Sherry v. State

498 P.3d 580

Maria C. SHERRY, Appellant,

v.State of Washington, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT, Respondent.

No. 54916-6-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Filed November 9, 2021

John Tirpak, Unemployment Law Project, 1904 3rd Ave. Ste. 604, Seattle, WA, 98101-1160, Mitchell D. West, Lowe Graham Jones, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3420, Seattle, WA, 98104-7032, for Appellant.

Rachel Athena Lumen, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 40110, Olympia, WA, 98504-0110, Leah E Harris, Washington State Attorney General's Offi, 800 5th Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, Licensing & Administrative Law Atty. General, Attorney at Law, 800 Fifth Ave, Suite 2000, Ms-tb-14, Seattle, WA, 98104, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Worswick, J.

¶ 1 Maria Sherry voluntarily quit her job and now appeals a superior court order affirming the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. She argues that she had good cause to quit because her work hours increased without a proportionate increase in her salary, thus amounting to a reduction in her compensation. We hold that a temporary increase in a salaried employee's work hours is not a reduction in compensation under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v). Because neither the Employment Security Department (ESD) commissioner nor the superior court erred in applying the law, we affirm the superior court's order and the ESD commissioner's decision to deny benefits.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Maria Sherry was an employee at Rite Aid from 2007 to 2019.¹ She was last employed as a store leader until the day she resigned on January 25, 2019. Sherry was a salaried, full-time, non-unionized employee earning $47,850 per year.

¶ 3 Sherry's assistant manager was discharged in November 2018. Rite Aid was actively recruiting to fill the position. After the store assistant was discharged, Sherry's hours increased from 50 hours per week to 65-70 hours per week, without any change in her salary. As a result of the increased hours, Sherry felt overworked and stressed. She reached out to a Rite Aid district leader about the stress she felt, and he instructed her to ask for assistance from neighboring stores. She received help from another store.

¶ 4 In early January 2019, Sherry suffered a panic attack and felt unwell for the following few days. She took a few days off work and returned on January 3. After returning to work, Sherry's district leader informed her of his expectations for completing the store's Valentine's Day decorations.

¶ 5 Although Sherry felt overworked and stressed, she did not make use of company resources available to her. For example, Sherry could have called the anonymous toll-free number for employee complaints; she could have emailed or submitted a complaint to human resources; and, she could have utilized the employee assistance program (EAP), a no-cost program available to Rite Aid employees that provides resources to help manage work-related stress and anxiety. She also could have requested a leave of absence, to which she was entitled.

¶ 6 Sherry feared that asking for help would make her appear incapable of doing her job, but she did not present any evidence as to why she had that belief. On January 25, 2019, Sherry quit her job and applied for unemployment benefits. The assistant manager position was still vacant when she left her job.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 7 The ESD denied Sherry unemployment benefits because she quit without good cause. Sherry appealed the decision, arguing, inter alia , that the increase in her work hours constituted a reduction in compensation and was, therefore, good cause to quit. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the ESD's decision, making findings of fact consistent with the facts above. Sherry then requested review of the ALJ's decision by the ESD's commissioner, who adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, and stated:

We note claimant's valiant attempt to recast her working of additional hours for no increase in pay as a "decrease in wages." However, this argument ignores both the plain meaning of the statute, RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v), the definition of compensation set forth at RCW 50.04.320, and the relevant regulation, WAC 192-150-115.

Administrative Record (AR) at 92. Sherry then appealed the agency's final decision to the superior court. The superior court affirmed the ESD commissioner's decision and denied Sherry unemployment benefits.

¶ 8 Sherry appeals the superior court's decision.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Sherry argues that the superior court erred in denying her benefits because she quit for good cause. Specifically, she argues that RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v) is ambiguous and should be construed in her favor, and that the ESD's interpretation of RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v) is contrary to the Employment Security Act's (ESA) purpose and leads to absurd consequences. Finally, she argues that the ESD's interpretation of the statute leads to all salaried employees waiving their rights under the statute. We disagree with all of Sherry's arguments.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Judicial review of a final agency decision is governed by Washington's Administrative Procedure Act (APA). RCW 50.32.120 ; RCW 34.05.570. Generally, when this court reviews an agency's decision, it sits in the same position as the superior court and applies the APA directly to the agency's record. Campbell v. Emp't Sec. Dep't , 180 Wash.2d 566, 571, 326 P.3d 713 (2014). Thus, we review the commissioner's decision, not the "ALJ's decision or the superior court's ruling." Michaelson v. Emp't Sec. Dep't , 187 Wash. App. 293, 298, 349 P.3d 896 (2015). The commissioner's decision is considered prima facie correct, and the party challenging the decision bears the burden of proving that decision was in error. Michaelson , 187 Wash. App. at 298, 349 P.3d 896 ; RCW 34.05.570(1)(a).

¶ 11 Whether a person quits for good cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Campbell , 180 Wash.2d at 573, 326 P.3d 713. When there is a mixed question of law and fact, the APA allows a reviewing court to reverse an administrative decision when: (1) the administrative decision is based on an error of law; (2) the decision is not based on substantial evidence; or (3) the decision is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3) ; Tapper v. Emp't Sec. Dept. , 122 Wash.2d 397, 402-03, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). Because Sherry has not challenged any of the commissioner's factual findings on appeal, the commissioner's findings are verities on appeal and there are no questions of fact for our review. Thus, we review the questions of law de novo. Tapper , 122 Wash.2d at 403, 858 P.2d 494.

II. THE MEANING AND INTERPRETATION OF RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v)

A. The Statute is Unambiguous

1. RCW50.20.050

¶ 12 Generally, RCW 50.20.050 disqualifies workers from earning unemployment benefits if they voluntarily quit. RCW 50.20.050 provides that "an individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has left work voluntarily without good cause ...." RCW 50.20.050(1)(a). The statute further states under subsection (2)(b) that

a[ ] [claimant] has good cause and is not disqualified from benefits under (a) of this subsection only under the following circumstances:

...

(v) The individual's usual compensation was reduced by twenty-five percent or more; [or]

(vi) The individual's usual hours were reduced by twenty-five percent or more.

RCW 50.20.050(2)(b). "Usual" is defined to include "amounts actually paid to you by your employer or, if payment has not yet been made, the compensation agreed upon by you and your employer as part of your hiring agreement." WAC 192-150-115(2). The term "reduced" is undefined, but "in the absence of a statutory definition, [we give] the term its plain and ordinary meaning ascertained from a standard dictionary." Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen , 151 Wash.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004). The dictionary defines "reduced" as "made smaller." Webster's Third New International Dictionary , 1905, (Phillip Babcock Grove ed., 2002). WAC 192-150-115 instructs that "compensation" is "remuneration as defined in RCW 50.04.320." "Remuneration" is statutorily defined as:

all compensation paid for personal services including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all compensation paid in any medium other than cash. The reasonable cash value of compensation paid in any medium other than cash and the reasonable value of gratuities shall be estimated and determined in accordance with rules prescribed by the commissioner.

RCW 50.04.320(4)(a).

2. Interpretation of RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v)

¶ 13 Sherry argues that RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(v) is ambiguous because it does not sufficiently define the term "compensation," and thus should be construed to apply to salaried employees whose work hours increased without a proportionate increase in pay. Br. of Appellant at 7. We disagree.

¶ 14 Our fundamental objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C. , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Campbell , 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. Courts determine plain meaning from all that the legislature has said in the statute and related statutes that disclose legislative intent about the provision in question. Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy v. Dep't of Ecology , 196 Wash.2d 17, 29, 468 P.3d 1064 (2020). If, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to construction aids, including legislative history. Campbell , 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4.

¶ 15 An unambiguous statute is not subject to judicial construction. Steen , 151 Wash.2d at 518, 91 P.3d 864. A statute is not ambiguous simply because "different interpretations are conceivable." Cerrillo v. Esparza , 158 Wash.2d 194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006).

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