Sheppard v. Roberts

LAWRENCE SHEPPARD, Plaintiff, v. ROBERTS, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-875 (VAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

October 16, 2020

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER AND ORDER ON MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Lawrence Sheppard ("Plaintiff"), then incarcerated at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center in Uncasville, Connecticut, filed a Complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Intelligence Officer Roberts, Lieutenant and Intelligence Officer Randolph, Lieutenant and Disciplinary Hearing Officer Eberle, Captain and Security Risk Group (SRG) Coordinator Papoosha, District Administrator Martin, Director of Security Santiago, and Commissioner Cook (collectively, "Defendants"). Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 (Aug. 13, 2020).

Mr. Sheppard has sued Defendants Roberts, Randolph, Eberle, and Martin in their individual capacities, and Defendants Papoosha, Santiago, and Cook in both their individual and official capacities, alleging that Defendants variously violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by improperly classifying him as a Security Risk Group member while a pretrial detainee, based on his social media posts. He also sets forth an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of his confinement and asserts related state law claims. Mr. Sheppard seeks injunctive relief and damages. Id.

The Court DISMISSES the First and Eighth Amendment claims, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and the request for injunctive relief, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Sheppard's state constitutional claims. The Court also DISMISSES any claims for damages against Defendants Papoosha, Santiago, and Cook in their official capacities. The Court DENIES without prejudice to renewal the motion to appoint counsel.

The Court will permit Mr. Sheppard's case against Defendants to proceed on the Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process claims and on the associated state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants in their individual capacities.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

On July 26, 2018, Mr. Sheppard allegedly "was admitted to the Hartford [Correctional Center] as a [pretrial] detainee and housed in general population." Id. ¶ 12.¹ The following day, he allegedly was brought to restrictive housing though he had allegedly not received a disciplinary charge. Id ¶ 13. Instead, he allegedly was told that his placement was the result of a social media post unrelated to prison concerns. Id. Mr. Sheppard also allegedly was told that he could not have an advocate or call witnesses at the hearing. Id. ¶ 14. Officer Randolph allegedly told Mr. Sheppard that there was no possibility that he would be found not guilty at the hearing. Id. Mr. Sheppard, allegedly under duress, then signed a paper Officer Roberts gave him. Id.

On July 31, 2018, Mr. Sheppard allegedly attended a hearing before Hearing Officer Eberle. Id. ¶ 15. He allegedly was not permitted to speak, present evidence or rebut the evidence presented. Id. The hearing allegedly was not recorded. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Sheppard alleged was found guilty of Security Risk Group affiliation based on his social media post. Id.

Mr. Sheppard allegedly had previously been designated a Security Risk Group member during a prior term of incarceration. Id. ¶ 16. He alleges that he successfully renounced his affiliation in 2013. Id. Allegedly as a result of the 2018 guilty finding of SRG affiliation, however, Mr. Sheppard was reaffiliated and classified as a "two-timer," which subjected him to a minimum two-year period of restrictive confinement. Id. Mr. Sheppard allegedly then was transferred to the SRG unit at Walker Correctional Institution. Id.

Mr. Sheppard alleges that he is not a Security Risk Group member. Id. ¶ 19. He alleges that he has sent numerous "letters, appeals, and grievances" to Defendants Papoosha, Martin, and Santiago. Id. ¶ 17. All were allegedly ignored or denied. Id.

In restrictive housing, Mr. Sheppard allegedly was subjected to the following conditions that those in general population were not: twenty-three hours per day in lockdown instead of six hours of recreation per day; three phone calls per week instead of six per day; being forced to house and recreated with inmates from rival gangs; a $35.00 weekly commissary spending limit with restricted items instead of a $75.00 weekly limit with no restrictions; no out-of-cell exercise beyond one hour per week of gym recreation; visits from immediate family only instead of from all persons on the inmate's visiting list; inability to earn risk-reduction earned credit; no early release opportunities; no law library or legal materials; no religious services or programming; no hot pot; three showers per week in an unsanitary facility instead of unlimited showers in facilities cleaned daily; limited access to medical and mental health services; and constant lock -downs, strip searches, and safety searches. Id. ¶ 22.

B. Procedural History

On June 24, 2020, Mr. Sheppard filed his Complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Compl., ECF No. 1 (June 24, 2020); Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2(June 24, 2020). On July 2, 2020, the Court granted the motion.² Order, ECF No. 7 (July 2, 2020).

On July 16, the Court noted that the Complaint appeared to be missing a page and directed Mr. Sheppard to file a complete Complaint by August 7, 2020. Order, ECF No. 8 (July 16, 2020).

On the same day, Mr. Sheppard moved to appoint counsel. Mot. to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 9 (July 16, 2020).

On August 13, 2020, Mr. Sheppard filed an Amended Complaint. Am. Compl.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), district courts must review prisoners' civil complaints against governmental actors and sua sponte "dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id.; see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134, n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that, under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is mandatory); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Section 1915A requires that a district court screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint sua sponte if, inter alia, the complaint is 'frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.'" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A)).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to provide the defendant "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,"see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

A plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A claim is facially plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require "detailed factual allegations," a complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claim] is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, however, "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F. 3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101- 02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the "special solicitude" courts afford pro se litigants). This requirement applies both when the plaintiff pays the filing fee and when he proceeds in forma pauperis. See Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). However, notwithstanding this liberal interpretation, a pro se complaint will not survive dismissal unless the factual allegations meet the plausibility standard. See Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Sheppard asserts violations of his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as related state constitutional claims and claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 28-34.

Specifically, Mr. Sheppard alleges that Defendants Roberts and Randolph confined him to restrictive housing for a social media post and denied him the ability to obtain evidence, have the assistance of an advocate, or call witnesses in order to present a proper defense, id ¶ 28; Defendant Eberle denied him the ability to present a proper defense, witnesses and evidence at the hearing and was not an impartial hearing officer, id ¶ 29; Defendants Papoosha, Martin and Santiago denied him adequate redress of grievances and were negligent in failing to remedy the violation of directive policy, id ¶ 30; Defendants Papoosha, Santiago and Cook were responsible for the coordination of the Security Risk Group program and units and...