Shotwell v. Reg'l W. Med. Ctr.

JUDY SHOTWELL, Plaintiff, v. REGIONAL WEST MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

4:14-CV-3210

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

August 30, 2016

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

The plaintiff, Judy Shotwell, has sued her former employer, Regional West Medical Center, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1101 et seq. This matter is before the Court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are not meaningfully disputed. The plaintiff began employment with the defendant as a bill collector in 1992. Filing 40 at 2.¹ She worked in that position, and later as a Patient Access Representative, until her termination on December 2, 2013. Filing 40 at 2, 6. The parties agree that the role of Patient Access Representative is largely administrative, requiring the employee to sit for long periods of time. Filing 50-1 at 4; filing 44-1 at 2.

The defendant had a "General Leave Policy" throughout the plaintiff's employment. Filing 40 at 2. The policy provided that the defendant "is not required to, and generally will not, reserve an employee's position beyond a total of 20 weeks leave time in a rolling 12-month period." Filing 40 at 2. Pursuant to the policy, an employee who exceeded 20 weeks leave, and whose position was not reserved, was placed on unpaid furlough status. Filing 40 at3. A furloughed employee who remained on the defendant's employment rolls, could reapply for other positions within the company, and was eligible for continued benefits through the defendant's long-term disability plan. Filing 40 at 2; filing 44-6.

In 2012, the plaintiff had back surgery, causing her to miss several months of work. Filing 40 at 3. She was on medical leave from November 12, 2012 until February 18, 2013, when she returned to work on a part-time basis. Filing 40 at 3. On April 18, 2013, she obtained a "return-to-work" release from her physician, which authorized her to return to full-time employment as a Patient Access Representative. Filing 40 at 3; filing 7. The plaintiff returned to full-time work on May 1, 2013. Filing 40 at 3.

On August 16, 2013, the plaintiff broke her leg. Filing 40 at 4. She underwent surgery for the injury on August 19, which required her to miss 2 weeks of work. Filing 40 at 4. While recovering from her surgery at home, she spoke with the defendant's Compensation and Benefits Manager, Eric Vardell. Filing 40 at 4. Vardell informed the plaintiff that she had exceeded 20 weeks leave, and that pursuant to the General Leave Policy, she must either quit or assume furlough status. Filing 40 at 4. The plaintiff chose to be furloughed, which Vardell said would be effective until December 1, 2013. Filing 40 at 4.

Following her conversation with Vardell, the plaintiff called the defendant's Vice President of Human Resources, Steve Hodges, seeking help. Filing 40 at 5; filing 49-1 at 53. Hodges told her that furlough could be "retro'd back and dropped" and that he would check into the matter further. Filing 40 at 5.

On September 3, 2013, Hodges notified the plaintiff by e-mail that he had reviewed her records, and that between her previous back injury and more recent leg injury, she had used up her leave benefits as of August 27. Filing 40 at 5; filing 40-8. He also wrote, however, that the defendant might reconsider its decision to place her on furlough status if it received a medical release from her physician. Filing 40 at 5.

The plaintiff obtained a work release from her physician on September 5, 2013. Filing 40 at 5; filing 40-9. The release authorized the plaintiff to return to work on a full-time basis starting September 11, 2013, as long as she remained in a wheelchair, performed only sedentary duties, and received assistance in and out of doors. Filing 40 at 5; filing 40-9. On September 9, 2013, Hodges informed the plaintiff by e-mail that he received the physician's release, and that he would review her work station "just to make sure I understand that [sic] dynamics of that physical layout and the need for assistance are reasonable." Filing 40 at 6.

Soon after receiving the e-mail, the plaintiff met with Hodges to discuss possible workplace accommodations. Filing 40 at 6. Specifically, the plaintiff informed Hodges—consistent with the physician's work release—that she could return to work in a wheelchair as long as she had help opening doors. Filing 40 at 6; filing 50-1 at 18. At the meeting, Hodges also encouraged the plaintiff to apply for long-term disability insurance through the defendant's disability provider, UNUM. Filing 40 at 6. Later that day, after the plaintiff left the meeting, she received a call from Hodges and the defendant's Chief Financial Officer, David Griffith. Filing 40 at 6. Hodges informed the plaintiff that the defendant had decided to keep her on furlough status. Filing 40 at 6. The plaintiff was formally terminated by the defendant on December 2, 2013. Filing 40 at 6.

The plaintiff filed for long-term disability insurance with UNUM on September 12, 2013, while she was still on furlough status. Filing 40 at 6-7. As part of the application, the plaintiff indicated that, with respect to her occupational duties, she "was unable to walk - stand - sit for any length of time." Filing 40 at 7 (quoting filing 40-12 at 5). UNUM approved the plaintiff's application for long-term disability, noting that she was "unable to perform the material and substantial duties of [her] regular occupation due to [her] medical condition of lumbar disc degeneration." Filing 40 at 8 (quoting filing 49-2 at 1).

The plaintiff and her doctor filed paperwork with UNUM after she was awarded benefits. On one questionnaire, filed December 26, 2013, the plaintiff informed UNUM that she stopped work the previous August "[b]ecause of my condition AND other reasons." Filing 40 at 8; filing 40-14 at 13. When prompted to explain the "other reasons," the plaintiff noted that she had been "having trouble sitting, standing, and getting around due to my back." Filing 40-14 at 13. She also claimed that, as of the previous summer, "things were getting worse" and that "it had gotten really bad and I knew I would not be able to continue my job." Filing 40 at 8 (quoting filing 40-14 at 13). Her physician, Dr. Donn Turner, responded to a questionnaire from UNUM on or around February 3, 2014, indicating that the plaintiff was unable to perform her occupational duties, which included "mostly sitting," exertion of up to 10 pounds, and brief periods of standing. Filing 40 at 9; filing 40-15 at 2.

On November 11, 2013, while the plaintiff was still on furlough status, she applied for disability benefits through the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). Filing 40 at 9. The plaintiff noted on her application that she had stopped working to due physical and/or mental conditions, and because she "was let go as due to my disabilities per RWMC missed too much work." Filing 40-13 at 5. She also stated on the application that she "received regpay and paid time off [and] extended illness bank [f]or time not allowed to work per could not work do to my disabilities." Filing 40-13 at 6. The SSA denied her claim. Filing 40 at 9.

On April 24, 2014, the plaintiff asked the SSA to reconsider its denial of her November claim. Filing 40 at 9. In addition to expressing her disagreement with the SSA's original determination, the plaintiff also stated, "my disabling condition continues and I am unable to sustain gainful work activity." Filing 40-16 at 1. The SSA granted the plaintiff's request for reconsideration and awarded her benefits. Filing 40 at 10.

After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff filed this suit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for the motion, and must identify those portions of the record which the movant believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Id. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the evidence are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id. But the nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. In order to show that disputed facts are material, the party opposing summary judgment must cite to the relevant substantive law in identifying facts that might affect the outcome of the suit. Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2011). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could conceivably find for the nonmovant. Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2011). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042.

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disability, in violation of the ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12112and NFEPA; that the defendant retaliated against her for requesting reasonable accommodations, in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §...