Shehan v. Warden

Joseph SHEHAN (Inmate #170107) v. WARDEN

No. TSRCV154006928S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Somers, Geographic Area 19

July 23, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Seeley, J.

The petitioner, JOSEPH SHEHAN, brings this second petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his first habeas counsel and his trial counsel in the criminal proceedings provided him ineffective assistance in violation of the state and federal constitutions. The petitioner is seeking to have his convictions vacated and to be released from confinement.

Based on the credible evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

I PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The petitioner was a criminal defendant in the matter of State v. Shehan, M09M-CR01-0156023-S in the judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown. He was charged with felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101(a)(2), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(1), larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122(a)(3), credit card theft in violation of General Statutes § 53a-128c(a), and illegal use of credit card in violation of General Statutes § 53a-128d(2). The state alleged that the petitioner killed the stepfather of his girlfriend, Carie Gouldsbrough, and that the petitioner and Gouldsbrough then stole items from the victim and fled to another state. Attorney William Grady represented the petitioner in the criminal proceedings.

On August 16, 2004, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), and he pleaded guilty to the following charges under the Alford doctrine:^[1] burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101(a)(2), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(1), and, larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122(a)(3).^[2] The state summarized the underlying facts at the change of plea hearing and indicated that Gouldsbrough had told the petitioner that the victim, her stepfather, had made sexual advances towards her, including making her sleep in the same bed with him while he masturbated next to her. This information enraged the petitioner and caused him to get into a physical altercation with the victim at the victim’s home between November 27, 2000 and November 28, 2000. During the fight, the petitioner repeatedly hit the victim with a broken bottle. The victim received numerous wounds. Ultimately, the victim died from blunt force head trauma and he bled to death.

Gouldsbrough was present in the apartment, but she remained in a bathroom during the assault. When she emerged from the bathroom, she saw the victim was injured. At the petitioner’s request, she handed him an extension cord and the petitioner hogtied the victim’s hands and feet with the cord. They took the victim’s wallet and other items, and left the victim in his apartment. Gouldsbrough believed that the victim was still alive because he was twitching as they left. They then stole the victim’s truck and purchased items with the victim’s credit cards. The petitioner and Gouldsbrough fled to Atlanta, Georgia, where eventually they were located and arrested.

On December 6, 2004, the court, Holzberg, J., sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of thirty-two and a half years to serve. Thereafter, on or about September 7, 2007, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was amended on August 14, 2009. The petitioner claimed he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleged that counsel failed to ensure that his plea to the murder charge was entered under the Alford doctrine pursuant to the petitioner’s instruction; that counsel failed to properly pursue the defense of extreme emotional disturbance relating to the murder charge; and, that counsel led petitioner to believe that he would be eligible for parole if he accepted the court-indicated sentence. The petitioner was represented by Attorney Bruce McIntyre at the first habeas proceeding. Following a trial, the court, Santos, T., issued a written decision and denied the petition. See Shehan v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV07-4001965 (May 24, 2011), 2011 WL 2478176.

On or about January 6, 2015, the petitioner filed the instant petition, his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After counsel was appointed, the petition was amended twice. The operative pleading is the second amended petition dated June 16, 2017, which alleges the following: (1) that the petitioner’s guilty pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily due to his trial attorney’s ineffective counsel; (2) that his habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to effectively raise a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate the elements of the offenses, the evidence against the petitioner and any potential defenses so that the petitioner could make an informed decision of whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial; and, (3) that his habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to effectively raise a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate potential defenses to the charges.

The court heard the trial on this matter on November 8, 2017 and March 23, 2018. The petitioner called three witnesses: himself, Attorney William Grady (trial counsel in the criminal case) and Attorney Bruce McIntyre (first habeas counsel). The petitioner also introduced numerous exhibits, including psychiatric and psychological evaluations of the petitioner, transcripts of the change of plea hearing and sentencing hearing, various police reports, laboratory reports and warrants in connection with the petitioner’s criminal case. The petitioner also introduced several exhibits relating to his first habeas proceeding, including the petitioner’s initial and amended petitions, the habeas trial transcript and the court’s memorandum of decision. The respondent called one witness, Mr. Grady, and introduced one exhibit, a certified copy of the court file in criminal case.

II FINDINGS OF FACT

The court has reviewed all of the testimony and evidence and makes the following findings of fact.

Petitioner’s trial counsel in the criminal case was William Grady, an experienced criminal defense attorney who began practicing law in 1984. During his career, Grady has handled hundreds of criminal cases and had at least twenty jury trials, including two murder cases. Grady also represented a defendant in a capital murder case. In this case, Grady represented the petitioner for almost four years.^[3] During that time period, Grady reviewed the discovery provided by the state, including the crime scene photographs, the autopsy report, the police reports, witness statements, and the petitioner’s statements. He conducted investigation and legal research, monitored the co-defendant’s case (Carie Gouldsbrough), interviewed and counseled the petitioner, discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case with the petitioner, pursued a psychiatric defense by hiring both a psychologist and psychiatrist to conduct forensic examinations, and engaged in extensive pretrial negotiations with the prosecutor, and judicial pretrial discussions with the prosecutor and the court.

Both the petitioner and Gouldsbrough spoke with law enforcement and admitted to taking valuables belonging to the victim, which the petitioner confirmed in his conversations with Grady. While the defense expert witnesses would have supported a claim of extreme emotional disturbance, the state’s expert witness disagreed and would have testified that the petitioner’s actions relating to the victim’s death were consistent with a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder. Thus, Grady counseled the petitioner that a jury may not accept an extreme emotional disturbance defense since there were conflicting psychological and psychiatric reports.

The petitioner made it clear to Grady that the petitioner wanted Gouldsbrough, his girlfriend, to be treated leniently. At the time the petitioner entered his guilty pleas, Gouldsbrough’s case had been resolved and she was released from jail. During his discussions with the petitioner, Grady expressed his concerns that Gouldsbrough would be a witness against him at a trial and based on her prior statements, she would negate any defenses that the petitioner would put forth such as self-defense, implied consent to take the victim’s truck, and, permission to be on the victim’s premises. Furthermore, the petitioner told Grady he did not want her to have to testify.

Grady also counseled him that the crime scene photographs were gruesome and would be difficult for a jury to view dispassionately. In particular, Grady informed the petitioner that he was concerned that a jury would have difficulty with the manner in which the victim died, namely, that because the victim had been "hog-tied" by the petitioner when he was still alive, he was not able to assist himself or call for assistance and it then took a substantial time for the victim to bleed out through his wounds. Additionally, Grady discussed with the petitioner the fact that he had fourteen prior felonies and a history of violent conduct that could be presented to the jury as well.

Grady advised the petitioner of the charges, including the elements of each offense and the evidence the state would need to present to prove him guilty, as well as the maximum penalties h...