Sidorova v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ.

158 Conn.App. 872

122 A.3d 656

Natalia SIDOROVA

v.EAST LYME BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.

No. 36506.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 4, 2015.

Decided Aug. 4, 2015.

Robert T. Rimmer, Old Saybrook, for the appellant (plaintiff).

David S. Monastersky, with whom, on the brief, was Alexandria L. Voccio, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and ALVORD and PELLEGRINO, Js.

Opinion

ALVORD, J.

The plaintiff, Natalia Sidorova, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, the East Lyme Board of Education (board) and the town of East Lyme (town), in this action arising out of the termination of the plaintiff's employment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in determining that (1) she lacked standing to pursue a breach of contract claim alleging violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the board and the East Lyme Teachers' Association, (2) governmental immunity applied to the superintendent's conduct in terminating the plaintiff, which conduct the court found to be discretionary, and (3) the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts in support of her claims that the defendants breached their duties of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts as either alleged in the complaint or undisputed by the parties are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff was employed by the board as a French teacher in the East Lyme public school system. She was first hired as a substitute teacher in January, 2003, and she obtained tenure in 2007. In 2009, the high school's principal, John Sullivan, told the plaintiff that she most likely would be transferred to the middle school the following year. Following that discussion, a town budget referendum was passed that necessitated school staff layoffs. On June 8, 2009, the plaintiff was called to Sullivan's office, and the superintendent of schools, Paul Edward Smotas, handed her a letter dated June 4, 2009. In the letter, he notified the plaintiff that her position had been eliminated and, thus, that her employment had been terminated. She was not provided advance notice that her contract was under consideration for termination, and thus she had no opportunity to discuss the termination prior to its taking effect.

The following procedural history is also relevant. On June 16, 2010, the plaintiff filed the present action against the defendants. The operative complaint, the fourth amended complaint, most recently was amended on June 3, 2013, and contained twelve counts. Counts one through four alleged breach of contract,¹ counts five and six alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, counts seven and eight alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress, and counts nine through twelve alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On June 27, 2013, the defendants filed a revised answer and special defenses. The defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law, attached to which were a number of documents, including excerpts of the deposition transcripts of the plaintiff, Sullivan, Smotas, and James D. Lombardo, the successor superintendent. Also attached were, among other documents, the June, 2009 termination letter and the agreement. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which was accompanied by a memorandum of law.² The defendants filed a reply memorandum, and the court heard oral argument.

On January 21, 2013, the court issued its memorandum of decision granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all counts of the plaintiff's complaint. As to counts one through four, the court determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the provisions of the agreement. As to counts five and six, the court concluded that the defendants were entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n (a)(2)(A),³ and that, even if such immunity were unavailable, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants' conduct was extreme or outrageous as required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.⁴ As to counts seven and eight, the court concluded that Smotas' conduct in terminating the plaintiff's employment was discretionary, such that the defendants were entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to § 52–557n (a)(2)(B).⁵ Addressing counts nine through twelve, the court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had engaged in a bad faith impediment of the plaintiff's rights as required to support the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is from this judgment that the plaintiff appeals.

“We begin with the relevant standard of review concerning motions for summary judgment. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.... A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary....

“[Practice Book § 17–49 ] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book [§ 17–45 ].” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jahn v. Board of Education, 152 Conn.App. 652, 657, 99 A.3d 1230 (2014).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts one through four because it improperly concluded that she lacked standing to bring a direct action for breach of contract against the defendants. Specifically, she argues that “it would be incongruous for a party to be penalized for not exhausting an administrative remedy process to which the party had received no notice nor meaningful opportunity in which to participate.”⁶ She further argues that the court improperly relied upon precedent involving claims that did not implicate General Statutes § 10–151 and that the court should have denied summary judgment based on the law of the case.⁷

We disagree.⁸

The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts three and four after concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a breach of contract claim alleging a violation of Article VII of the agreement.⁹ The court explained: “Absent a contrary provision or the union's failure to adequately represent its members, individual union members do not have standing to enforce provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by a municipality and a labor union.” Because the plaintiff could not identify any provision of the agreement granting her the right to enforce the agreement, and because she did not allege that the union had breached its duty of fair representation, the court concluded that she lacked standing. As to counts one and two, the court concluded that, to the extent that those counts alleged a direct action against the defendants for their failure to comply with the statutory provisions of § 10–151, that statute provided no such private right of action other than through the administrative appeal process provided therein.¹⁰

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.... If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 717, 629 A.2d 333 (1993).

Our Supreme Court previously has articulated the rules of standing applicable to employees seeking to pursue breach of contract actions based on alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements. “Ordinarily a court may entertain a suit by an individual employee to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement only if the agreement so provides.... An employee does, however, have standing to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement if the employee claims that the union has breached its duty of fair representation.” (Citation omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 239 Conn. 168, 182, 682 A.2d 490 (1996).

On appeal, the plaintiff in the present case fails to identify any provision in the agreement permitting her individually to enforce Article VII or any other provision of the agreement. Moreover, she fails to allege that the union has breached its duty of fair representation. Rather than claiming that the present action satisfies one of the exceptions discussed previously, the plaintiff instead argues that the general principles of standing for unionized employees do not apply to teachers who receive protection under § 10–151, commonly known as the Teacher Tenure Act. She claims that “Connecticut courts have routinely allowed direct...