Sines v. Darling Ingredients Inc.

1

JAMES and MANUELA SINES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DARLING INGREDIENTS INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-19121

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 6, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

EVELYN PADIN, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiffs are a putative class of Jersey City residents who allege that Defendant Darling Ingredients Inc. (“Darling”) which operates a Newark animal rendering facility, releases noxious odors into the environment which reduce Plaintiffs' property values. D.E. 2 (“Am Compl.”) ¶¶ 3, 6, 16-19. Plaintiffs move for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. D.E. 70 (“Class Cert. Mot.”). Darling opposes. D.E. 78 (“Class Cert Opp'n”). Darling also moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to exclude the testimony of two experts offered in connection with class certification: Mark Cal and Theodore Lamicella. D.E. 72 (“Cal Daubert Mot.”); D.E. 73 (“Lamicella Daubert Mot.”). Plaintiffs oppose these motions. D.E. 76 (“Cal Daubert Opp'n”); D.E. 77 (“Lamicella Daubert Opp'n”). The Court has reviewed all relevant submissions and considered the motions without oral argument.^[1]See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); L. Civ. R 78.1(b).

For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT the motions to exclude and DENY the motion for class certification.^[2]

I. BACKGROUND^[3]

Darling operates an animal rendering facility that is surrounded by residential properties, including the properties where Plaintiffs reside. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiffs allege that the Darling animal rendering facility releases noxious odors that enter the surrounding residential properties, contaminate the air, disturb residents' use and enjoyment, and diminish property values. Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 83-84, 92, 106-07. Plaintiffs seek relief on behalf of a putative class of owneroccupants and renters on theories of nuisance, trespass, and negligence. Id. ¶¶ 87, 100, 108.

Initially, Plaintiffs defined the putative class as all owner-occupants and renters of residential property within 1.75 miles of the Darling animal rendering facility. Id. ¶ 59. However, in the present class certification motion, Plaintiffs modify the putative class to include only those owner-occupants and renters of residential property within a pre-defined geographic area in Jersey City, across the bay from Darling's facility. Class Cert. Mot. at 1-2; see also D.E. 70-2 (proposed class area map). Plaintiffs seek to certify this putative class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3). D.E. 70-1 (“Class Cert. Br.”) at 9, 48.

To meet class certification requirements, Plaintiffs offer expert testimony from Mark Cal and Theodore Lamicella. See, e.g., id. at 26-30. Plaintiffs offer Cal's testimony to provide a classwide method for determining whether Darling emitted odors throughout the proposed class area, as well as the extent of any odor emissions. See D.E. 70-29 at 5 (Cal Rpt.). Relatedly, Plaintiffs offer Lamicella's testimony to provide a class-wide method for determining whether Darling caused damages, as well as the measure of any damages. See D.E. 70-30 at 3 (Lamicella Decl.). However, Darling asserts that both experts' testimony is inadmissible under Rule 702 and the standard set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). D.E. 72-1 (“Cal Daubert Br.”); 73-1 (“Lamicella Daubert Br.”). Accordingly, Darling has moved to exclude both experts. Cal Daubert Mot. at 2; Lamicella Daubert Mot. at 2.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A “party proposing class-action certification bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence [its] compliance with the requirements of Rule 23.” Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28, 2015). Specifically, “every putative class action must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of either Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012).

Under Rule 23(a), a class may be certified only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1)-(4). These requirements are, respectively, referred to as the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. See, e.g., Marcus, 687 F.3d at 590-91.

Under Rule 23(b)(3), a party who seeks class certification must satisfy three additional requirements. First, the party must prove “that the class is ascertainable.” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. Second, the party seeking class certification must establish that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). Third, the party must show “that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. These additional requirements are, respectively, referred to as the ascertainability, predominance, and superiority requirements. See, e.g., Byrd, 784 F.3d at 161 n.4, 162, 164.

A party who seeks class certification cannot “demonstrate conformity with Rule 23” through “challenged expert testimony” unless the party also proves “that the expert testimony satisfies the standard set out in Daubert” and Rule 702. In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2015). According to the standard set out in Daubert, the district court acts as a “gatekeeper” pursuant to Rule 702 to ensure that “any and all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable.” 509 U.S. at 589. Under Rule 702 and Daubert, the district court must consider: (1) the “qualifications” of the expert, (2) the “reliability” of the expert methodology, and (3) the “fit” between the expert analysis and the case. In re Paoli R.R. Yard Pcb Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-43 (3d Cir. 1994); Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000). The party offering the expert testimony bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. See Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 1999).^[4]

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' putative class does not satisfy Rule 23. Specifically, the putative class fails the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a) and the ascertainability, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Additionally, Plaintiffs' expert testimony does not satisfy Rule 702 or Daubert; Cal and Lamicella propose approaches that fail the reliability and fit requirements, and Lamicella also fails the qualifications requirement. Importantly, even if the Court does not exclude the relevant expert testimony, it would still decline to certify the class.

A. The Putative Class Does Not Satisfy Rule 23(a)

Although Plaintiffs' putative class satisfies the numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements, it fails the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a).^[5]

1. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied

“No minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain a suit as a class action, but generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that there are 3,550 households in the proposed class area. D.E. 70-11 at 2 (Roman Decl.).^[6]Thus, the numerosity requirement is satisfied.

2. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied

“[T]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 264 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the common question “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).

Here, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the putative class shares questions of fact and law that are capable of class-wide resolution. In New Jersey, a public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with the exercise of a right common to the general public” and a private nuisance is “an [unreasonable] invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land.”^[7]Mayor & Council of Borough of Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F.Supp. 1039, 1056 (D.N.J. 1993); Smith v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 2011 WL 810065, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2011) (internal citations omitted). Relatedly, negligence entails “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by defendant; and (3) an injury to plaintiff proximately caused by [that] breach.”^[8]Optica, Inc. v. Metro Pub. Adjustment, Inc., 2005 WL 1719134, at *16 (D.N.J. July 21, 2005). Most of the common questions proposed by Plaintiffs are plainly relevant to these factual and legal determinations.^[9] And since a trespass is “an [unauthorized] entry onto another's property,” another shared question is whether the dispersion of noxious odors constitutes an entry onto property. Rowe v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 262 F.R.D. 451, 463 (D.N.J. 2009). Ultimately, these common questions can be resolved in one stroke, as they concern Darling or objective inquiries, rather than Plaintiffs or the putative class. Accordingly, the commonality requirement is satisfied.^[10]

3. The Typicality...