Simmons v. Ford Motor Co.

576 F.Supp.3d 1136

Clarence SIMMONS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

CASE NO. 18-CV-81558-RAR

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed December 22, 2021

Gelber Schachter, Greenberg, P.A.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant's Omnibus Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions [ECF No. 114] ("Motion"). The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion, Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition [ECF No. 128]; Defendant's Reply in Support [ECF No. 142]; and other relevant portions of the record. For the reasons set forth below, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Omnibus Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinions [ECF No. 114] is DENIED .

BACKGROUND

This is a Class Action suit brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and similarly situated members of a purported Nationwide Class and multiple State Classes against Ford Motor Company alleging design defects of Ford Mustang-, Expedition-, and Explorer-branded vehicles. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint [ECF No. 70] ("Compl.") at 1– 2. The alleged defect causes "the Class Vehicles’ aluminum panels to corrode and the exterior paint on the aluminum body parts to bubble, flake, peel, rust and/or blister." Id. at 2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is presently before the Court. See generally [ECF No. 151]. In support of their Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs offer three expert witnesses: Erik Anderson (design defect), Edward Stockton (damages), and Kirk Kleckner (warranty valuation). Mot. at 1. Defendant filed the instant Motion requesting that this Court strike all three of Plaintiffs’ class certification experts pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 410, 402, and 702, as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "controls the admission of expert testimony." United States v. Frazier , 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc ). When expert testimony is introduced under Rule 702, "the party offering the expert testimony bears the burden of laying the proper foundation, and that party must demonstrate admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence." City of S. Miami v. Desantis , No. 19-22927, 2020 WL 7074644, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2020) (citing Rink v. Cheminova, Inc. , 400 F.3d 1286, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2005) ). "The presumption is that expert testimony is admissible, so that once a proponent has made the requisite threshold showing, further disputes go to weight, not admissibility." Id. (quoting Little v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 249 F. Supp. 3d 394, 408 (D.D.C. 2017) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule." Moore v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc. , 995 F.3d 839, 850 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee's Note to 2000 Amendments).

As the Supreme Court explained in Daubert , the purpose of the expert admissibility rules is for district courts to serve as "gatekeepers to ensure that speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury." Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc. , 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Daubert , 509 U.S. at 597 n.13, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this role must be properly balanced with a parties’ right to a jury trial where "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert , 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

In the Eleventh Circuit, the admissibility inquiry has been distilled down to three factors, which require the district court to consider whether:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address;

(2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and

(3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. , 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998). These factors are referred to as qualification, reliability, and helpfulness. Frazier , 387 F.3d at 1260. While "there is inevitably some overlap among the basic requirements—qualification, reliability, and helpfulness—they remain distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them." Id.

With respect to qualification, an expert may be qualified based on "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." J.G. v. Carnival Corp. , No. 12-21089, 2013 WL 752697, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2013) (citing Furmanite Am., Inc. v. T.D. Williamson , 506 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129 (M.D. Fla. 2007) ). "An expert is not necessarily unqualified simply because [his] experience does not precisely match the matter at hand." Id. (citing Maiz v. Virani , 253 F.3d 641, 665 (11th Cir. 2001) ). "[S]o long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert's expertise go to credibility and weight, not admissibility." Clena Invs., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co. , 280 F.R.D. 653, 661 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc. , No. 8-10052, 2009 WL 2058384, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2009) ). "After the district court undertakes a review of all of the relevant issues and of an expert's qualifications, the determination regarding qualification to testify rests within the district court's discretion." Carnival Corp. , 2013 WL 752697, at *3 (citing Berdeaux v. Gamble Alden Life Ins. Co. , 528 F.2d 987, 990 (5th Cir. 1976) ).

The reliability inquiry requires the court to determine "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Frazier , 387 F.3d at 1261–62 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, to make this determination, the district court examines: "(1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community." Id. (citing Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois, UK Ltd. , 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003) ). The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that alternative questions may be more probative in the context of determining reliability as these factors are not dispositive. See id. Accordingly, trial judges are afforded "considerable leeway" when assessing reliability. Id. at 1258 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) ).

For example, in design defect cases where "a proposed expert's opinion relies principally upon his experience and knowledge, the Court must satisfy itself that the witness has appropriately explained how his experience leads to the conclusion he reached, why that experience provides a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts." Clena Invs., Inc. , 280 F.R.D. at 663 (citing United States v. Brown , 415 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2005) ). Accordingly, "design experts, like experience-based experts generally, are not necessarily required to ‘test’ their opinions." Anderson v. FCA U.S., LLC , No. 16-558, 2019 WL 826479, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2019) (citing Clena Invs., Inc. , 280 F.R.D. at 663 ); see also Pineda v. Ford Motor Co. , 520 F.3d 237, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Pineda proffered Clauser as an engineering expert who understood the stresses and forces that might cause glass to fail. Clauser's specialized, rather than generalized, experience in this area allowed him to recognize that exerting a force on one area of the rear liftgate glass before exerting a force on another area of the glass could lead to its shattering. Clauser did not have to develop or test alternative warnings to render an opinion ...."); Schenone v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc. , No. 12-1046-J-39MCR, 2014 WL 9879924, at *5–8 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2014) ("In some cases, the expert's experience in conjunction with knowledge, skill, training or education alone may provide a sufficient basis to the reliability of the expert's opinion."). While testing is generally not required in design defect cases, "an expert's unexplained assurance that [his] opinions rest on accepted principles" is not enough. Furmanite Am., Inc. , 506 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (citing McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. , 401 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) ) (emphasis added).

The final element—helpfulness—considers whether the expert testimony applies to "matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person." Edwards v. Shanley , 580 F. App'x 816, 823 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Frazier , 387 F.3d at 1262 ). "Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments." Frazier , 387 F.3d at 1262–63. This prong requires trial courts to "exclude expert testimony that is ‘imprecise and unspecific,’ or [when the] factual basis is not adequately explained." Id. (quoting Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., Fla. , 402 F.3d 1092, 1111 (11th Cir. 2005) ). To be helpful, a nexus must exist between the offered opinion and the facts of the case. McDowell v. Brown , 392 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Daubert , 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ). For example, testimony is not helpful "where a large analytical leap must be made between the facts and the opinion." Id. ...