Shields v. Andeavor Logistics LP

THERESSA SHIELDS, Plaintiff, v. ANDEAVOR LOGISTICS LP; ANDEAVOR REFINING AND MARKETING CO;ANDEAVOR COMPANY; TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING COMPANY LLC;TESORO CORPORATION; MARATHON PETROLEUM LOGISTICS SERVICES LLC;MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-04995-JFW-SS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

July 31, 2019

Note Changes Made by Court

STATEMENT OF DECISION GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants in the Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging the following state law claims for relief: (1) disability discrimination in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), California Government Code ("Cal. Gov. Code") § 12940(a); (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(m); (3) failure to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(n); (4) sex and/or race discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); (5) retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h); (6) failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and/or retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k); (7) wrongful termination in violation of California public policy; and (8) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5(b). See Document Number ("Doc. No.") 1-1, Exhibit ("Exh") B, Complaint ¶¶ 29-82.

On June 7, 2019, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, alleging this Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on grounds that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, preempts Plaintiff's state law claims. Doc. No. 1.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"The Ninth Circuit strictly construes the removal statute against removal jurisdiction." Bonilla v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Court must reject removal "if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9^th Cir. 2010).

The LMRA preempts a plaintiff's state law claims only where the court must interpret the CBA. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994); Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9^th Cir. 2007); Cramer v. Consolid.Freightways Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9^th Cir. 2001) ("The plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim."). A "hypothetical connection" between a plaintiff's claim and the CBA is "not enough to preempt the claim: adjudication of the claim must require interpretation of a provision of the CBA." Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691-92 (emphasis added). The Court reviews Plaintiff's claims, and not Defendants' proposed defenses, to determine whether the CBA triggers Section 301 preemption. See Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9^th Cir. 2002) ("[R]eliance on CBA provisions to defend against an independent state law claim does not trigger [Section] 301 preemption."); Irving v. Okonite Co., Inc., 120 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1026 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Humble to deny defendant's argument for preemption based on defendant's anticipated use of CBA to defend against FEHA claims).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's FEHA Claims Are Not Preempted by Section 301 OF The LMRA.

The first six of Plaintiff's eight causes of action are claims under FEHA. "The Ninth Circuit has 'consistently held that state law discrimination claims under the FEHA do not require courts to interpret the terms of a CBA and are therefore not preempted by [Section] 301.'" Klausen v. Warner Bros Tele., 158 F.Supp.3d 925, 930-31 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Schrader v. Noll Mfg. Co., 91 Fed. App'x 553, 555 (9^th Cir. 2004) and citing Ackerman v. W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9^th Cir. 1988)); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9^th Cir. 1989); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9^th Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Fox Tele. Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9^th Cir. 1993)). FEHA creates "nonnegotiable state law rights which cannot be altered by contract, including by CBAs." Id. (quoting Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748); see also Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1286 (holding FEHA rights are "defined and enforced under state law without reference tothe terms of any collective bargaining agreement"); Cook, 911 F.2d at 240 ("[The employee's] state-law claim is consequently independent of the agreement. That [he] might also have separate remedies under the bargaining agreement makes no difference."); Humble, 305 F.3d at 1009 ("As the Supreme Court explained in Lingle, just because a CBA provides a remedy or duty related to a situation that is also directly regulated by non-negotiable state law does not mean the employee is limited to a claim based on the CBA.").

1. Plaintiff's First and Fourth Causes of Action for Disability, Sex, and Race Discrimination

Plaintiff's FEHA discrimination claims allege that Defendants discriminated against her based on her disability, sex, and/or race when they terminated her employment, failed to rehire her and rejected her for an open alternative position. See Doc. No. 1-1, Exh. B, Complaint ¶¶ 32, 53. These claims require a factual inquiry into Defendants' motives, an inquiry that requires no interpretation of the CBA. See, e.g., Detabali v. St. Luke's Hospital, 482 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9^th Cir. 2007) (finding no Section 301 preemption in FEHA discriminatory termination claim "because there is no dispute over the meaning of any terms within the agreement"); Robles v. Gillig LLC, 771 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ("The key to resolving Plaintiff's claims will be Defendant's motivation in terminating Plaintiff's employment, i.e. whether Defendant terminated him because of his disability. This purely factual determination does not require a court to interpret the 'just cause' provision of the CBA.").

2. Plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of Action for Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations and Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability is not preempted by the LMRA because the range of options foraccommodating her disabilities are not limited to those identified in the CBA. See Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1528 (9^th Cir. 1995) (holding that a claim for FEHA reasonable accommodation was not preempted because there was a range of accommodations that the employer might have provided that would not have required interpreting the terms of the CBA). In fact, FEHA regulations require an employer to consider "any and all reasonable accommodations of which it is aware or that are brought to its attention by the applicant or employee, except ones that create an undue hardship." See 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11068. In addition, even if the Court must refer to the CBA to review some of the accommodations available to Plaintiff, the CBA remains only "peripherally relevant" to Plaintiff's claims and mere reference to the CBA does not "mandate preemption." Humble, 305 F.3d at 1011.

With respect to Plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, the Court must also engage in a fact-specific inquiry into whether Defendants reasonably accommodated Plaintiff's disability, the Court must also perform a fact-specific inquiry into whether Defendants engaged in a good faith interactive process in determining the options available to Plaintiff. See 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11069 (c) (California regulation outlining the fact-specific interactive process obligations of an employer under FEHA). Therefore, Plaintiff's failure to engage in the interactive process claim would only potentially require reference to, as opposed to interpretation of, the CBA. See Humble, 305 F.3d at 1010.

Defendants confuse the difference between reference to a CBA and interpretation of a CBA. In Perez v. Proctor and Gamble Manufacturing Co., 161 F.Supp.2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2001), the plaintiff claimed he was constructively discharged in violation of FEHA when his employer failed to accommodate his disability with an alternate position. The employer argued the claim was preempted by the LMRA because the court would have to interpret the selection guidelines ofthe CBA to determine whether the plaintiff was eligible for other positions. Id. at 1118. The district court rejected this argument because the "selection guidelines and the CBA are simply one of several factors for the court to consider in evaluating his claim." Id. at 1118-19. Indeed, "[t]he meaning of the selection guidelines are not the subject of dispute. While the analysis of [the employer's] FEHA defense requires the court to consider the guidelines, it does not require the court to interpret them." Id. at 1119 (emphasis in original); see also Roberts v. Boeing Co., No. CV 05-6813, 2006 WL 4704616, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006) (holding no preemption where no material dispute over CBA terms).

In this case, there is no material dispute about the meaning of the CBA. As in Perez, this dispute centers on Defendants' failure to meet their FEHA obligations to accommodate Plaintiff's disability and to engage in a good faith interactive process to explore all possible reasonable accommodations. The CBA provisions on alternate positions are only a few of the "several factors for the [C]ourt to consider in evaluating [Plaintiff's] claim." Perez, 161 F.Supp.2d at 1118-19.

3. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for Retaliation

Plaintiff's claim for FEHA retaliation is not preempted by Section 301. Plaintiff must show (1) that she "opposed practices forbidden [under FEHA]; (2) retaliatory animus on the part of the employer; (3) an adverse action by the employer; (4) a causal link between the...