Sigler v. Black River Elec. Coop., Inc.

Tiffany Sigler, Plaintiff, v. Black River Electric Cooperative, Inc., Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 3:20-cv-02203-JMC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA COLUMBIA DIVISION

March 8, 2021

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Tiffany Sigler ("Plaintiff") brought this action against her former employer, Defendant Black River Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Black River"), claiming Defendant retaliated against her after taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and defamed her. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 7-8.) This matter is before the court upon review of Defendant's Objections (ECF No. 16) to the Report and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge ("Report") (ECF No. 15). The Report recommended that the court grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and deny Defendant's Motion to Strike. (Id. at 15.)

For the reasons set forth below, the court ACCEPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and adopts the findings herein (ECF No. 15), GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 7), DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for defamation¹ (see ECF No. 1-1 at 8), and ORDERS that Plaintiff is authorized to amend the Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order regarding her defamation claim.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff began working at Black River in 2007. (ECF No. 15 at 2.) Over a decade later on July 24, 2017, "Plaintiff was involved in a serious car accident, and, as a result, suffered head trauma, muscle tension, and neurological symptoms." (Id.) Upon advice from her physician, Plaintiff obtained the appropriate FMLA paperwork and submitted it to Black River in order to take time off from work. (Id.) Black River denied Plaintiff's request for FMLA leave twice, even though Plaintiff provided the necessary paperwork, and only approved such leave after speaking directly with Plaintiff's physician. (Id.)

On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff's direct supervisor Patricia Davis informed Plaintiff she needed to be at work the next day. (Id. at 3.) Yet upon Plaintiff's arrival the following morning, Davis sent Plaintiff home after seeing her condition. (Id.) Plaintiff ultimately returned to work in September 2017. (Id.) On September 19, 2017, within one week of her return, "she received a performance awareness write-up about an issue that allegedly occurred in February 2016, eighteen months prior, and shortly after Plaintiff began working in the Member Service Department." (Id.) Plaintiff insists that "[the September 2017] write-up was the first of several pretextual write-ups Plaintiff received after she returned from FMLA leave. Many of these write-ups and disciplinary actions were based on the training Plaintiff received from her supervisor, Davis, or were mistakes that Davis herself made." (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3.)

In April 2019, "Vice President of Finance[] Betty Welsh . . . sent Plaintiff a memorandum about an arrangement Plaintiff had made on a customer's account." (ECF No. 15 at 3.) Plaintiff subsequently met with Welsh

and explained she had been trained by Davis to make such arrangements, Davis made the same arrangements, and Plaintiff was able to produce a report supporting her explanation. Plaintiff expressed to Welsh that she felt as though she was being treated differently from her coworkers and that she had been experiencing this treatment since she returned from her FMLA leave. Plaintiff informed Welsh her coworkers advised her they had been informed by Davis not to talk to Plaintiff or ask her for help. A coworker told Plaintiff she was tasked to review Plaintiff's accounts for mistakes.

(Id. at 3-4 (internal citations omitted).) Relatedly, within this timeframe Plaintiff claims her "workload increased significantly, and she assisted more customers than any other employee. Davis also asked Plaintiff on numerous occasions to complete Davis's work when she was out of the office." (Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted).)

In October 2019, Plaintiff informed Human Resources Administrator Shavon White "that she was being mistreated in comparison to other employees. Plaintiff subsequently received a negative performance evaluation in October 2019. Plaintiff was notified that her employment was terminated effective December 30, 2019. A coworker informed Plaintiff that White had stated Plaintiff's termination was 'something in the works for two years.'" (Id. (internal citations omitted).)

Plaintiff brought the Complaint in May 2020, claiming retaliation under the FMLA and defamation against Defendant based on the above events. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6.) Defendant removed the case to federal court in June 2020 (ECF No. 1) and, shortly thereafter, filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and to Strike (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 10), to which Defendant replied (ECF No. 11).

The Magistrate Judge issued the Report in July 2020, suggesting the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part, and the Motion to Strike be denied. (ECF No. 15.) Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found the FMLA retaliation claim should survive because Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged

she engaged in protected activity by taking FMLA leave . . . and that, upon her return from FMLA leave, she was written up almost immediately and then again multiple times over the course of years, including a disciplinary action and poor performance evaluation, eventually leading to her termination, and that she was informed her termination had been "in the works" since she took FMLA leave.

(Id. at 5-6.) Next, the Magistrate Judge suggested dismissing Plaintiff's defamation claim because at least some of the underlying supportive allegations were not false or defamatory.³ (Id. at 9-10.) Further, the Magistrate Judge pointed out that other allegations "lack[ed] the necessary specificity to state a claim for defamation" and were "protected by a qualified privilege because they concern[ed] Plaintiff's job performance and were made in good faith and in the usual course of business." (Id. at 11 (citation and internal marks omitted).) Lastly, the Magistrate Judge declined to strike certain terms and narrow statements within the Complaint, as Defendant "fail[ed] to show that it has suffered any harm or prejudice, much less significant prejudice, from Plaintiff's allegations."⁴ (Id. at 15.)

In response to the Report, Defendant filed Objections contending that the Magistrate Judge erred by finding the FMLA retaliation claim should survive. (See ECF No. 16.) Defendant particularly takes issue with the purported causal connection between Plaintiff's protected activity and her firing, claiming "the Magistrate Judge has taken liberty with Plaintiff's factual allegations and inferred a causal connection where none exists[.]" (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff filed a Reply to these Objections (ECF No. 17), to which Defendant filed a Sur Reply (ECF No. 18).

II. JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FMLA claim via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the claim arises under a law of the United States, and also pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2), which providesthat an action under the FMLA may be maintained "against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction[.]" Id. Additionally, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim because it is "so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Id. The court reviews de novo only those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are filed. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). The court reviews those portions which are not specifically objected to only for clear error. Id. at 316. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The court is charged with making the final determination of the pending matter as the Magistrate Judge's recommendation carries no presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). As such, the court reviews de novo those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).Yet when no party offers timely, specific objections, the court "need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record . . . to acceptthe recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 72 advisory committee's note); see Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating the court is not required to explain the Report's adoption if no party offers specific objections).

B. Motion to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) ("A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses."). To be legally...