Shehata v. Blackwell

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, United States District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Dr. Ehab Shehata and Defendants University of Kentucky, Provost David W. Blackwell, Dr. Larry Holloway, and General Counsel William E. Thro. [R. 71; R. 107.] Between January 2019 and June 2020, Dr. Ehab Shehata, an employee of the University of Kentucky College of Dentistry accused of health care fraud, was forbidden from engaging in clinical activities and had his employment contract terminated. [R. 67 at 3-6.] In response, Dr. Shehata filed suit against multiple defendants including the University of Kentucky, Provost Blackwell, Dr. Holloway, and General Counsel Thro. [R. 1.] In his Complaint, Dr. Shehata alleges violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights, First Amendment retaliation, breach of contract, and violations of Kentucky wage and hour law. Id. Dr. Shehata now moves for summary judgment against Provost Blackwell for his procedural due process claim, against the University for his

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breach of contract claim, and against multiple defendants^[1] for his wage and hour claim. [R. 71.] In response, the University, Provost Blackwell, Dr. Holloway, and General Counsel Thro move for summary judgment against Dr. Shehata for all claims filed against them. [R. 107.]

Further relevant to this matter is a companion case, Cunningham v. Blackwell, et al., 3:20-cv-00008-GFVT. In that matter, Dr. Larry Cunningham, a former colleague of Dr. Shehata who was also accused of having committed health care fraud, brings similar claims. The Court notes this companion case because the matters are closely intertwined and require frequent reference to one another. Specific to this matter, however, the Court, having reviewed the record, and for the reasons set forth herein, will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART both Motions [R. 71; R. 107.]

I

Dr. Ehab Shehata was employed at the College as both an oral and maxillofacial surgeon and as a clinical title series assistant professor from 2013 through June of 2020. [R. 71-4 at 1; R. 107 at 3.] ¶ 2018, the office of the UK Healthcare Corporate Compliance began an investigation of Dr. Shehata regarding a “documentation concern, ” which was later concluded without disciplinary action. [R. 71-4 at 12.] In January 2019, however, William Blackwell, the Provost of the University of Kentucky, informed Dr. Shehata that he was accused of fraud for “claiming credit for services which he did not perform.” Id. at 21. Though Provost Blackwell allegedly indicated that “he was not comfortable pursuing termination at that time, ” he forbade Dr. Shehata from performing any clinical activities. Id. at 21-22. As a result of this action, Dr.

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Shehata was not allowed to treat patients in the faculty clinic, not allowed to perform surgery at UK Chandler Hospital, not allowed to oversee residents' and interns' patient care, not allowed to teach clinical courses, and forbidden from working at the Veterans' Administration Hospital. See Id. at 23. On June 24, 2019, in the midst of the ongoing investigation into his billing practices, Dr. Shehata signed his annual appointment and assignment contract, which he believed to guarantee him an additional two years of employment at the College. [R. 71-4 at 29-30.] In August 2019, however, Dr. Shehata was presented a letter through UK's counsel, William Thro, indicating that, only if he agreed to certain conditions, including an admission of wrongful conduct, would his contract be renewed. Id. Dr. Shehata did not agree to the terms included in the letter, and, as a result, was informed by Mr. Thro that his employment at UK would end on June 30, 2020. Id. at 30. On January 16, 2020, Dr. Shehata filed a Complaint alleging violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights, First Amendment retaliation, breach of contract, and violations of Kentucky wage and hour law. [R. 1.] Now, cross-motions for summary judgment are pending and ripe for review.

II

The Court first turns to Plaintiff Dr. Shehata's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 71-4.] In his Motion, Dr. Shehata seeks summary judgment against Provost Blackwell for his procedural due process claim, against the University for his breach of contract claim, and against multiple defendants for his wage and hour claim.^[2] [R. 71.] Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery materials, and other documents in the record show “that there is

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no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). “A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows ‘that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Olinger v. Corp. of the Pres. of the Church, 521 F.Supp.2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue in dispute. Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

The Court must then determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). In doing so, the Court must review the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is inappropriate where there is a genuine conflict “in the evidence, with affirmative support on both sides, and where the question is which witness to believe.” Dawson v. Dorman, 528 Fed.Appx. 450, 452 (6th Cir. 2013).

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A

Dr. Shehata first seeks summary judgment against Provost Blackwell regarding his procedural due process claim. [R. 71-4 at 34-40.] In his Motion, Dr. Shehata alleges that Defendants forbade him to perform his clinical duties and terminated his employment without due process. See Id. In opposition, Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor, arguing that Dr. Shehata held no property interest in his clinical duties, held only a limited interest in his employment, and that he was provided sufficient due process.^[3] [R. 107 at 24-32.] The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause protects rights created by state law and guarantees that no significant deprivation of life, liberty or property will take place until notice has been provided and the individual has a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989), the United States Supreme Court stated:

We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v Helms, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 675. The types of interests that constitute “liberty” and “property” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes are not unlimited; the interest must rise to more than “an abstract need or desire ” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, and must be based on more

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than “a unilateral hope, ” Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2464, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981). Rather, an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.

Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460.

Under step one, the Court must determine whether Dr. Shehata held a property interest which implicates procedural due process rights. [R. 71-4 at 32-36.] First, the Court will determine whether Dr. Shehata held a property interest in his ability to perform clinical duties. The College operates under the University's Dental Service Plan. [R. 71-4 at 2.] Under the Plan, the primary physician who performs services for a patient, called the “Treating Provider, ” is the physician who receives payment for his or her services. [See Id. at 5.] If the Treating Provider is a faculty member like Dr. Shehata, the faculty member receives forty to sixty percent of the payment collected for the service provided, on top of his or her standard salary. However, if the Treating Provider is a resident supervised by a faculty member, the College itself receives the payment in its entirety.^[4] See Id. Accordingly, as a physician permitted to perform clinical services at multiple clinics owned by the University, Dr...