Siebert v. Okun

1

SUSAN L. SIEBERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REBECCA C. OKUN, M.D. and WOMEN'S SPECIALISTS OF NEW MEXICO, LTD., Defendants-Appellants.

No. A-1-CA-39966

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

September 23, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Victor S. Lopez District Court Judge

Curtis & Co. Lisa K. Curtis Luke W. Holmen Albuquerque, NM for Appellee

Hinkle Shanor LLP William P. Slattery Dana S. Hardy Benjamin L Lammons Santa Fe, NM

Lorenz Law Alice T. Lorenz Albuquerque, NM for Appellants

Integration Group, Inc. Barry J. Berenberg, Senior Counsel Albuquerque, NM

Office of Superintendent of Insurance Cass Brulotte, Life &amp Health Attorney Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae

OPINION

ZACHARY A. IVES, JUDGE

{¶1} The Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-5-1 to -29 (1976, as amended through 2023), imposes caps on liability, one of which limits "a health care provider's personal liability" for "monetary damages and medical care and related benefits." Section 41-5-6(D) (1992).^[1] When, under a judgment or settlement, a plaintiff is owed an amount "in excess of" the amount of the provider cap, the excess "shall be paid from the patient's compensation fund" (PCF). Id. This appeal, which is the second to this Court in this litigation, presents two questions of first impression about the recovery of pre- and post-judgment interest when a plaintiff is owed more than the statutorily capped amount for provider liability. First, are pre-and post-judgment interest recoverable on the capped amount plus the excess or only on the capped amount? We hold that interest is recoverable on the total of the capped amount and the excess. That holding raises a second question: Must the liable provider pay only the interest on the capped amount, or must the provider also pay the interest on the excess, even though the PCF is liable for amounts over the statutory cap? We hold that interest must be allocated between the provider and the PCF in accordance with the allocation of their liability for damages under the MMA. In other words, the provider must pay the interest on the capped amount, and the PCF must pay the interest on the amount "in excess of" the cap. Section 41-5-6(D). In reaching this holding, we conclude that the PCF does not have sovereign immunity from the payment of interest under NMSA 1978, Section 56-8-4(D) (2004) because the PCF is not "the state."

{¶2} In this case, the district court answered the first question correctly: It awarded Plaintiff Susan L. Siebert pre-and post-judgment interest on the capped amount as well as the excess owed to her under the judgment. However, the district court answered the second question incorrectly: It held the providers, Defendants Rebecca Okun, M.D. and Women's Specialists of New Mexico, liable for all of the interest. We therefore affirm as to the amount of interest, but reverse as to the allocation of liability for interest, and remand for amendment of the judgment consistent with this opinion. We also reject Defendants' argument that the district court erred in determining when interest stopped accruing.

BACKGROUND

{¶3} Plaintiff sued Defendants for medical malpractice in 2013. The jury found that Defendant Dr. Okun was negligent and awarded Plaintiff $2.6 million in compensatory damages-an amount above the statutory cap on nonmedical and nonpunitive damages imposed by the MMA. The MMA limited Plaintiff's total damages recovery to $1,535,916.15. This total is the sum of $935,916.15 in stipulated medical expenses, which are not subject to any cap, plus nonmedical damages, which are capped by the MMA at $600,000. See § 41-5-6(A).^[2] Despite this statutory cap, the district court entered the $2.6 million judgment against Defendants in April 2016, with interest and costs to be determined at a later date. Plaintiff moved for pre- and post-judgment interest. But Defendants objected to the judgment, moving to amend it from $2.6 million to $1,535,916.15 to reflect the $600,000 cap, $200,000 of which would be paid by Defendants pursuant to the cap on provider liability in Section 41-5-6(D). After a sua sponte evidentiary hearing on Defendants' motion, the district court denied Defendants' motion and ruled that the MMA's statutory cap is unconstitutional.

{¶4} Defendants' appeal challenging this ruling was the first appeal in this litigation. This Court certified the constitutional questions to our Supreme Court, see Rule 12-606 NMRA, which accepted certification, held that the $600,000 cap on aggregate nonmedical and nonpunitive damages is constitutional, and reversed the district court and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. See Siebert v. Okun, 2021-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 1-3, 56, 485 P.3d 1265.

{¶5} On remand, Plaintiff submitted a proposed order conforming the judgment to the $600,000 cap and calculating pre- and post-judgment interest on $1,535,916.35,^[3]instead of $2.6 million. The proposed form of order held Defendants exclusively liable for all of the interest on the entire judgment. Defendants objected, arguing that they are only personally liable for $200,000 plus the interest on that amount, and that "[t]he judgment should reflect the statutory allocation of liability as between Defendants and the [PCF]." The district court did not accept this argument. Instead, the court adopted Plaintiff's proposed order and calculated interest based on $1,535,916.35, awarding $411,120 in pre-judgment interest and $166,005.27 in post-judgment interest against Defendants. A dispute also arose about when post-judgment interest stopped accruing, and the district court resolved that dispute in favor of Plaintiff.

{¶6} Defendants appealed. After briefing by the parties was complete and the parties participated in oral argument, we invited the Superintendent of Insurance (SOI), as custodian of the PCF, see § 41-5-25(C) (2021), to submit a brief as amicus curiae. The SOI did so, and the parties responded with supplemental briefs.

DISCUSSION

I. Awards of Interest on Judgments Under the MMA

{¶7} Defendants' appeal presents two legal issues regarding the availability of interest on judgments under the MMA. The first issue we address is whether Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the full amount of the judgment-the entire $1,535,916.35 recoverable consistent with the $600,000 cap on nonmedical damages-or only on the amount recoverable against Defendants pursuant to the $200,000 cap on the personal liability of providers. See § 41-5-6(D). We hold that Plaintiff may recover interest on the full amount. We then turn to the second question of who is liable for the interest on the amount above the personal liability cap, holding that liability for interest is allocated between Defendants and the PCF in accordance with the MMA's allocation of liability for damages.

A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Interest on $1,535,916.35

{¶8} Plaintiff argues that pre- and post-judgment interest under Section 56-8-4 should be calculated based on the entire judgment and not on the capped amount for which a provider is personally liable under the MMA, and therefore the district court did not err in awarding her pre- and post-judgment interest on $1,535,916.35.^[4] We agree.

{¶9} The interpretation of the MMA and the interest statute "presents a question of law that we review de novo." Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. N.M. Tax'n & Revenue Dep't, 2020-NMCA-011, ¶ 6, 456 P.3d 1085. In order to give effect to the Legislature's intent, we look first to the plain language of the statutes. See Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2010-NMCA-108, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 92, 244 P.3d 787 ("Our courts have repeatedly observed that a statute's plain language is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent."). When the plain language "is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (text only) (citation omitted). Because multiple statutes are at play here, we seek to interpret them in a harmonious way. See Draper v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1994-NMSC-002, ¶ 4, 116 N.M. 775, 867 P.2d 1157.

{¶10} In this case, harmony occurs naturally because the statutes include nothing discordant on the question presented interest is available under the interest statute and under the MMA. The interest statute, Section 56-8-4, applies generally to awards of interest on judgments and decrees, and the statutory text neither excludes medical malpractice judgments nor imposes limitations on awards of interest under the MMA. Section 56-8-4(A) provides for post-judgment interest, stating that "[i]nterest shall be allowed on judgments and decrees for the payment of money from entry" and shall be calculated "at the rate of fifteen percent" when the judgment is for "tortious conduct." That is, the text of the statute makes post-judgment interest broadly available on judgments and decrees, and explicitly provides for a higher rate of interest in tort cases, see Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶¶ 73-79, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791, of which medical malpractice cases are one type. Section 56-8-4(B) allows for pre-judgment interest "of up to ten percent," at the discretion of the district court, "after considering, among other things: (1) if the plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of the plaintiff's claims; and (2) if the defendant had previously made a reasonable and timely offer of...