Simon v. Bickell

737 F.Supp.2d 10

Charles SIMON, Plaintiff,

v.Danny BICKELL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09-01983 (HHK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Sept. 14, 2010.

Charles Simon, Bronx, NY, pro se.

Christian Alexander Natiello, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HENRY H. KENNEDY, JR., District Judge.

Charles Simon, proceeding pro se, brings this action against United States Supreme Court clerks Jeffrey Atkins and Danny Bickell; Assistant United States Attorney Wynne P. Kelly and three John Doe attorneys in their official capacities; ¹ Federal Prison Industries, Inc. ("FPI"); and Steve Shwalb, in his official capacity as Chief Operating Officer of FPI (collectively "defendants"). Simon's allegations relate to the compensation awarded to him as a result of a work-related injury he suffered while in prison.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Simon's Complaint [# 11] and Simon's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against the defendants and their attorney, Assistant U.S. Attorney Christian A. Natiello [# 16]. Upon consideration of the motions, the oppositions thereto, and the record of this case, the Court concludes that defendants' motion must be granted and Simon's motion must be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Simon's allegations stem from an injury he suffered in 1987, while a prisoner at a correctional facility in Oxford, Wisconsin.² As compensation for his injury, Simon was awarded $73.67 per month. Over the last two decades, Simon filed numerous suits in various districts, including the District of Columbia, challenging the amount awarded to him under the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 et seq., the validity of the statutes and regulations governing the calculation of the award, and related motions. See, e.g., Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 238 Fed.Appx. 623 (D.C.Cir.2007); Simon v. Robinson, 219 Fed.Appx. 137 (3d Cir.2007); Simon v. Robinson, 196 Fed.Appx. 54 (3d Cir.2006); Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 91 Fed.Appx. 161 (1st Cir.2004); Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 159 F.3d 637 (unpublished table decision) (D.C.Cir. May 13, 1998); Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 1997 WL 811741 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 23, 1997); Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 2009 WL 2618349 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009); Simon v. Federal Prison Industries, 2006 WL 462671 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2006).³ In this case, Simon once more asserts claims arising from his injury and subsequent compensation award.

A. Simon's Original and Amended Complaint

Simon has filed both a Complaint [# 1] and an "Amended Complaint Rule 15 F.R.C.P. In Support of Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction Pursuant First Amendment Deprivation" [# 4]. These complaints are not consistent, and the amended complaint contains new claims and allegations and omits claims and allegations contained in the original Complaint. Under normal circumstances, the Court would consider only the claimspresented in the amended complaint. See Anderson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 218 F.R.D. 307, 311 (D.D.C.2003) (noting that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and thus becomes the operative complaint in the litigation). Because Simon is a pro se plaintiff, however, the Court will afford him leeway and consider the claims presented in both complaints. See Atherton v. Dist. of Columbia Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.Cir.2009) ("A pro se complaint ... 'must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' " (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007))).

Together, Simon's complaints present a great number of allegations. These allegations can be divided into three categories: claims relating to Simon's inmate compensation award and the validity of the inmate compensation system; claims relating to individuals in the judicial system and their treatment of Simon's previous lawsuits; and a request for a preliminary injunction.

In the first category of claims, Simon appears to allege violations of his civil rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and to make claims regarding an alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 28 C.F.R. § 301.314 et seq. , and the Prison Industries Fund, 18 U.S.C. § 4126. The complaints do not indicate which claims apply to which defendants.

Second, Simon makes specific allegations against various individuals in the judicial system who have handled his cases in the past. He sues Supreme Court clerks Atkins and Bickell for their refusal to submit Simon's application for injunctive relief to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 22 and demands one million dollars in damages from each clerk under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Compl. ¶ 8. He appears to request the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on Assistant United States Attorney Kelly and three John Doe attorneys for their use of Rule 12(b)(6) motions, ⁴ and requests five million dollars in damages from each of these attorneys under Bivens. Id. ¶ 9.⁵

Lastly, Simon appears to request the issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring the recalculation of his compensation award and judicial review by Justice Ginsburg under Supreme Court Rule 22. Am. Compl. ¶ 11.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Bar Many of the Claims in Simon's Complaints.

Defendants argue that Simon claims regarding his inmate compensation award are barred by claim preclusion principles and thus are subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants point out that Simon either has raised or could have raised these claims in his prior lawsuits. The defendants' position has merit.

1. Res Judicata Bars Simon's Claims Against FPI and Shwalb.

The doctrine of res judicata holds that "a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving identical parties ... based on the same cause of action." Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.2004). Res judicata prevents the relitigation of both issues raised in the original action and issues that could have been raised there. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1033-34 (D.C.Cir.2001). In short, the doctrine embodies the principle "that a party who once has had a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal usually ought not to have another chance to do so." SBC Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 407 F.3d 1223, 1229 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 6 (1982)) (emphasis in original).

In this case, res judicata prevents Simon from litigating his claims against FPI and Schwalb, parties that Simon has sued many times in the past asserting causes of action related to his inmate accident compensation award. See Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27268, at *2-3 (D.Mass. July 15, 2003) (noting that "this filing constitutes at least the seventh attempt by [Simon] to bring claims against FPI" and the fifth attempt to bring claims against Schwalb). In this district alone, Simon has filed several lawsuits against FPI and Schwalb related to his November 1987 injury and subsequent compensation award. See Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 2009 WL 2618349 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (summarizing previous cases in this district and dismissing Simon's complaint against FPI and Schwalb as "plainly barred by the doctrine of res judicata"); see also Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 159 F.3d 637 (unpublished table decision) (D.C.Cir. May 13, 1998) (affirming district court's judgment and holding that Simon's compensation award under the Inmate Accident Compensation Act was properly calculated and Simon's challenge to the validity of the inmate compensation system was meritless). All of these cases are based on the same nucleus of facts relating to his inmate compensation award and contain claims that arise out of his objections to that award and the inmate compensation system. Consequently, Simon's claims here against FPI and Schwalb are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, including any new claims he makes involving the award and the inmate compensation system.

Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to all claims against FPI and Schwalb.

2. Collateral Estoppel Prevents Simon From Litigating the Appropriate Calculation of His Compensation Award Against the Other Named Defendants.

Under the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may precluderelitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case." McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. 411. Here, collateral estoppel bars Simon from further litigating the issue of the calculation of his inmate accident compensation award with any defendant. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1982) (stating that "[a] party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party ... is also precluded from doing so with another person" except under certain circumstances not applicable here). As cited above, courts have already determined that Simon's inmate accident compensation award was calculated appropriately. See e.g., Simon v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 159 F.3d 637 (unpublished table decision) (D.C.Cir. May 13, 1998) (affirming district court's merits-based judgment). Thus, to the extent that Simon continues to challenge his inmate accident compensation or the validity of the inmate compensation system, his claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Simon cannot continue to waste judicial resources with "repeated litigation of...