Shook v. Governing Body of Santa Fe

538 P.3d 466

Marie A. SHOOK, Ed Oppenheimer, and Joan Conrow, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. GOVERNING BODY OF the CITY OF SANTA FE, Defendant-Appellee,andZia Station, LLC, Real Party in Interest.

No. A-1-CA-40279

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: September 11, 2023

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Jenica L. Jacobi, Jacques H. Chouinard, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants

Herdman MacGillivray Fullerton Cameron Pumarejo Honeycutt PC, Frank T. Herdman, Santa Fe, NM, Erin K. McSherry, City Attorney, Marcos D. Martinez, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

WRAY, Judge.

{1} The present case arose from an administrative proceeding relating to five applications submitted by Zia Station, LLC (Developer) seeking zoning changes and amendments to the land use plans of the City of Santa Fe (the City). The City's Governing Body (the Governing Body) approved Developer's request, which Marie Shook, Ed Oppenheimer, and Joan Conrow (Residents) appealed, first to the district court and then to this Court. In both appeals, Residents argued that the Governing Body did not afford sufficient process during a public hearing about Developer's plans for their community. The City maintains that Residents’ appeal should be dismissed. It is well established that in administrative appeals brought under Rule 1-074 NMRA, the district court can simultaneously exercise appellate and original jurisdiction. See Maso v. N.M. Tax'n & Revenue Dep't , 2004-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 6, 17, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276. The capacity in which the district court acted depends on whether the issue raised in the district court was within the administrative agency's jurisdiction to determine. Id. ¶¶ 13 -14. Whether the district court wielded appellate or original jurisdiction dictates the appropriate procedures for this Court's further review. See Barraza v. N.M. Tax'n & Revenue Dep't , 2017-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 16-17, 395 P.3d 527 (explaining that in Rule 1-074 appeals, "[w]hen the district court sits in its appellate capacity ... there is no right to a further appeal in this Court, [instead], a timely petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed in this Court, which is granted or denied at the discretion of this Court" under Rule 12-505 NMRA ).

{2} Based on these principles, the City maintains that Residents’ due process appeal to this Court should be dismissed, because the district court exercised its appellate jurisdiction, and Residents should have filed a petition for certiorari seeking this Court's discretionary review instead of taking a direct appeal by filing a notice of appeal. See Wakeland v. N.M. Dep't of Workforce Sols. , 2012-NMCA-021, ¶¶ 15, 22, 274 P.3d 766 (explaining that "unlike cases in which a party has an appeal as of right, review in this Court of the district court's order on appeal from an administrative agency is discretionary"). We hold that (1) the district court exercised its original jurisdiction to decide Residents’ due process appeal, and therefore, Residents properly initiated a direct appeal by filing a notice of appeal; and (2) the Governing Body did not violate Residents’ right to procedural due process. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

{3} Because Residents limit their appeal to the process that they received during the public hearings on Developer's applications and do not challenge the City's factual findings or the substantive decision, we rely on the City's findings of fact to set forth the factual background.

{4} Developer submitted five separate applications to the City in order to construct apartments and space for retail, offices, and restaurants. Near the start of the process, long before the applications reached the Governing Body, ninety members of the public attended a virtual early neighborhood notification (ENN) meeting with Developer and the City's staff (City Staff). A neighborhood association requested a second ENN with Developer, which was held, and a third virtual meeting with the public was subsequently conducted by City Staff. After a period of written public comment followed by a two-day presentation that included oral public testimony, the Planning Commission voted to approve the applications.

{5} The Governing Body next considered the applications and held the public hearing over two separate, virtual meetings. The agenda provided instructions to the public about how to submit written comment in advance and how to offer testimony at the hearing on the first day. Thirty-nine members of the public submitted written comment to the Governing Body before the public hearing. On the first day of the hearing, the Governing Body received testimony from City Staff, Developer, and forty-four members of the public. Developer spoke for approximately fifty minutes, while the forty-four members of the public were each limited to two minutes for their presentations. Before concluding the first day, the Governing Body questioned some members of the public about their testimony. On the second day, the Governing Body engaged City Staff and Developer with questions, but the public was limited to watching the hearing online and could not participate. At the end of the second day, the Governing Body voted to approve the five applications.

{6} Residents filed a notice of appeal in the district court under Rule 1-074(A) NMRA (setting forth the procedures governing appeals from the decisions of administrative agencies when there is a statutory right to appeal). Residents, however, did not continue to use the Rule 1-074 procedures. See Rule 1-074(V) (directing parties to Rule 12-505 NMRA to appeal in this Court the district court's review of the administrative decision); Rule 12-505(A)-(D) (governing this Court's discretion to review a district court's Rule 1-074 decision and requiring an appellant to file a petition for certiorari containing specific information within thirty days of the district court's order). After the district court rejected Residents’ argument that the Governing Body had violated Residents’ due process rights at the public hearing, Residents instead turned to Rule 12-201 NMRA ("Appeal as of right."), and filed a notice of direct appeal in this Court within thirty days of the district court's decision, followed thirty days later by a docketing statement that contained statements of the case and legal issues, as well as supporting legal authority. See Rule 12-208(B), (D) NMRA (docketing statements).

{7} In this Court, Residents continue to argue that the Governing Body denied them due process, but the City maintains that the appeal should be dismissed. The City asserts that because Residents did not follow Rule 1-074(V), the appeal to this Court is untimely under Rule 12-505. Specifically, the City argues that Residents filed no document that could be construed as a petition for certiorari within thirty days of the district court's decision, because the notice of appeal that Residents filed did not contain the information required by Rule 12-505, and the docketing statement was not filed within thirty days of the district court's decision. See Wakeland , 2012-NMCA-021, ¶ 19, 274 P.3d 766 (permitting a docketing statement to substitute for a petition for writ of certiorari if the docketing statement is filed within thirty days of entry of the district court's order). The City initially brought these arguments in a motion to dismiss, which this Court denied. In the answer brief and by motion for rehearing, the City has renewed its position that Residents’ appeal to this Court is procedurally deficient and should be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

{8} We first consider the City's procedural challenge and then evaluate the process afforded by the Governing Body.

I. Residents’ Appeal Was Timely

{9} In order to determine the appropriate procedure for Residents’ appeal of the district court's decision, we must first determine in what capacity the district court exercised its jurisdiction when it reviewed the Governing Body's decision. See Barraza , 2017-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 16-17, 395 P.3d 527. When acting as an appellate court, the district court's jurisdiction "is limited by the scope of appellate review." Maso , 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276. In those circumstances, the "district court lack[s] appellate jurisdiction to resolve the matter" if the administrative body lacked the authority to itself consider the argument that is raised on appeal in the district court. Id. On the other hand, the district court's original jurisdiction is not so limited. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17 ; see N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13 ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted in this constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as provided by law."). If a party

appeals issues that are within the statutory limits of an [administrative] hearing, and the [party] also states claims that are beyond the scope of such a hearing, the district court should consider each claim according to its appropriate standard of review and maintain the distinction between the [district] court's appellate and original jurisdiction in rendering its decision.

Maso , 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276. Thus, in any given administrative appeal, "the district court can simultaneously exercise its appellate and original jurisdiction." Id.

{10} The capacity in which the district court acts "has very real consequences," which impact both the standard of review and the procedure for appealing to this Court. See Barraza , 2017-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 16-17, 395 P.3d 527 (contrasting the standard of review and appellate procedure when the district court acts in an appellate capacity as opposed to when it exercises its original jurisdiction). Importantly, if the district court acts in its appellate capacity, "there is no right to a further appeal in this Court" and "a timely petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed in this Court, which is granted or denied at the discretion of th[is] Court...