Sheppard v. Geneva Rock

493 P.3d 632

Carol SHEPPARD, Appellant,

v.GENEVA ROCK, Geneva Rock Products, Inc., and David Dalby, Appellees.

No. 20190363

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard February 17, 2021

Filed July 15, 2021

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Cherise Bacalski, Bountiful, for appellant

Terry Plant, Matthew D. Church, Kirsten S. Ashton, Colton A. Matheson, Salt Lake City, for appellees

Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, and Justice Petersen joined.

On Direct Appeal

Justice Pearce, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 A truck hit Carol Sheppard's vehicle as she was driving on I-15.¹ The truck's driver, David Dalby, worked for Geneva Rock. Sheppard brought a complaint against both Dalby and Geneva Rock alleging that Dalby's negligence had caused the crash. Sheppard also alleged that Geneva Rock had negligently employed Dalby and shared some fault for her injuries. Geneva Rock conceded that Dalby was at fault for the collision and then moved to exclude all evidence of negligence: both Dalby's and its own. The district court excluded the evidence of negligence and negligent employment.

¶2 Trial proceeded solely on the issue of damages. After Sheppard rested her case-in-chief, the district court ruled that the jury could not award special damages to Sheppard because she had produced insufficient evidence of those damages. The jury returned a general damages verdict of $30,000. The district court then granted Geneva Rock's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and vacated the jury's verdict. The court reasoned that Sheppard failed to produce evidence sufficient to meet the requirements that Utah Code section 31A-22-309 puts in place for plaintiffs seeking general damages in certain cases.

¶3 Sheppard argues that the district court erred when it: (1) overturned the jury's general damages verdict; (2) found that Sheppard had introduced insufficient evidence to permit the jury to consider special damages; and (3) concluded that the law required it to exclude evidence of Geneva Rock's negligent employment of Dalby. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶4 While driving on I-15 in July of 2012, Sheppard heard a loud bang. Her car spun and Sheppard found herself facing the wrong way in the middle of the freeway. She couldn't open the driver's side door. Sheppard climbed over her center console and exited on the passenger's side. As she climbed out, she felt a severe pain in her back. An ambulance transported her to an emergency room where she received stitches for a cut she sustained on her arm.

¶5 At the emergency room, Sheppard was diagnosed with "left flank and abdominal contusion." Later that month, her primary care physician diagnosed her with lower back strain. In the following year, Sheppard received treatment for lower back pain from a chiropractor and two courses of treatment from physical therapists.

¶6 A year after the crash, Sheppard relocated to Virginia. There, she sought treatment for her back from two different primary care clinics and a physical therapy clinic. That treatment continued through October 2015. The physical therapy clinic, operated by a therapist named Scott Roberts, charged her more than $65,000.

¶7 Although Sheppard had occasionally experienced back pain before the collision, a review of her medical records showed that she did not complain of back pain or receive treatment for it before the collision.

¶8 Geneva Rock employed Dalby, the truck driver who struck Sheppard's car. A witness to the collision reported that Dalby was "making a turn into [Sheppard's] lane" and "actually crossed into that lane and made connection with her vehicle at that point."

¶9 Sheppard alleges that Dalby was accused of violating driving laws many times prior to the accident. Geneva posted safe driving stickers on its trucks that provided a number for motorists to call if they saw a Geneva Rock driver engage in unsafe driving. On at least eight separate occasions, Geneva Rock had received reports that Dalby ran red lights or stop signs, drove too fast for the conditions, wove in and out of traffic, failed to use signals, made improper lane changes, tailgated, failed to stay in his lane, or was otherwise discourteous.²

¶10 On another occasion, Geneva Rock sent Dalby home when a random drug and alcohol test revealed that he had arrived to work with a blood alcohol content of .029. Dalby received a verbal warning from Geneva Rock for that offense.

¶11 Within hours of the crash with Sheppard, Geneva Rock tested Dalby for alcohol, but Geneva Rock lost the test results. Geneva Rock later determined that Dalby was at fault for the accident and suspended him without pay, initially for five days, but then reduced it to four.³

¶12 While Dalby drove for Geneva Rock, Geneva Rock provided an incentive program for its drivers. The program tracked how many tons of material drivers moved for the company and compiled that into an "efficiency" score. Dalby received the highest efficiency score in the company several times.⁴

¶13 Sheppard filed a complaint alleging that Dalby's negligent driving injured her. She also alleged that Geneva Rock negligently employed Dalby by failing to adequately supervise and train him. Dalby and Geneva Rock initially denied Sheppard's complaint in its entirety. They also alleged that Sheppard's fault for the accident was as much as, or more than, their own.

¶14 Ten months after the end of fact discovery and near the eve of trial, Geneva Rock and Dalby admitted liability for the accident. Two days before trial was set to begin, the district court ruled that all evidence of defendants’ negligence was irrelevant because Geneva Rock had admitted that Dalby was negligent and that respondeat superior made Geneva Rock liable for Dalby's negligence. Among other things, the district court barred the admission of the evidence Sheppard had collected about Dalby's seemingly checkered driving record and Geneva Rock's efficiency incentive program.

¶15 The parties proceeded to trial with damages as the only issue. Sheppard took the stand and described the crash, the pain she felt in her back, the cut she received on her arm, and the scar that the cut left behind. Sheppard recounted her treatment history following the collision, beginning with her emergency room visit immediately following the crash and extending to the physical therapy Roberts provided after she moved to Virginia.

¶16 During trial, Sheppard called an expert witness, Dr. Erekson, a physical therapist. Erekson testified that Roberts had billed Sheppard roughly $65,000 for physical therapy. In response to questioning, Dr. Erekson opined that, of that amount, only $28,685 was "justified."

¶17 After Sheppard rested her case, Geneva Rock moved for judgment as a matter of law. Geneva Rock argued that Sheppard had not introduced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to award general or special damages.⁵

¶18 With regard to special damages, Geneva Rock argued that Sheppard had not introduced sufficient evidence of her medical expenses to recover the expenses as special damages, because she had not introduced medical records. And, in the same vein, Geneva Rock argued that Sheppard had not provided evidence that the accident with Dalby caused the injuries for which she sought treatment—also preventing an award of special damages.

¶19 Geneva Rock further contended that Sheppard could not seek general damages because she did not satisfy the requirements of Utah Code section 31A-22-309 (the Personal Injury Protection statute or PIP statute). The PIP statute requires that, in certain circumstances, plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered one of six categories of damages before they can ask for an award of general damages.⁶

¶20 Sheppard argued that she met the PIP statute's requirements in two ways. She pointed to testimony concerning the medical bills she had incurred—bills that far exceeded the $3,000 that the PIP statute requires. She also contended that she had suffered a "permanent disfigurement" evidenced by a small scar that resulted from the cut she had sustained in the accident.

¶21 The district court partially granted Geneva Rock's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court allowed the case to go to the jury on the issue of general damages. But the court found that Sheppard had not introduced sufficient evidence supporting a claim for special damages.

¶22 The jury returned a verdict for Sheppard and awarded her $30,000 in general damages. Defendants promptly renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Sheppard had not produced evidence satisfying any of the PIP statute's threshold criteria. Sheppard appealed.

¶23 On appeal, Sheppard requests alternative forms of relief. Sheppard asks that we reinstate the jury's general damages verdict. Alternatively, she asks us to give her a new trial if we decide that the district court improperly prevented her from seeking special damages. She also asks us to grant her a new trial if we find that the district court improperly excluded evidence of Geneva Rock's negligent employment. We conclude that Sheppard is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred when it granted the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because the issues might reemerge on remand, we hold that the district court erred when it excluded evidence of Geneva Rock's negligence and when it concluded that Sheppard had failed to qualify for general damages under the PIP statute.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶24 Sheppard argues that the district court erred when it granted Geneva Rock's motion for judgment as a matter of law on her claim for special damages. "This [c]ourt's standard of review of a [judgment as a matter of law] is the same as that imposed upon a trial court." Gables at Sterling Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Castlewood-Sterling Vill. I, LLC , 2018 UT 04, ¶ 21, 417 P.3d 95 (first alteration in...