Silversmith v. Martin

BERNICE SILVERSMITH, on behalf of herself andHWEELDI SILVERSMITH, Plaintiffs, v. SHAWN MARTIN, ARTHUR M. CRUZ, CHRISTIAN ROMAN,AND UNKNOWN PERSONS 1-100, Defendants.

No. 1:20-CV-00566 WJ/GJF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

April 28, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based on Qualified Immunity, filed February 4, 2021 (Doc. 31) (the "Motion"). The Motion seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as probable cause existed for the arrest of Plaintiff 1 (defined herein). Additionally, the Motion asserts that Plaintiff 2 (defined herein) was not arrested and his affidavit should be stricken for lack of competence. Plaintiffs' response to the Motion contends that the stop itself was racially motivated in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Defendants had no probable cause to make an arrest as to both Plaintiffs and said arrests were in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Having considered the parties' arguments, the applicable law and the record, including the video footage of the sobriety testing and arrest, the Court finds that the Motion is well-taken and should be GRANTED.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

Plaintiffs in this case are Bernice Silversmith ("Plaintiff 1") and Hweeldi Silversmith ("Plaintiff 2") (together, "Plaintiffs"). Both Plaintiffs are enrolled members of the Navajo Nation. Doc. 1-8 at 2, ¶ 2. Plaintiff 1 is the adoptive mother of Plaintiff 2 and has cared for him since he was a child. Id., ¶ 4. Plaintiff 2 is approximately 33 years old and disabled.¹ Id., ¶ 3.

Defendants in this case are Shawn Martin, Arthur Cruz, and Christian Roman (collectively, "Defendants" or "Named Defendants"), as well as unnamed individuals who, through amendment of the Complaint, may be named as Defendants responsible for all or a portion of the alleged harm suffered by Plaintiff ("Unnamed Defendants"). Doc. 31 at 2-3, ¶¶ 5 & 6. Defendant Martin is a member of the Navajo Nation. Martin Affidavit, ¶ 3. Defendant Cruz is a member of the Acoma Pueblo tribe. Cruz Affidavit, ¶ 2. Defendant Roman's wife and children are members of the Navajo Nation. Roman Affidavit, ¶ 2. Another Officer on the scene but not named as a Defendant, Calvin Brown ("Officer Brown"), is a member of the Navajo Nation. Brown Affidavit, ¶ 1. At all times relevant to the Complaint in this case, Defendants were law enforcement officers employed by the New Mexico State Police ("NMSP"). Doc. 1-8 at 2, ¶ 5.

At approximately 2:20 a.m. on May 6, 2017, Plaintiff 1 was driving northbound on US Highway 491 in McKinley County with Plaintiff 2 as a passenger. Doc. 31 at 3, ¶ 2. Plaintiff 1 was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint where Defendants were stationed. Id., ¶ 3; Martin Affidavit, ¶ 5. Every driver was stopped at the checkpoint. Id., ¶ 5; Martin Affidavit, ¶ 7. Defendant Martin was the supervisor at the checkpoint. Id., ¶ 4; Martin Affidavit, ¶ 5.

After approaching the vehicle and observing Plaintiff 1, Defendant Cruz initiated a DWI investigation and requested that Plaintiff 1 undergo a series of standard sobriety tests. Id. at 4, ¶ 10-11; Cruz Affidavit, ¶ 13. Following the sobriety tests, Plaintiff 1 was detained and transported to the NMSP station, id., ¶ 13-14; Cruz Affidavit, ¶ 21, and Plaintiff 2 was escorted to a family member's home, Doc. 31 at 6, ¶ 32. On the way to the NMSP station, Plaintiff 1 "nod[ded] off" in the back of the police vehicle. Plaintiff 1 Affidavit, ¶ 9; Cruz Affidavit, ¶ 22.

At the NMSP station, Plaintiff 1 underwent two breathalyzer tests,² a Drug Recognition Evaluation ("DRE") and further sobriety testing—the "walk and turn, one legged stand, and finger to nose tests." Doc. 31 at 4, ¶ 14, 16, 20; Roman Affidavit, ¶ 4, 9. Results for both breathalyzer tests showed a 0.00% alcohol level. Id., ¶ 15; Cruz Affidavit, ¶ 23. Plaintiff 1 then signed a written consent form for a blood draw carried out at the hospital, and pending the results of such blood test, criminal charges were filed. Id. at 5, ¶ 22-23; Roman Affidavit, ¶ 15-16. The blood test results eventually showed no alcohol or detectable drug content, and the charges were dismissed on August 21, 2017. Id., ¶ 23; Roman Affidavit, ¶ 16.

DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

Defendant Cruz alleges that he smelled an alcoholic odor coming from Plaintiff 1 at the traffic stop, and observed that she had "blood-shot watery eyes and she was somewhat incoherent." Cruz Affidavit, ¶ 11. Defendant Cruz asked Plaintiff 1 to undergo a field sobriety test, the results of which caused Defendant Cruz to "form[] a reasonable belief that [Plaintiff 1] failed the field sobriety test and could not safely operate a motor vehicle."³ Id., ¶ 20.

In the police station, Defendant Roman also smelled an odor of alcohol on Plaintiff 1 and observed "bloodshot and watery eyes." Roman Affidavit, ¶ 6. Following another sobriety test, Defendant Roman "had reasonable suspicion that [Plaintiff 1] was under the influence of depressants and was unable to operate a vehicle." Id., ¶ 13. Plaintiff 1 told Defendant Roman that she "did not have any physical impairments, but she took medications for diabetes, allergies, pain pills, and supplements." Id., ¶ 8.

Plaintiff 1 believes that Defendants Cruz and Roman could not have smelled alcohol because, she claims, "I do not drink alcohol and I don't smoke. I don't believe in drinking." Plaintiff 1 Affidavit, ¶ 1. Plaintiff 1 claims instead that she consumed one and a half cans of Red Bull.⁴ Id., ¶ 2. Further, Plaintiff 1 contends that she had "allergies," but "didn't have droopy eyes, bloodshot or watery eyes." Id., ¶ 5. Plaintiff 1 also disagrees that Defendants Cruz and Roman formed a reasonable belief that she failed the sobriety tests, and claims, "I had on heels and was standing on gravel and I didn't stagger and lose my balance." Id., ¶ 7.

Officer Brown was present at the checkpoint and claims to have recognized that Plaintiff 2 was disabled. Brown Affidavit, ¶ 9. Officer Brown also claims to have transported Plaintiff 2 to his aunt's home in Window Rock, Arizona following the detention of Plaintiff 1. Id., ¶ 11, 22; see also Martin Affidavit, ¶ 11. Plaintiff 2 contends that Defendant Martin, not Officer Brown, drove him home from the checkpoint, Plaintiff 2 Affidavit, ¶ 3, and that he was breathalyzed, restrained with handcuffs, hit his head and sustained an injury on his leg when "pushed" into the "van" while his mother was being put into the police cruiser, id., ¶¶ 4-5; Doc. 1-8 at 4, ¶ 13. Plaintiff 2 further alleges that Defendant Martin "told me that I would never see my mom again," claimed to be a"Peyote member," and made other comments which made Plaintiff 2 cry while in the vehicle. Id., ¶ 6-7. Finally, Plaintiff 2 alleges that he was delivered to his step-sister's house, not his aunt's. Id., ¶ 10.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bridges v. Yeager, 352 Fed. Appx. 255, 257 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (internal quotations omitted); see Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582 (1998). "[P]laintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added). "To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff in a §1983 suit challenging alleged racial discrimination in traffic stops and arrests must present evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the law enforcement officials involved were motivated by a discriminatory purpose and their actions had a discriminatory effect." Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).

II. Qualified Immunity

"When [a] defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity ... the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that: (1) the officer's actions violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue."⁵ Amundsen v.Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000)) (This special standard for qualified immunity is "based on the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). A plaintiff's failure to meet either burden entitles the defendant to qualified immunity and a grant of summary judgment; however, if a plaintiff does meet this burden, then the defendant must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact under a summary judgment analysis. Id. at 1198.

"As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986). Qualified immunity recognizes the "need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interests in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). The Harlow standard is specifically designed to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment," Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. Qualified Immunity, when applicable, includes "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

III. Probable Cause

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