Simmons v. Gomez

1

Donell Simmons, (R12863), Petitioner, v. David Gomez,^[1] Respondent.

No. 21 C 3032

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 28, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LASHONDA A. HUNT, United States District Judge

Petitioner Donell Simmons, a state prisoner convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, brings this pro se habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. He argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress. (Dkt. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the petition is denied, and the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are drawn from the state court record (Dkt 33) and the state appellate court opinion (Dkt. 33-1) and are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). On June 4, 2003, Randy “Kato” Rangel, Jr. was shot and killed, and Harrison Hall and Estaban Claz were injured by gunfire in a barber shop. (State Ct. R., Ex. S, Pt. 1B at 76 Dkt. 33-20). In response to an investigative alert indicating that Petitioner was suspected of killing Rangel, Detective Keith Allen and ten other members of a tactical gang unit in the Chicago Police Department (CPD) proceeded to a residence to arrest Petitioner. People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 4. After being taken into custody, Petitioner signed a handwritten statement confessing to Rangel's shooting. Id. at ¶ 19. He was subsequently charged with first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm along with three codefendants: Labar “Bro-Man” Spann, Martise “Shorty” Nunnery, and Marcus “Black” Ware (also known as John Coleman). Id. at ¶ 2.

A. Trial court proceedings

Petitioner moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest, contending the police lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant. (State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt. 1A at 5-7, Dkt. 33-19). During the suppression hearing, the State presented testimony from Sergeant Charles Daly, a CPD detective working in “Area 4 violent crime homicide” who was investigating the June 4 shootings. (State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt. 1B at 75-76, Dkt. 33-20). Sgt. Daly testified as follows in support of probable cause for Petitioner's arrest.

Sgt. Daly learned from CPD officers that a man named “Rio,” who was facing unrelated charges, was cooperating with them. (Id. at 76; State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt 1C at 14-15, Dkt. 33-21). While wearing a wire, Rio had recorded a conversation with Nunnery, Petitioner's co-defendant, that seemingly discussed Petitioner and Nunnery's involvement in Rangel's death. (State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt. 1B at 76-81, Dkt. 33-20). Sgt. Daly listened to that recording, read the transcript of that recording, and then spoke with Rio a few days later. (Id. at 76-79). During their discussion, Rio confirmed his belief that Nunnery told him Petitioner shot Rangel. (Id. at 79-81); People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 5.

On November 13, 2003, Sgt. Daly contacted Spann, Petitioner's co-defendant, who had been arrested on unrelated charges. (State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt 1C at 3-4, Dkt. 33-21). Spann told Sgt. Daly that he, Petitioner, and Nunnery drove to the barber shop after Nunnery received a phone call. (Id. at 5). Spann relayed that Nunnery handed Petitioner a .45 caliber handgun, Petitioner exited the vehicle, they heard gunshots, and Spann fled the area. (Id.). Spann said Petitioner later told him that Petitioner had killed Rangel. (Id.).

Nunnery, Petitioner's co-defendant, was arrested on November 14, 2003, and provided a videotaped statement about Rangel's death to a CPD detective and an assistant state's attorney. (Id. at 7-8). According to Nunnery, he, Spann, and Petitioner went to the barber shop after Nunnery received a call from Ware stating that Rangel was inside the barber shop. (Id. at 8). Nunnery handed Petitioner his .45 caliber handgun, Petitioner entered the barber shop, and Nunnery heard gunshots. (Id.). Nunnery said Petitioner later told him that Petitioner had killed Rangel. (Id. at 9).

Ware, Petitioner's remaining co-defendant, was also arrested on November 14, 2003, and provided a videotaped statement regarding the shooting. (Id. at 10). Ware stated that he called Nunnery to inform him of Rangel's location, and Nunnery later told Ware that “they” killed Rangel. (Id. at 11).

Finally, Sgt. Daly testified that Darren McCline was arrested on November 19, 2003, and provided a handwritten statement about Rangel's death. (Id. at 11-12). McCline said Petitioner told him that Petitioner killed Rangel because Petitioner was hired to do so. (Id. at 12).

Detective Allen, one of the members of the tactical gang unit who arrested Petitioner on November 22, also testified at the suppression hearing. (State Ct. R., Ex. S, Pt. 1B at 67-73, Dkt. 33-20). Detective Allen confirmed that he and the arresting officers, who were in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles, acted pursuant to an investigative alert, did not have a search or arrest warrant for Petitioner, and saw Petitioner in handcuffs, not violating any laws, when they entered the residence. (Id. at 69-71). Furthermore, that investigative alert listed Detective William Ruck in Area 4 as the contact person. (State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt. 4 at 126, Dkt. 33-24).

The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress, finding “more than sufficient, almost overwhelming probable cause” to arrest Petitioner. (State Ct. R., Ex. S Pt 2 at 10-11, Dkt. 33-22). Petitioner's confession was thus admitted at trial. After a severed bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to 47 years and 6 years, respectively, to be served consecutively. People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 2, 19, 21.

B. Direct appeal

Petitioner appealed, arguing that his jury waiver was invalid, but the appellate court affirmed. Id. at ¶ 22. Petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court. (State Ct. R., Ex. J, I, Dkts. 33-10, 33-9). Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. (State Ct. R., Ex. U, Dkt. 33-27).

C. Post-conviction proceedings

Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the circuit court dismissed, and he appealed. People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 23. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his section 2-1401 petition, which was denied and he subsequently appealed. Id. Both appeals were dismissed by the appellate court. Id. Petitioner then filed a postconviction petition in the circuit court, which the state moved to dismiss pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Id. at ¶ 1. The circuit court granted the State's motion, finding, among other things, that Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim regarding probable cause was meritless. Id. at ¶ 31.

Petitioner appealed, arguing that “he made a substantial showing that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present an eyewitness, and his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress.” Id. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for an evidentiary hearing only on the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present an eyewitness. Id. at ¶ 65. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court on probable cause for the arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 57-65. Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal, which the Illinois Supreme Court denied. (State Ct. R., Ex. O, Dkt. 33-15).

D. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings

Petitioner filed the instant petition on June 7, 2021 (Dkt. 1), which was originally dismissed without prejudice to reinstating the case within the statute of limitations and after exhausting postconviction remedies in state court (Dkt. 12). The petition was reinstated on August 15, 2022 (Dkt. 18), at which time Petitioner was given an opportunity to assert all claims he intended to bring. Petitioner stood on his original claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to appeal the denied suppression motion (Dkt. 23). This matter is fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits in state court, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Unreasonable application of clearly established law occurs if a state court identifies the correct legal rule, yet applies it in an objectively unreasonable manner,” which “requires that the state court do more than just get it wrong.” Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). On the contrary, to demonstrate an unreasonable application of clearly established law, a petitioner “must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

Section 2254(d) is “designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Id. As a result, state court decisions adjudicating the...