at appellant's original sentencing, and second, for failure to present mitigation evidence at appellant's sentencing. The court granted post-conviction relief for resentencing on the second ground, failure to present mitigation evidence at sentencing. However, the court held that Maryland's statutory law on sentencing did not allow for consideration of competency at sentencing unless it was challenged previously during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial.

During the 2021 resentencing in the Prince George's County Circuit Court, Dr. Meltzer testified that appellant was incompetent to assist in his post-conviction proceedings. He reiterated his assessment from 2018 that appellant was not competent.

The joint appellant/State recommendation was that appellant be resentenced to life in prison, with all but 33 years suspended, followed by 5 years' probation. The court questioned how Dr. Meltzer could find appellant incompetent but at the same time recommend his release. In response, appellant's counsel state as follows:

"You know, there is a difference between competence in a legal sense and, you know, how somebody would do when they're in the community or released from prison. And I think that - I think that we can provide some, you know, conditions of probation that would adequately address your concerns."

The prosecutor suggested sending appellant to Clifton T. Perkins for an assessment on his competency for sentencing, stating that this was a criminal matter, as opposed to the prior civil transfer which had been denied by the Court of Special Appeals.^[2] However, the court postponed sentencing.

At appellant's subsequent sentencing hearing, both his counsel and the State requested a 90-day postponement. Appellant had started to medicate, and more time was needed for the medication to become effective. The court denied the postponement request.

The court was doubtful that appellant would continue to medicate post-release. For several reasons, the court expressed a reticence to resentence appellant according to the joint state/defense recommendation.^[3] The court was doubtful that appellant would continue his medication post-release. Additionally, the court was concerned regarding appellant's ostensible lack of remorse. Appellant's counsel countered that this was because of his mental illness. The court found that argument unpersuasive, stating as follows:

"Exactly. Because of his mental illness, which is very dangerous . . . But, you know, again, I have to put the public's safety in front of everything else, so. Is there anything else?"

Before his final sentencing, appellant asked the court for the opportunity to address the court. The court denied him the opportunity to allocate. Appellant also requested a new attorney; this request was rejected and the court resentenced appellant to a total term of life in prison with no time suspended. This timely appeal followed.

II.

We address appellant's first argument that the trial court erred by failing to determine appellant's competency prior to resentencing. Appellant states that the court relied erroneously on its prior finding that Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §3-104^[4] allowed at sentencing a consideration of competency only if it had been challenged earlier. Appellant asserts that he was entitled to a finding of competency at resentencing as a matter of U.S. Constitutional law, Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland common law, and based upon a correct interpretation Crim. Proc. §3-104.

Appellant argues that the trial court misinterpreted Crim. Proc §3-104(c). First, appellant cites a 2006 modification of the statute which changed some relevant language regarding a defendant's right to competency from "at any time before the trial" to "any time before final judgment."^[5] Appellant argues that the language 'final judgement' implies the Legislature's intent that the right to competency extends to the sentencing phase. Additionally, appellant asserts that any ambiguity in the statute should be construed in favor of appellant. Lastly, appellant argues that the purpose of the statute is to guarantee the common law and due process prohibition on trying an incompetent defendant. Consequently, any interpretation which restricts its...