Shoffner v. State

175 N.E.3d 337 (Table)

Gina Lynn SHOFFNER, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-75

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED September 1, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Jennifer L. Koethe, Navarre, Florida

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Steven J. Hosler, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Gina Shoffner appeals her conviction of operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life, a Level 5 felony. Shoffner raises multiple issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether her conviction was improper because she operated the motor vehicle during an "extreme emergency" as defined by Indiana Code section 9-30-10-18 ; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her; and (3) whether her sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of her offense and her character. Concluding Shoffner failed to meet her burden to establish an extreme emergency, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 8, 2019, Shoffner was alone at Michelle Kerrigan and Larry Phillips’ home. Shoffner was on the phone with her mother when she heard her mother's dog yelp, her mother yell, and then the phone went dead. Shoffner testified that she believed her mother had fallen down the stairs because six months earlier her mother had fallen and fractured her knee. Shoffner attempted to call her mother back and tried calling her son and Phillips, but no one answered. Shoffner then decided to drive to her mother's house. Shoffner stated that she did not call 9-1-1 because she believed she could get to her mother quicker than they could. See Transcript, Volume II at 70. Similarly, Shoffner did not run to her mother's home, which was only four blocks from Kerrigan's, because driving would be faster. See id.

[3] On Shoffner's way out of the house she passed a neighbor, Michelle Blonien, but did not ask Blonien to drive her to her mother's home. See id. at 96. Blonien testified that when she saw Shoffner the day of the incident, Shoffner was running down the stairs frantically, claimed something had happened to her mother, and was acting "[v]ery neurotic[, v]ery freaked out[, v]ery scared." Id. at 100. Shoffner was driving to her mother's house when Officer Adam Jaskowiak of the LaPorte City Police Department, pulled behind her.

[4] While driving behind Shoffner, Officer Jaskowiak ran the vehicle's license plate to check for arrest warrants and whether the car was reported stolen. The Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") records retrieved by his in-car computer listed Shoffner as the owner of the vehicle and indicated that she was a lifetime habitual traffic violator. Officer Jaskowiak followed Shoffner's vehicle for several blocks before the vehicle came to a stop on its own. While Officer Jaskowiak followed her, Shoffner did not speed, stopped at all stop signs, and came to complete stops at intersections.

[5] When Shoffner came to a stop at her mother's house, she attempted to get out of her vehicle, but Officer Jaskowiak turned his cruiser's lights on and ordered Shoffner to return to her vehicle. Officer Jaskowiak informed Shoffner that he stopped her because the owner of the vehicle was an habitual traffic violator. Shoffner told Officer Jaskowiak that she was not the owner of the vehicle and stated her name was Virginia Wright but said that she did not have State Identification with her. Shoffner provided Officer Jaskowiak with a date of birth and social security number; however, his in-car computer found no match in the BMV records to the identifying information provided by Shoffner.¹ When Officer Jaskowiak returned to the vehicle he called out using Shoffner's real name and she responded immediately. Shoffner then confirmed her actual identity and was arrested. During Shoffner's interaction with Officer Jaskowiak, she made no claim that she was driving due to an emergency. See id. at 43.

[6] On February 11, 2019, the State charged Shoffner with operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life, a Level 5 felony, and false informing, a Class B misdemeanor. The State later amended the charging information to include an habitual offender enhancement to the count of operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life.

[7] Following a jury trial, Shoffner was found guilty as charged. Subsequently, Shoffner admitted to being an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Shoffner to fifty-four months for operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life and six months for false informing, to be served concurrently in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") with no time suspended. Additionally, Shoffner was sentenced to two years under the habitual offender enhancement. Shoffner now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

A. Standard of Review

[8] Shoffner argues that her conviction must be reversed because she believed an extreme emergency existed requiring her to operate a vehicle. See Appellant's Brief at 13. This is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Moore v. State , 702 N.E.2d 762, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

[9] Our standard of reviewing a sufficiency claim is well-settled: we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Bailey v. State , 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences supporting it. Id. Therefore, the evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Drane v. State , 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). "[W]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Gray v. State , 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011).

B. Extreme Emergency

[10] To convict Shoffner of operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life, the State was required to show that Shoffner operated a motor vehicle after her driving privileges were forfeited for life. Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17(a)(1). However, "it is a defense that the operation of a motor vehicle was necessary to save life or limb in an extreme emergency." Ind. Code § 9-30-10-18(a). Shoffner bears the burden to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Whether there was an "extreme emergency" is a question of fact for the jury. Cain v. State, 844 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[11] Here, Shoffner showed no signs of an emergency while driving. Officer Jaskowiak testified that while he followed her, Shoffner did not speed, stopped at all stop signs, and came to a complete stop at intersections. See Tr., Vol. II at 42. Once stopped, Shoffner failed to inform Officer Jaskowiak of any emergency requiring her to operate a vehicle. See Moore , 702 N.E.2d at 764 (noting that defendant "did not mention at any time during the stop that he was ill or in need of medical attention"); see also Shrum v. State , 664 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting defendant's extreme emergency defense because passenger who allegedly had a medical emergency that required defendant to drive "did not even tell [the defendant], or the police officer, that he was experiencing an emergent health condition"). Further, clear alternatives to driving existed. Shoffner was only four blocks away from her mother's home and could have traveled on foot, she could have called 9-1-1, or she could have asked Blonien to drive her. See Cain , 844 N.E.2d at 1066 (finding that the defendant "had alternatives to continuing to drive").

[12] Given the evidence, the jury was justified in determining the circumstances with which Shoffner was faced did not rise to the meaning of an extreme emergency necessitating her operation of a motor vehicle. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

II. Sentencing

A. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

[13] Subject to the appellate courts’ review and revise power, sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g , 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Id. (citation omitted).

[14] Our supreme court explained in Anglemyer :

One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.

Id. at 490-91.

[15] Shoffner argues that the "trial court abused its discretion by sentencing [her] to fifty-four (54) months in the [DOC] with no time suspended[.]" Appellant's Br. at 19. Specifically, Shoffner contends that the following mitigating circumstances were offered to the trial court and supported by the record:

• She accepted responsibility.

• She did not cause or threaten serious harm to person or property.

• Substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify her offense existed.

• She was remorseful.

See id.

[16] Here, the trial court found no mitigating factors. See Tr., Vol. II at 156. The finding of a mitigating circumstance is discretionary and therefore, the trial court has no obligation to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the weight to mitigating evidence that the...