Simonis v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co.

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JOHN SIMONIS, Plaintiff, v. KRAFT HEINZ FOODS COMPANY, LLC, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-00009-SEP

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

March 3, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARAH E. PITLYK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Kraft Heinz Foods Company LLC's motion to dismiss Count Two of the complaint. Doc. [11]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

Facts and Background^[1]

This employment discrimination case arises out of events leading up to Plaintiff's 2021 termination from his job at Defendant's meat processing plant in Kirksville Missouri, where he had been employed as an operator technician since 2017. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 2, 12, 55-56. Plaintiff maintains that he started his employment in good health but was diagnosed with coronary artery disease in 2018 after he experienced a heart attack. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Plaintiff states that his heart condition required multiple surgeries, interferes with his ability to lift, breath, walk, run, see, and bend, and prevents him from spending more than two hours in the freezing temperatures of the meat lockers, working near magnets in the plant's mix room, or climbing the scraper in the mix room. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 in November of 2020, which worsened his heart condition and caused him to miss work. Id. ¶¶ 28-34. When he returned to work, he learned that his fellow employees had been discussing his health and speculating about whether he would survive his infection. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered an adverse reaction to the COVID-19 vaccine that harmed his vision. Id. ¶¶ 42-46.

On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff underwent surgery on his eye due to the vision impairment caused by the COVID-19 vaccine. Id. ¶ 47. He scheduled a follow-up doctor's appointment on February 17, 2021, and notified his supervisor, Brandon Douglas, that he would not be available to work that day. Id. ¶¶ 47-49. Plaintiff alleges that on February 13th he noticed that he was scheduled to work on February 17th, and he reminded Mr Douglas of his appointment. Id. ¶ 50-51. Plaintiff alleges that later that day, another supervisor Troy Smith, told Plaintiff that Mr. Douglas wanted to speak with him in his office. Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiff responded that he planned to speak to the plant manager, Stephen Davis, about being scheduled to work overtime on a day he had requested off to seek medical care. Id. ¶ 54. Less than an hour later, Mr. Douglas approached Plaintiff, asked for his badge, and walked him out of the plant for insubordination. Id. ¶ 55. Five days later, on February 20, 2021, Chuck Nicholson from Defendant's human resources office called Plaintiff to notify him that his employment was terminated. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant later changed the reason for his termination from insubordination to poor performance and workplace violence. Id. ¶ 59.

On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed this three-count action, alleging disability discrimination and harassment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq., in Count One, retaliation in violation of the ADA in Count Two, and disability discrimination and harassment in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010-137, in Count Three.

Defendant now moves to dismiss Count Two for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that Plaintiff did not assert an ADA retaliation claim in his charge of discrimination to the EEOC, and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), courts shall not dismiss any complaint that states a facially plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint is plausible on its face when the pleaded facts allow the Court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable. Id. at 678. The Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008)). The Court must accept the facts alleged as true, “even if doubtful.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Discussion

The ADA makes it unlawful to discriminate against a “qualified individual with a disability” because of the disability. Bahl v.Cnty. of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 83 (8th Cir. 2012). The ADA also contains an anti-retaliation provision that prohibits discrimination “against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two events.” Lors v. Dean, 746 F.3d 857, 867 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Green v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 914 (8th Cir. 2006)). Under the ADA, a retaliation claim “requires a but-for causal connection between the employee's assertion of [his] ADA rights and an adverse action by the employer.” Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)). “In . . . retaliation claims, a temporal connection between an event and an adverse employment action can serve as evidence supporting a prima facie [ ] showing of causation.” Myers v. Hog Slat., Inc., 55 F.Supp.3d 1145, 1158 (N.D. Iowa 2014). “[T]iming alone is not adequate to establish causation unless the timing is ‘very close,' usually meaning less than one month.” Id. (quoting Lors v. Dean, 746 F.3d 857, 865-66 (8th Cir. 2014).

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff did not administratively exhaust the claim. Before filing a lawsuit alleging retaliation in violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC and receiving a right-to-sue letter. Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of ADA retaliation claim where the plaintiff did not assert retaliation claim or check the retaliation box in his EEOC charge); Ware v. Lumiere Place Casino, 2019 WL 6716371, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2019) (dismissing retaliation claim where plaintiff did not assert retaliation claim or check the retaliation box in his EEOC charge). The exhaustion requirement ensures that the EEOC gets the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices, Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996), and puts the charged party on notice of the claims at issue, Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1994). See also Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998) (To “[a]llow[] a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge.”) (quoting Williams, 21 F.3d 218, 223 (8th Cir.1994)). Because of its notice function, the completion of the EEOC process constitutes exhaustion only as to allegations that are “‘like or reasonably related to the substance of the charges'” submitted to the EEOC. Lindeman v. Saint Luke's Hosp. of Kansas City, 899 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Williams, 21 F.3d at 222).

It is not necessary “that subsequently-filed lawsuits mirror the administrative charges” precisely. Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 F.3d 661, 674 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004). Courts should “construe administrative charges liberally, [but they] will not invent, ex nihilo, a claim that was not made before the relevant agency.” Weatherly v. Ford Motor Co., 994 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2021). The Eighth Circuit has made clear that retaliation claims, in particular, are not considered to be reasonably related to underlying discrimination claims and thus must be independently exhausted. Sellers v. Deere & Co., 791 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2015); see also Wedow, 442 F.3d at 672 (“We have long treated discrimination and retaliation claims as distinct for exhaustion purposes, so that exhausting one does not usually exhaust the other.”). Nevertheless, sometimes a claim is “so like or reasonably related to an exhausted claim” that it will be allowed to proceed. Weatherly, 994 F.3d at 944-45. “The key is that the scope of a [subsequent] judicial complaint can be no broader than the scope of the EEOC investigation that ‘could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge' in the EEOC complaint.” Id. at 945 (quoting Wedow, 442 F.3d at 674).

Here Plaintiff checked the “disability”, “age,” and “other” boxes in the section of the EEOC charge titled “CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es)).” Doc. [1-1] at 2. He did not check the “retaliation” box in that same section of the charge. In the section of the charge form where Plaintiff was to describe the basis for his...