Sican v. JBS S.A.

663 F.Supp.3d 967

Evelyn SICAN, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Luciano Sican-Soloman,Kimberly Acosta, Luis Sican, Jasmine Sican, and Glenda Sican, Plaintiffs, v. JBS S.A., JBS USA Food Company, Swift Pork Company,JBS Live Pork LLC, John Does 1-3, and John Does 4-7, Defendants.

No. 4:22-cv-00180-RGE-HCA

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division

Signed March 23, 2023

Brian O. Marty, J. Barton Goplerud, Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese P.C., West Des Moines, IA, Aidan Bryant Carickhoff, Pro Hac Vice, Jason Scott Weiss, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffrey Paul Goodman, Pro Hac Vice, Saltz Mongeluzzi & Bendesky, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Adam D. Zenor, Zenor Kuehner, PLC, Des Moines, IA, Benjamin Stewart, Pro Hac Vice, Clayton Bailey, Pro Hac Vice, Jason Marlin, Pro Hac Vice, Bailey Brauer PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Evelyn Sican—individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Luciano Sican-Soloman, Kimberly Acosta, Luis Sican, Jasmine Sican, and Glenda Sican sue Defendants JBS S.A., JBS USA Food Company, Swift Pork Company, JBS Live Pork LLC, John Does 1-3, and John Does 4-7.¹ Plaintiffs allege Sican-Soloman contracted COVID-19 at the JBS meat processing plant where he worked in Ottumwa, Iowa, and he died from complications from the virus. See Compl. 1-3, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege the plant is owned, supervised, and/or controlled by JBS S.A., JBS USA Food Company, Swift Pork Company, JBS Live Pork LLC, and John Does 1-3. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs bring claims for negligence (Counts I and II), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count III), wrongful death (Count IV), and loss of consortium (Count VI) against these Defendants.² ECF No. 1 at 23-32, 34.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15; Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15-1. Defendants first argue Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678. ECF No. 15-1 at 4-9. Defendants next argue Plaintiffs' claims are foreclosed by the exclusivity provision of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act, Iowa Code § 85.20. Id. at 10-16. As explained below, Plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act. Plaintiffs' claims are, however, subject to the exclusivity provision of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court accepts the facts set forth in the complaint as true for the purpose of analyzing the motion to dismiss. See Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 2010).

The first known case of COVID-19 in the United States was reported on January 21, 2020. ECF No. 1 at 8. On January 31, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a "public health emergency." Id. Beginning March 9, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration began issuing public health guidelines for employees and employers. Id. The guidelines from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration recommended employers provide personal protective equipment to workers and encourage workers to stay home if they are sick. Id. at 8, 12-13. On April 23, 2020, the Mexican Consulate of Omaha, Nebraska emailed a JBS human resources employee expressing concern over the lack of COVID-19 precautions at the company's Iowa meatpacking plants. Id. at 18.

The complaint alleges that despite the OSHA guidelines and the concerns expressed by the Mexican government, Defendants maintained "strict attendance requirements" that penalized employees who missed work due to illness. See id. at 9, 11-12. Defendants also failed to provide sufficient personal protective equipment to employees and instructed employees not to wear masks. Id. at 13. Defendants did not enforce any social distancing policies and required employees to work in close proximity to one another. Id. at 2, 12-13. Defendants did not require employees experiencing COVID-19 symptoms to report their potential illness or stay home from work. Id. at 15. Nor did Defendants test and monitor employees exposed to COVID-19 at the workplace. See id. at 2, 13.

Defendants employed Sican-Soloman at a meatpacking plant in Ottumwa, Iowa. Id. at 2. In the spring of 2020, several of Sican-Soloman's co-workers contracted COVID-19. See id. at 14. Sican-Soloman worked in close proximity to these workers during the period in which they became infected with COVID-19. Id. at 14. Defendants knew these employees had contracted COVID-19, but never informed Sican-Soloman that he had been exposed to the virus. Id. Sican-Soloman tested positive for COVID-19 on May 6, 2020. Id. at 21. He died from complications caused by COVID-19 on May 28, 2020. Id. at 1, 21.

On May 27, 2022, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants. ECF No. 1. Defendants move to dismiss all claims, arguing Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act and subject to the exclusive remedies provision of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act. ECF No. 15-1 at 4-16. The parties did not request oral argument, and the Court declines to order it, finding the parties' briefing adequately presents the issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); LR 7(c). Having considered the parties' briefing and applicable law, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Additional facts are set forth below as necessary.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); accord Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009). "The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.' " Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). The Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, but not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences most favorably to the complainant." United States ex rel. Raynor v. Nat'l Rural Utils. Co-op. Fin., Corp., 690 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2012).

A plausible claim for relief "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Plaintiffs must "nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [else] their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Meat Inspection Act Preemption

Plaintiffs bring five counts against Defendants: negligence (Counts I and II); fraudulent misrepresentation (Count III); wrongful death (Count IV); and loss of consortium (Count VI). ECF No. 1 at 22-32, 34. Defendants contend each claim is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act. ECF No. 15-1 at 4-9. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing their claims do not fall within the scope of the Federal Meat Inspection Act's preemption clause. See Pls.' Br. Supp. Response Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 10-13, ECF No. 18.

The Federal Meat Inspection Act "regulates the inspection, handling, and slaughter of livestock for human consumption." Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 455, 132 S.Ct. 965, 181 L.Ed.2d 950 (2012). The Act "regulates a broad range of activities at slaughterhouses to ensure both safety of meat and humane handling of animals." Id. at 455, 132 S.Ct. 965. "The Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has responsibility for administering the [Federal Meat Inspection Act] to promote its dual goals of safe meat and humane slaughter." Id. at 456, 132 S.Ct. 965. "Over the years, the [Food Safety and Inspection Service] has issued extensive regulations to govern the inspection of animals and meat, as well as other aspects of slaughterhouses' operations and facilities." Id. (citing 9 C.F.R. § 300.1 et seq. (2011)).

The Act's preemption clause states: "Requirements within the scope of this chapter with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided under [the Act], which are in addition to, or different than those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 678. The Federal Meat Inspection Act's "preemption clause sweeps widely." Harris, 565 U.S. at 459, 132 S.Ct. 965. It "prevents a State from imposing any additional or different—even if non-conflicting—requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and concern a slaughterhouse's facilities or operations." Id. at 459-60, 132 S.Ct. 965. A state requirement falls within the scope of Federal Meat Inspection Act preemption if the Food Safety and Inspection Service "could issue regulations under the [Act] . . . mandating" the requirement. Id. at 466, 132 S.Ct. 965.

"Although the [Federal Meat Inspection Act]...