Simmons v. Commonwealth

ARCHIE LAVANCE SIMMONS

v.COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 2434-09-2

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Date: OCTOBER 26, 2010

Present: Judges Frank, Beales and Powell Argued at Richmond, Virginia

MEMORANDUM OPINION^* BY JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

Catherine S. Rusz (Johnson, Gaborik, Fisher-Rizk and Rusz, PLC, on brief), for appellant.

Richard B. Smith, Special Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Richard D. Taylor, Jr., Judge

Archie Lavance Simmons, appellant, appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, second or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because police seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements because the Commonwealth failed to show that his statements were made after a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda¹ rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Under well established principles of appellate review, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below. Banks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 543, 586 S.E.2d 876, 877 (2003).

So viewed, the evidence proved that at approximately 7:20 p.m. on April 1, 2008, Richmond City police officers Stuart Hannah and Michael Kirby were patrolling the area around Mosby Court. This is a high-crime area and a Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) property. Officer Hannah recognized appellant from previous encounters with him and knew that he did not live in Mosby Court. Mosby Court had "no trespassing" signs posted. When the officers first had contact with appellant, he was walking along R Street. R Street is a public thoroughfare.

Officer Hannah pulled his marked police vehicle closer to question appellant about a trespass. Appellant walked quickly away from the officers while clutching his waistband. Officer Kirby got out of the car and approached appellant to ask him what he was doing in the area.

Appellant began quickly walking away towards Mosby Court property, while still clutching his waistband. Because Hannah knew that appellant did not live in the Mosby Court area, he suspected that appellant was trespassing. Although Hannah knew that appellant had been previously arrested, he did not know if appellant was barred from Mosby Court. Hannah and Kirby believed, based on their training and experience, that appellant's actions walking away quickly and holding his hand to his waistband--were consistent with someone trying to conceal a firearm.

While Kirby attempted to talk to appellant, Hannah drove the police car to a convenience store parking lot and observed appellant cutting through Mosby Court. When Hannah got out of his car, appellant changed directions, but did not increase his pace. Appellant saw Officer Hannah and began to run away from him, keeping his right hand at his waistband and shieldinghis body away from the officers. Officer Hannah told appellant to stop because he was investigating a trespassing, but appellant continued running until Officer Kirby caught him.

When Officer Kirby grabbed appellant, appellant's jacket slipped off his body, and a green plastic container fell from the jacket to the ground. This container contained six individually wrapped "hits" of heroin. The officers eventually pinned appellant to the ground. Appellant would not remove his right hand from under his body, requiring the officers to force his hand behind his back in order to put him in handcuffs.

While on the ground and in handcuffs, appellant complained of injury to his back. An ambulance and emergency personnel arrived to assist appellant. Appellant hit one of the emergency personnel while the officers were adjusting his handcuffs. When the emergency workers rolled appellant onto a backboard, a gun was on the ground under where appellant's right arm had been.

Officer Kirby read appellant his Miranda warnings at the hospital, before appellant received treatment. The Miranda warnings were entirely verbal; appellant did not sign a waiver, nor did he sign the notepad on which Kirby recorded his notes. Appellant stated he understood his rights and then made several incriminating statements.

At the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, Officers Hannah and Kirby testified that they believed RRHA policy prohibited entering into Mosby Court without the permission of a leaseholder, but admitted that they had not confirmed this belief. Appellant admitted that he entered onto Mosby Court property.

ANALYSIS

Motion to Suppress Evidence Appellant first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, alleging that police seized him without reasonable articulable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

"In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence claiming a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. The burden is on the defendant to show that the trial court committed reversible error. We are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless those findings are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. We will review the trial court's application of the law de novo.''" Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 300, 306-07, 683 S.E.2d 299, 301 (2009) (quoting Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69, 655 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2008)).

Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 273-74, 687 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (2010).

Police officers may stop a person to investigate possible criminal behavior even if there is no probable cause for an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). A police officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 30. An officer must be able to articulate more than an unparticularized suspicion or "hunch" that criminal activity is afoot in order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000).

It is well-settled law that whether reasonable suspicion '"exists to warrant an investigatory stop is determined by the totality of the circumstances.'" Gregory v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 100, 107, 468 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1996) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100, 1103, 407 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1991)). These circumstances may include "an obvious attempt to avoid officers," Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 S.E.2d 79, 87 (1987), the "defendant's presence in a high crime area," Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 232, 235 n.1, 421 S.E.2d 911, 912 n.1 (1992), and any "furtive movements and suspicious conduct" of the accused, Purdie v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 178, 186, 549 S.E.2d 33, 37 (2001).

A person is "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes if, under the circumstances, "a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave the scene of an encounter with the police." McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001). In this case, appellant was seized when Officer Kirby grabbed him. Before that physical contact, appellant had disregarded the officers' requests for him to stop and talk to them, so he had not been seized. "A seizure does not occur in the absence of physical force used by a law enforcement officer or a defendant's submission to an officer's assertion of authority."Id at 491, 545 S.E.2d at 546. See also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); Washington v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 5, 10-11, 509 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1999).

The police attempted a consensual encounter with appellant. When they seized appellant, they had reasonable suspicion to do so. Appellant contends this case is analogous to Jones v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 171, 179, 670 S.E.2d 31, 36 (2008), which held that "mere presence in a 'high-crime area' is insufficient as a matter of law to provide reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop." While there are some factual similarities, this case is easily distinguishable. Officers in Jones did not recognize the defendant and had no articulable reason to suspect criminal activity.

It should be noted that our analysis is not limited to trespassing, but is based on the totality of the circumstances. We do not require the officer to suspect a specific crime; rather, "he must have 'a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the [person] is involved in criminal activity.'" Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). To determine whether the "officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped may be involved in criminal activity, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances." Id at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 722-23 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

In the instant case, by the time officers seized appellant, they recognized him from previous encounters; he was on private, RRHA property, which officers identified as a high-crime area, see Bandy v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 510, 518, 664 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2008); he had made furtive gestures, see Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 209, 216, _ S.E.2d_, _(2009); grabbing his waistband and concealing his body from police, see Langston v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 276, 284, 504 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1998); and he had run from police, see Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276, 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010). This is not "mere presence," a...