Shultz v. Shultz

1

ALLEN L. SHULTZ, III Appellant v. FAITH E. SHULTZ

No. 1102 MDA 2022

No. J-S12044-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

June 21, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Civil Division at No(s): 2017-1766

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J. ^[*]

MEMORANDUM

PER CURIAM:

Allen L. Shultz, III ("Husband") appeals, pro se, from an order entered June 15, 2022 divorcing Husband from Faith E. Shultz ("Wife") and approving the master's report and recommendations in Husband's divorce with Wife. We dismiss Husband's appeal based upon his failure to comply with the briefing requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Husband and Wife were married in 1986 and lived together until 2014 when Wife moved out of the marital home. Wife returned to live in the home again in July 2015, but she finally moved out in June 2016. On April 21, 2017, Husband filed a divorce complaint through counsel. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim, and Husband then filed an amended complaint on October 4, 2017. Husband's counsel withdrew in 2018, and Husband then filed, pro se an amended divorce complaint on August 16, 2019. Husband has continued to represent himself through the remainder of these proceedings.

On August 7, 2020, the trial court entered an order approving the grounds for divorce but deferring the entry of a divorce decree until the resolution of the parties' equitable distribution claims. On August 13, 2020, the trial court denied a request by Husband for recusal. Husband filed appeals from both of these orders, which were quashed by this Court sua sponte as non-final interlocutory orders. See Order, No. 1132 MDA 2020, 10/26/20; Order, No 1182 MDA 2020, 10/26/20.

On October 16, 2020, the trial court appointed James M. Stein Esquire, as master to preside over the claims for divorce, alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees and expenses. A hearing was held before the master on June 14, July 7, and July 28, 2021.

On October 6, 2021, the master filed his report and recommendations in the trial court. In the report, the master found the date of the parties' separation as December 18, 2014, finding that the Wife's subsequent return to the marital home for an 11-month period did not result in a reconciliation among the parties. Report and Recommendations, 10/6/21, at 9-10. The master determined that the valuations proposed by Wife's expert were credible and recommended that the trial court accept the values that were assigned to the parties' marital assets, which included the marital home, five additional properties, and various personal property. Id. at 6-8. The amount of marital debt was set at $100,870, including $98,275 on a home equity line of credit, while the debt on the home equity line of credit accrued after the date of separation was attributable solely to Husband. Id. at 8-9.

The master recommended that the marital estate be split with 60% of the net value to be received by Wife and 40% to Husband, with Husband remaining responsible to pay Wife the sum of $91,822.60 over a period of 10 years after the division of the identified assets. Id. at 15-16. The master further recommended that the trial court award alimony to Wife in the amount of $200 per month until February 28, 2027, when she turned 65. Id. at 21. Finally, the master recommended that the court direct Husband to pay $5,000 in attorney's fees to Wife's counsel based upon Husband's "numerous and repeated steps to delay the resolution of this matter, including the filing of numerous frivolous motions and appeals which have been denied for various procedural and substantive reasons." Id. at 22-23.

Husband filed exceptions to the master's report and recommendations, and the trial court heard oral argument on the exceptions on March 3, 2022. On June 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order overruling Husband's exceptions, along with an accompanying opinion explaining the court's reasoning as to each of his 14 exceptions. The court entered a separate order on that date ordering Husband and Wife's divorce and approving the master's recommendations. Husband then filed a notice of appeal from this latter order.^{[1] [2]} Prior to reaching the merits of this appeal, we must address the question-raised by Wife in applications to dismiss and in her appellate brief and noted by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion-of whether Husband's failure to comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure requires dismissal of this appeal or waiver of all his appellate issues. Wife argues that Husband's concise statement of errors complained of on appeal filed pursuant to Rule 1925 "takes issue with every possible item that he could think of that relates in any way to this case, and sets them forth in a defamatory, incoherent rant." Wife's Brief at 5. Noting that the concise statement was replete with personal attacks on herself, the trial court, the master, and others involved in the case, Wife contends that Husband's statement "fails to identify each error with sufficient detail or clarity that allows a response" and that it raises an "outrageous" number of issues. Id. at 6.

Wife further argues that Husband failed to comply with the briefing requirements set forth in Chapter 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, asserting that his "almost 400-page brief is a diatribe of accusations and defamatory statements," including only Husband's version of the facts and procedural history without any citations to the record or correspondence to what actually occurred in this case. Id. Wife notes that Husband includes numerous attachments to his brief that are irrelevant to this appeal and were not introduced as exhibits in the lower court. Id. at 6-7. According to Wife, Husband's brief contains no citations to pertinent legal authority, and it is simply "a compilation of redundant and incoherent thoughts that leave [Wife] unable to appropriately and effectively respond." Id. at 7. Wife contends that, notwithstanding Husband's pro se status, it is impossible to discern from his concise statement and brief what issues he seeks to raise, and therefore dismissal of his appeal or waiver of all his appellate issues is required. Id. at 9-10.

We first address Wife's arguments related to the deficiencies in Husband's appellate brief. Pursuant to our appellate rules, an appellant's brief must be divided into various prescribed sections, including a statement of the questions involved, statement of the case, summary of the argument, and argument. Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(4), (5), (6), (8). An appellant must comply with the strictures of our appellate rules regarding the composition of his brief or risk quashal or dismissal of his appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 2101 ("[I]f the defects are in the brief . . . of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal . . . may be quashed or dismissed."); Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2021) (dismissing appeal where defects in appellant's brief foreclosed any possibility of appellate review); Elliot-Greenleaf, P.C. v. Rothstein, 255 A.3d 539, 541-42 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quashing appeal based upon "serious inadequacies" in appellant's brief).

As relevant to this specific case, we note that the statement of questions involved "must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail." Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). The statement of the case shall include the procedural history of the case, discussion of the determinations under review, and a condensed chronological narrative of the facts of the case with appropriate reference to the record, but this section "shall not contain any argument" and instead must communicate "a balanced presentation of the history of the proceedings and the respective contentions of the parties." Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(1), (2), (4), (b). Furthermore, the argument section "shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued," with distinctively displayed headings "followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent." Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). The appellant must also include "a concise, but accurate, summary of the arguments presented" in the summary of argument section of the brief. Pa.R.A.P. 2118.

As Husband is representing himself in this appeal, we observe that, although this Court will construe the materials filed by a pro se litigant liberally, pro se status confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Smithson, 264 A.3d at 760; Norman for Estate of Shearlds v. Temple University Health System, 208 A.3d 1115, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2019). A "pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court," and we must not act as an appellant's counsel. Smithson, 264 A.3d at 760-61; see also In re deLevie, 204 A.3d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2019). "To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing." Norman, 208 A.3d at 1118-19; see also Smithson, 264 A.3d at 761.

Upon review of Husband's appellate brief, we agree with Wife that the defects of the brief are so numerous and fundamental so as to preclude our ability to effectively address his appeal. Husband does include a statement of the case in his brief, but this section lacks a procedural history of the case and information regarding the determinations for which he seeks review, and his discussion of the factual background is riddled with argumentative assertions and rehashing of the events that led to his separation from Wife. Pa.R.A.P....