Shelton v. Gure

JONATHAN SHELTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ABDIRIZAK GURE, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-00843

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 2, 2020

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court in this trucking accident case is a partial motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendants: Abdirizak Gure ("Gure"); YaYa Transport, LLC ("YaYa"); and Young Stars Transport, Inc. ("Young Stars"). (Doc. 35). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages arising from allegations of recklessness and gross negligence. (Doc. 35).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts. (Doc. 35, at 6-9). All citations to statements of material fact refer to the paragraphs within pages six through nine of Document 35, which also contains the Motion itself. The Court will note where a fact is in dispute. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, a statement of material fact that is "disputed" shall be deemed admitted if it includes a reference to the part of the record that supports the statement and the disputing party neglects to provide record support for its position.¹ M.D. Pa. LR 56.1.

This matter involves a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 18, 2017, on Interstate 80 eastbound, near mile marker 146 and the Snow Shoe Rest Area in Centre County, Snow Shoe Township, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 35, ¶ 1; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 1). At the time of the accident, Defendant Gure was operating a tractor trailer on I-80 eastbound in the right lane. (Doc. 35, ¶ 2; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 2). The trailer driven by Gure was owned by Young Stars and was on lease to YaYa. (Doc. 35, ¶ 2; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 2). Gure was employed by YaYa at the time of the collision and was operating under YaYa's DOT 2627559. (Doc. 35, ¶ 2; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 2). The parties dispute whether or not the vehicle's lights were on at the time of the collision. (Doc. 35, ¶ 2; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 2).

As Gure was proceeding, his trailer was struck from behind by a tractor-trailer owned by Plaintiffs R&L and Truck Leasing. (Doc. 35, ¶ 3; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 3). This tractor-trailer was operated by Plaintiff Shelton within the course and scope of his employment with R&L. (Doc. 35, ¶ 3; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 3). Shelton was operating his vehicle in the left lane and as he moved into the right lane behind Gure's vehicle, he "glanced down for about two seconds, looked back up," and Mr. Gure's vehicle was right in front of him. (Doc. 35, ¶ 4; Doc. 35-3, at 3-4). Shelton was unable "to slow down fast enough," and hit the corner of Gure's trailer.² (Doc. 35, ¶ 4; Doc. 35-3, at 4). Shelton's vehicle continued across the road and ended up in a ditch on the left side of the highway. (Doc. 35, ¶ 5; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 5).

Shelton filed his First Amended Complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on May 20, 2019. (Doc. 35, ¶ 6; Doc. 35-1, at 34; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 6). Shelton claims that Gure's lights were not on, therefore Shelton had to swerve into the left lane before striking Gure's vehicle in the rear. (Doc. 35, ¶ 7; Doc. 35-1, ¶¶ 35-39; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 7). Shelton alleges that Defendants' conduct was reckless because they "act[ed] with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff," and seeks punitive damages. (Doc. 35, ¶ 7; Doc. 35-1, ¶¶ 40, 51(aa), 54(aa), 59(gg), 62(aa), 67(gg)); Doc. 40-1, ¶ 7). Similarly, R&L and Truck Leasing allege in their separate complaint against Defendants that their property damages were the result of "negligence, carelessness, gross negligence ... and recklessness of Defendants ...'" (Doc. 35, ¶ 8; Doc. 35-2, ¶ 20; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 8). R&L and Truck Leasing aver that as a "direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence, carelessness, gross negligence, and recklessness, R&L sustained severe and extensive damages." (Doc. 35, ¶ 9; Doc. 35-2, ¶ 21; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 9). By pleading recklessness and gross negligence, R&L and Truck Leasing left open a claim for punitive damages. (Doc. 35, ¶ 9; Doc. 40-1, ¶ 9).

On the day of the accident, Gure performed a pre-trip inspection of the vehicle, which indicated that the lights on the trailer were operating properly. (Doc. 35, ¶ 10; Doc. 35-4, at 3-4). Plaintiffs R&L and Truck Leasing submit that "third party witness testimony, and testimony from Pennsylvania State Trooper Nicklas state the lights of Gure's vehicle were not illuminated [during and immediately after the collision]." (Doc. 40-1, ¶ 10; Doc. 40-5, at 8; Doc. 40-7, at 18). Dennis Anderson, a witness to the accident, testified that after the accident occurred, Gure's four-way flashers were on and functioning. (Doc. 35, ¶ 11; Doc. 35-5, at 3-4). Plaintiffs R&L and Truck Leasing add that Anderson's testimony is thatthe lights of Defendants' truck were not illuminated at the time of the collision. (Doc. 40-1, ¶ 11; Doc. 40-5, at 8).

As the motions have been fully briefed, they are now ripe for review. (Doc. 36; Doc. 39; Doc. 40).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences "should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

A federal court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.Rather, the court must simply "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

"Although the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the 'benefit of all factual inferences in the court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to some evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact.'"³ Velentzas v. U.S., No. 4: CV-07-1255, 2010 WL 3896192, *7 (M.D. Pa. August 31, 2010) (quoting Goode v. Nash, 241 F. App'x 868, 868 (3d Cir. 2007)) (citation omitted). The opposing party "cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memorandum, or oral argument." Goode, 241 F. App'x at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

In this motion, Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. (Doc. 36, at 2). They submit that Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that Defendants "had an evil motive or a reckless indifference to the rights of others," which is required to sustain such a claim. (Doc. 36, at 2). Plaintiff Shelton responds that he "has produced evidence sufficient to establish that Defendants exhibited a recklessindifference to health and safety of the motoring public, including Plaintiff." (Doc. 39, at 3). Plaintiffs R&L Transfer and Truck Leasing aver that a tractor trailer operating without its lights illuminated could be considered reckless or grossly negligent, so a jury should be presented the chance to award punitive damages. (Doc. 40, at 2-3). After discussing the punitive damages standard, the Court will address the claims as to Defendant Gure, followed by the claims as to Defendants YaYa and Young Stars.

A. APPLICABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Defendants assert that punitive damages should be precluded from this action because the record lacks evidence that Defendants' conduct was intentional, malicious, or recklessly indifferent. (Doc. 36, at 10). Even if the lights on Gure's trailer were off at the time of the collision, which Defendants assume for purposes of this motion, the Plaintiffs fail to establish that Gure's state of mind was such that punitive damages could be awarded. (Doc. 36, at 10). The act itself is not enough, rather "evidence of subjective appreciation of risk as well as conscious disregard" is needed, according to Defendants. (Doc. 36, at 10).

First, as this Court sits in diversity jurisdiction, it must apply Pennsylvania substantive law, including the law regarding punitive damages. See Good v. Firstenergy Corp., 2015 WL 6703321, at *10 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 2015). The standard for awarding punitive damages is this:

The standard governing the award of punitive damages in Pennsylvania is settled. "Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) (1979)); see alsoChambers v. Montgomery, 192

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