Singh v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.

PRANAV SINGH, HARPREET KAUR and ISHNOOR KAUR, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants.

No. C22-3035-LTS-MAR

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division

February 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

LEONARD T. STRAND, CHIEF JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on a motion (Doc. 20) to dismiss by defendants United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Alejandro N. Mayorkas, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Ur M. Jaddou, in her official capacity as Director of the USCIS and Terri Robinson in her official capacity as Director of USCIS National Benefits Center. Plaintiffs Pranav Singh, Harpreet Kaur and Ishnoor Kaur have filed a resistance (Doc. 29) and defendants have filed a reply (Doc. 32). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).

II. BACKGROUND

This dispute concerns the adjudication of plaintiffs' I-485 applications (also referred to as green card applications). Doc. 1 at ¶ 3. Plaintiffs are nationals of India. In August 2014, Singh filed a Form I-140 Petition for Alien Worker with his wife and daughter, applying under the EB-2 category as a professional with an advanced degree or exceptional ability. On January 7, 2015, USCIS approved the petition. The petition's priority date is December 15, 2013. In April 2022, plaintiffs were notified that their green card applications were ready to file. They were also informed at this time that after September 30, 2022 (the end of fiscal year 2022 (FY22), their visas would retrogress. On May 9, 2022, plaintiffs submitted their I-485 applications so they could adjust status to permanent residents as soon as their priority date became current. On June 1, 2022, their priority date became current.

Plaintiffs' applications remained pending at the time they filed their lawsuit on September 16, 2022. They allege the following claims:

• Count I - Unreasonable delay pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

• Count II - Arbitrary and capricious actions in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

• Count III - Writ of Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361

• Count IV - Agency action unlawfully withheld in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(B) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)

Doc. 1. The complaint requested an order compelling defendants to adjudicate their permanent residency applications by September 30, 2022 (the end of Fiscal Year 2022, or FY22), or to order that USCIS “reserve” or “hold” extra EB visa numbers for plaintiffs. Doc. 1. Despite filing their complaint just two weeks before the end of FY22, plaintiffs did not file a motion for injunctive relief or otherwise seek expedited consideration of their claims.

III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

ORDER

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that “have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Marine Equip. Management Co. v United States, 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1993). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a motion to dismiss a complaint due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. V S Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, a federal court has a special obligation to consider sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction in every case. Hart v. United States, 630 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2011). If a plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a claim, then the court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Faibisch v. Univ. of Minnesota, 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2002). “Therefore, a standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1).” Id. When determining standing, the emphasis is on whether the plaintiff “possesses a legally cognizable interest, or ‘personal stake,' in the outcome of the action.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013) (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011)). Generally, a plaintiff must assert his or her own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).

Where a party limits its subject matter jurisdiction attack to the face of the complaint, the attack is a “facial challenge.” Jones, 727 F.3d at 846 (citing BP Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2002)). When presented with a facial challenge, “‘the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings, and the nonmoving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).'” Id. (quoting Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)). Those protections include treating the complainant's factual allegations as true and dismissing the action only if it appears beyond a doubt that the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 & n.6.

By contrast, when a party makes a factual challenge to the district court's jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “‘no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the [complainant's] allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude [the court] from evaluating . . . the merits of the jurisdictional claims.'” Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 861 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729-30 & n. 6). Where the challenge is factual, “the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). “[T]he court may look beyond the pleadings and ‘the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'” Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F.Supp.2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court “may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004). Here, the attack is factual, as the defendants rely on evidence outside of the pleadings.

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing, mootness or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. I will first analyze the standing and mootness issues.

The doctrine of standing ensures that courts hear only “those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). As the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural' or ‘hypothetical.'” Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.

Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted); see also City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, 495 F.3d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 2007). The requirement of standing “ensures that [judges] act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013). Defendants primarily attack plaintiffs' standing based on redressability, noting that where a defendant has no lawful power or authority to prove the remedy sought by a plaintiff, a plaintiff cannot establish redressability. See Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2015).

Standing is “[a] close cousin of mootness.” Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Becerra, 55 F.4th 583, 601 n.13 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Noem v. Haaland, 41 F.4th 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2022)). “[T]he difference between standing and mootness is merely one of ‘time frame: the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).'”) Id. (quoting Sisney v. Kaemingk, 15 F.4th 1181, 1194 (8th Cir. 2021)). “When, during the course of litigation, the issues presented in a case ‘lose their life because of the passage of time or a change in circumstances . . . and a federal court can no longer grant effective relief,' the case is considered moot.” Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Beck v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 18 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1994)). If an issue is moot, the court has “no discretion and must dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969)).

Defendants state that under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii), USCIS may not approve an I-485 application until the Department of State (DOS) allocates a visa number. They have provided the declaration (Doc. 20-2) of Andrew Parker, the Branch...