Sims v. City of Seattle

1

ANTHONY SIMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, and ROBERT BROWN, GREGORY NASH, GARRETT FOLLETTE, and BRADLEY RICHARDSON, Officers of the Seattle Police Department, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00483-TL

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

July 31, 2023

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TANA LIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief stemming from an interaction between a Seattle resident and Seattle police officers. This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 28) and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No 40). Having considered the Parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary see LCR 7(b)(4), and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motions.

I. Background

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

A. Events Prior to May 17, 2020

1. Defendant City's Training and Policies for High-Risk Vehicle Stops

Defendant City of Seattle (the “City”) does not define a “high-risk vehicle stop” (“HRVS”) anywhere in its policies. Dkt. No. 42-23 at 6 (81:12-14) (Davisson 30(b)(6) deposition); see also Dkt. No. 54-2 (same). Defendant City provides guidelines and training related to a HRVS and when to conduct it. See Dkt. No. 42-8 (training presentation on HRVS); Dkt. No. 42-23 at 6 (81:22-82:2). Detective Leroy Outlaw of the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) authored the HRVS training presentation, according to which all Seattle police officers have been trained since 2019. Dkt. No. 42-21 at 12 (89:1-92:11) (Outlaw 30(b)(6) deposition); see also Dkt. No. 54-1 (same).

In the presentation, a HRVS is defined as “any stop which poses a significant risk to the officer(s) when dealing with the occupant(s) of a motor vehicle” or “any stop of a vehicle with subjects that are known, or have a high probability, of being armed and/or dangerous.” Dkt. No. 42-8 at 7. The presentation depicts a HRVS where multiple officers are present and some have drawn their firearms.^[1]Id. at 13, 15. Officers are trained to initiate a HRVS “if you have a situation where you can articulate that you think you're dealing with a possible higher risk ....” Dkt. No. 42-21 at 13 (103:21-23); id. at 4 (51:7-14) (“[I]f they deem [HRVS] to be a safer practice and they deem it necessary, then they need to articulate why they did it.”).

With respect to the use of firearms during a HRVS at the time of the incident, Defendant City trained its officers to have their firearms out but only pointing them directly at an individual if they deem it necessary.^[2] Dkt. No. 42-21 at 5-6 (56:8-57:13). During a HRVS, a firearm may be pointed or used in a “low ready” position. Dkt. No. 42-23 at 5 (79:22-80:3). Holding a firearm in a “low ready” position means that the officer can see the hands of the person towards which the firearm is pointed. Id. at 5 (77:12-16), 7 (88:3-8). It also means that the firearm is pointed away from the person such that were it to discharge, it would not hit the person. Dkt. No. 54-1 at 4 (65:25-66:10); Dkt. No. 54-2 at 6 (76:10-15). Defendant City admits that an observer would not be able to tell whether a firearm is in the “low ready” position or simply pointed at someone. Dkt. No. 42-23 at 8 (91:8-12). Officers are taught to assume the “low ready” position at the rear of their vehicles. Dkt. No. 54-1 at 8 (95:21-22). Officers are not required to report when they use a firearm in the “low ready” position because it is not considered a use of force. Dkt. No. 42-23 at 3 (67:16-68:3).

With respect to the search of vehicles during a HRVS, Defendant City's Rule 30(b)(6) deponent testifies that officers are trained to perform a “sweep” of the vehicle where at least three officers look at the outside of the car and “all of the open spaces they can see” for people or hazards. Dkt. No. 42-21 at 8-9 (71:24-73:2). The opening of a closed trunk or other locked area is only appropriate where “additional factors” are present. Dkt. No. 54-2 at 7 (93:10-12); see also id. (94:7-9) (“[Q:] If you needed the key to open the trunk, then that would not be permissible as part of a sweep or a clear? A: That's correct.”); Dkt. No. 54-1 at 5 (73:19-23) (can open locked area if “reason to believe” there is an “immediate hazard” or a person there); Dkt. No. 42-8 at 21 (citing State of Washington v. Snapp, a Washington Supreme Court case, as holding that “locked area of the vehicle not accessible by the occupants of the vehicle, cannot be searched during a clearing or safety sweep unless there is reason to believe there is a person or immediate threat in that area”).

2. Plaintiff's Car Purchase

On January 8, 2020, Plaintiff Anthony Sims purchased a 2008 Ford Fusion. Dkt. No. 56-1 at 2 (sale report). At that time, the vehicle was assigned license plate number BEX1947. Id. at 12 (2019 registration). The next day, the seller reported the sale to the Washington State Department of Licensing. Id. at 2. Plaintiff did not apply to register the vehicle until June 1, 2020. Dkt. No. 56-1 at 5.

B. Events of May 17, 2020

1. Defendant Brown Follows Plaintiff

On the morning of May 17, 2020, Plaintiff was working as a delivery driver. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 2 (Sims declaration). At about 5:07 a.m., Plaintiff was responding to a delivery order requiring that he pick up items from a 7-Eleven at the intersection of First Avenue and Cherry Street in downtown Seattle. Id. ¶ 3. At the same time, Defendant SPD Acting Lieutenant Robert Brown was on patrol in downtown Seattle when he observed “a white Ford Fusion sedan bearing Washington plate BEX1947”—Plaintiff's vehicle. Dkt. No. 42-6 at 2 (field contact report); Dkt. No. 35-1 at 12 (same); Dkt. No. 42-18 at 8 (44:14-24) (Brown deposition); Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 3-4 (Brown declaration). The light conditions were “twilight,” and it appeared to Defendant Brown that the car did not have its headlights on. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 9 (45:8-14, 46:17-47:9); Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 4. At 5:07:40 a.m., he performed “a standard license plate check” by entering the plate number into a mobile data terminal (MDT), a touch screen device inside his vehicle, while he was driving. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 9 (47:10-22, 48:1-9), 10 (50:5-14, 52:6-7), 11 (55:11-14), 12 (59:4-6); Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 5-6. The MDT allows law enforcement officers in the field to access criminal justice information from databases including the Washington Crime Information Center (“WACIC”) and the Department of Licensing (“DOL”). Dkt. No. 42-18 at 10-11 (52:15-53:1); Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 7-8.

Defendant Brown received several MDT search results. Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 42-18 at 11 (53:24-54:6); Dkt. No. 33-1 (MDT results); Dkt. No. 42-16 (same). While driving, Defendant Brown accessed the response page for two of the results. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 11 (53:2454:6, 55:11-14); Dkt. No. 42-21 at 3 (33:22-34:5). He first viewed the search result for license plate BEX1997. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 11 (55:15-21, 56:3-16), 12 (57:12-18). The plate was marked as a “near hit” to the plate of a stolen vehicle. Dkt. No. 42-16 at 4. Defendant Brown then viewed the search result for license plate BEX1974. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 12 (57:19-58:22). This plate was also marked as a “near hit” to the plate of a stolen vehicle. Dkt. No. 42-16 at 2. The MDT results further stated that the vehicle had been sold four months prior and that there was no record of license plate BEX1947. Dkt. No. 33-1 at 3-4. Defendant Brown states that he did not notice the licensing issues and was only focused on the WACIC “near hit” for stolen license plate BEX1974. Dkt. No. 29 ¶¶ 30-34. Defendant Brown also states that no other search results were relevant to any action that he took in this matter. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 11 (54:17-19).

At about 5:08:19 a.m., Plaintiff activated his right-turn signal and turned right onto First Avenue by moving into the leftmost lane. Dkt. No. 34-1, Ex. A, at 0:06-0:12 (Brown in-car video); see generally Dkt. No. 42-1 (same). Plaintiff continued for about two blocks on First Avenue before activating the right-turn signal at about 5:08:43 a.m. and pulling over to the right side of the road. Dkt. No. 34-1 at 0:12-0:47. Almost simultaneously, at 5:08:46 a.m., Defendant Brown made a radio call informing police dispatch that he was following a possible stolen vehicle. Dkt. No. 29 ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 35-1 at 7 (CAD log); Dkt. No. 42-7 (same); Dkt. No. 42-5 at 0:57-1:13 (radio audio). This call triggered a response from other SPD officers, including Defendants Garrett Follette, Gregory Nash, and Bradley Richardson, who arrived between 5:10:32 a.m. and 5:11:05 a.m.^[3]Dkt. No. 35-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 30 ¶ 7 (Follette declaration); Dkt. No. 31 ¶ 11 (Nash declaration); Dkt. No. 32 ¶ 11 (Richardson declaration). In total, at least eight officers ultimately responded to the scene, including Defendant Brown. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 24 (109:25-110:9). Defendant Brown was the highest-ranking officer on scene. Id. (110:12-14).

2. Defendant Brown Stops Plaintiff

At about 5:09:01 a.m., Plaintiff parked his vehicle and activated its hazard lights. Dkt. No. 34-1 at 1 (0:48-0:53). Plaintiff opened the driver's door, exited the vehicle and started walking toward the 7-Eleven. Id. at 0:53-1:00. When Plaintiff exited the vehicle, Defendant Brown could see for the first time that Plaintiff was a Black male. Dkt. No. 42-18 at 22 (103:2124). Defendant Brown activated his emergency lights and told Plaintiff to “wait at your vehicle, okay?” using a loudspeaker. Dkt. No. 34-1 at 1 (1:00-1:09). Plaintiff stopped, walked back to his car, sat down in the driver's seat, and shut the door. Id. at 1:10-1:28. At about 5:09:36 a.m., Defendant Brown stated on radio that the...