Shine-Johnson v. DeWine

JOSEPH SHINE-JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MIKE DEWINE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action 2:20-cv-5919

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

April 12, 2021

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is now before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiffs' Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. This matter is also before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 4.

For the reasons that follow, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiffs' claims in their entirety. That recommendation notwithstanding, Plaintiff Goodson is ADVISED that he has the right to file a separate action to pursue any claim(s) for medical deliberate indifference that he believes he may have.

The Court also DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 4.

I.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs are sixteen inmates at Belmont Correctional Institution ("BCI") who each allege that Defendants are not adhering to proper social distancing and other public health-related protocols in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. (See generally ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiffs are not proceeding as a putative class, but rather they assert individual claims against Defendants.¹ Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "[a]ll incarcerated people are at a heightened risk of contracting the COVID-19 virus," that "[a]ll said Plaintiffs have contracted COVID-19 at least once and some twice and or are still experiencing the after effects of the virus," and "[a]ll [Plaintiffs] were denied treatment and quarantine because they did not exhibit a fever or labored breathing." (Id. at PAGEID ## 21, 29, ¶¶ 19, 59.) Plaintiffs allege that "[a]ll Defendants that are staff at [BCI] tested positive for COVID-19," and they claim that their injuries "were caused by the Defendants' lack of care." (Id. at PAGIED ## 28, 30, ¶ 51, 60.)

Plaintiffs allege that "[d]ue to the negligence and ['deliberate indifference'] [] of the health and safety of inmates, and the failures of [all] said Defendant(s') duties and [obligations], which created the unsafe environment [and] health conditions by overcrowding," Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights "by creating conditions that would create long term physical and mental health conditions," including death, due to COVID-19. (Id. at PAGEID # 27, ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs further allege that "[h]ad the said Defendants been in compliance[] with ACA standards and the Ohio Administrative Code, when the State ofEmergency occurred, [BCI] would have been better prepared to prevent and maintain the spread of COVID-19 within [BCI] and the community at large." (Id. at PAGEID # 27, ¶ 45.)

Plaintiffs bring this action against the following eleven (11) Defendants, each in their individual and official capacities: (1) Mike DeWine, Governor; (2) Amy Acton, State of Ohio Department of Health Director; (3) Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC"); (4) Ernie Moore, Deputy Director of the ODRC; (5) Eddy Bobby, Regional Director of the ODRC; (6) Dr. Eddy Andrews, Medical Director of the ODRC; (7) Karen Stanforth, Chief Medical Inspector; (8) David Gray, Warden of BCI; (9) BCI Healthcare Administrator Murphy; (10) Patrick Haley, Institutional Inspector for BCI; and (11) BCI Unit Manager Taylor. (Id. at PAGEID ## 19-20, ¶¶ 4-15.) Plaintiffs seek the following relief: (a) a declaration that "the acts [and] omissions described herein [violated] Plaintiff[s'] rights under the Constitution [and] laws of the United States"; (b) a preliminary and permanent injunction "ordering all said Defendants . . . to eliminate the overcrowding of inmates and reduce the population to the ACA standards for the Institution to which inmates are incarcerated"; and (c) injunctive relief "to provide a compassionate release to said Plaintiffs from custody and or allow for release with sanctions until all safe prison conditions are met and COVID-19 pandemic subsides." (Id. at PAGEID # 31, ¶¶ 71-73.)

II.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to "lower judicial access barriers to the indigent." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, "Congress recognized that 'a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.'" Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)² as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court's determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) "imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints." 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require "'detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'" is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints "'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; "'courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.'" Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App'x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III.

Plaintiffs bring their claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant part as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

Id. In order to proceed under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove both that (1) the perpetrator acted under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the complainant of rights, privileges,or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1983), rev'd and remanded sub nom, Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985). As a general rule, a plaintiff proceeding under Section 1983 must allege that the deprivation of his rights was intentional or at least the result of gross negligence. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). Mere negligence is not actionable under Section 1983. Chesney v. Hill, 813 F.2d 754, 755 (6th Cir. 1987).

Here, Plaintiffs bring their claims against Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID # 20, ¶ 15 ("Each of these Defendants is sued and in their own individual and official capacity.").) The Court will address each type of claim in turn.

A. Official Capacity Claims

"'[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office,' which is 'no different from a suit against the State.'" McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App'x 646, 654 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). The Eleventh...