Silla v. Holdings Acquisition Co., L.P.

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REJEANA M. SILLA, Plaintiff, v. HOLDINGS ACQUISITION CO., L.P. d/b/a RIVERS CASINO, Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-00963

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

March 6, 2024

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak Chief United States District Judge

Before the Court are the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 73, 78). The Court held oral argument on those Motions, and they are ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is set out in full in the Court's prior Opinion (ECF No. 16). The parties are familiar with the factual background of this action, so the Court recites it only as necessary here.

Ms Rejeana M. Silla (“Silla”) brings this action pro se, raising various claims of discrimination harassment, and retaliation against Defendant Holdings Acquisition Co., L.P. d/b/a/ Rivers Casino pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). (ECF No. 7). Ms. Silla's Complaint additionally asserts a state law claim for breach of contract, alleging that Defendant breached a contract for employment created by its employee onboarding documents. (Id.).

Defendant previously moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, claiming that that Silla filed her original complaint after the expiration of the 90-day filing window that follows the issuance of a dismissal and right to sue (“RTS”) letter by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). (ECF Nos. 9, 10). The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, concluding that Silla's suit was filed after the 90-day EEOC right to sue window closed and that equitable tolling was inappropriate,^[1] but on appeal, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded. Because the expiration of the 90-day filing window was not apparent on the face of Silla's original Complaint, it held that it was error for the Court to dismiss Silla's claims on timeliness grounds, at least at the motion to dismiss stage. Silla v. Holdings Acquisition Co LP, No. 20-3556, 2021 WL 4206169, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2021).

On remand, and following discovery, both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 73, 78). Defendant reinstitutes its statute of limitations argument, alleging that, absent the motion to dismiss stage's deferential standard of review for affirmative defenses, Silla's ADA and Title VII claims were undisputedly filed outside the 90-day right to sue window. (ECF No. 74 at 13). On the merits, Defendant argues that Silla's allegations under the PHRA, ADA, and Title VII do not raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment and that there was no ongoing contractual relationship between Silla and Defendant. (Id. at 15, 19, 23).

Silla, in her Motion for Summary Judgment, argues that (1) Defendant used evaluation criteria that lacked any relationship to her performance; (2) Defendant's termination of Silla was not a reasonable exercise of its business judgment; (3) other employees of the same protected class were discriminated against by Defendant; and (4) Defendant intentionally discriminated against Silla with respect to her employment discrimination claim. (ECF No. 79 at 9, 11).^[2]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Motions for summary judgment, and responses in opposition to such motions, must be supposed by “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).

“A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence' of some disputed facts but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is a fact whose resolution will affect the outcome of the case under applicable law. Liberty Lobby., 477 U.S. at 248. The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1991). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the non-movant must present affirmative evidence-more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance-which supports each element of his claim to defeat a properly presented motion for summary judgment). Where the Court concludes that the record presented is inadequate or inconclusive, denial of a summary judgment motion is appropriate. Taylor v. Truman Med. Ctr., No. 03-cv-0001, 2006 WL 2796389, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2006).

While submissions from pro se plaintiffs are held to less stringent standards than submissions from lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), “on a motion for summary judgment, ‘a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of [her] obligation under Rule 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.'” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Ray v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 052507, 2007 WL 1377645, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2007)). “The party opposing summary judgment, whether pro se or counseled, must present evidence, through affidavits, depositions, or admissions on file, to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F.Supp.2d 481, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

1. Right to Sue Window

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), claims brought under Title VII must be filed within ninety days of a claimant's receipt of the EEOC RTS letter. Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009). The ADA incorporates by reference Title VII's requirement that a civil action must be filed within ninety days after the EEOC notifies the person aggrieved of a charge's dismissal. Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 108 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

This 90-day period is therefore applicable to the claims asserted under both Title VII and the ADA.

The beginning of that 90-day right to sue period is “generally considered to be the date on which the complainant receives the right-to-sue letter.” Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The institution of suit within ninety days is not treated as a jurisdictional requirement, but instead is treated as a claims processing rule. Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit has held that raising this issue is an affirmative defense and that the burden of proof “rests solely on the employer.” Ebbert., 319 F.3d at 108. And though the Third Circuit's Mandate from the appeal in this case made plain that operative standard at the motion to dismiss stage was whether the time bar was apparent on the face of the complaint, Silla, 2021 WL 4206169, at *1, at summary judgment, this deferential rule is not applicable. See Figueroa, 188 F.3d at 176 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment as to the issue of timeliness under Title VII).

Here, Defendant has again raised Silla's alleged lack of timeliness in filing this suit. Silla dual-filed an EEOC charge on February 25, 2020, raising claims under Title VII, ADA, and the PHRA. (ECF No. 10-1). The EEOC issued its right to sue letter to Silla dated March 20, 2020.^[3]Silla filed this suit on June 25, 2020. Even applying the presumption that Silla received her RTS letter on March 23, 2020, Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999), the filing of her Complaint in the instant action still falls outside of the mandatory 90-day filing window. Figueroa, 188 F.3d at 176 (“We have held that a claim filed even one day beyond this ninety-day window is untimely and may be dismissed absent an equitable reason for disregarding this statutory requirement.”) (citing Mosel v. Hills Dep't Store, Inc., 789 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1986)). It is not disputed that this action was instituted in this Court more than 90 days after Silla received the right to sue letter. Silla's claims under Title VII and the ADA are therefore untimely.

2. Equitable Tolling

In response to the timeliness reality that she does not dispute, Silla raises two arguments in support of equitable tolling of that filing period: (1) because the EEOC decision incorrectly applied the law and the facts, the 90-day right to sue window never began running; and (2) Silla refers to conversations she had with EEOC staffers informing her that the 90-day window can be tolled for “various different reasons.”

Neither argument carries the day; equitable tolling is not appropriate in this case.

Turning first to Silla's “application of the law and the facts” argument, her position boils down to this: an EEOC staffer wrote...