Singleton v. Stirling

1

Sterling L. Singleton, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Dennis Patterson, Willie Davis, Terry Wallace, Whittington, Willie Ocean, Michael Pressly, Edward Gadsden, Bostic, Brennen, Ms. Labradore, William Gill, Shannon Dean, Shawn Stover, Anthony Berry, Terry Marshal, Dr. Kinnard Debose, Tishiro Inabnit, and Sophia Paquette, Defendants.

C. A. No. 9:21-cv-03820-RMG-MHC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

June 23, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Sterling L. Singleton (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). ECF No. 31. Defendant Anthony Berry filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 82, and the remaining Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 81. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motions Plaintiff filed Responses in Opposition. ECF Nos. 93, 95. Defendant Berry filed a Reply. ECF No. 94. The matter is therefore, ripe for review.

All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while housed at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“KCI”), a facility run by SCDC. ECF No. 1. On January 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 17. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint, which this Court granted. ECF Nos. 23, 26, 27. On February 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 31.

In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on December 7, 2018, he was stabbed during an inmate-on-inmate assault while housed at KCI. ECF No. 31 at 8. Specifically, he alleges that a fellow inmate, who had threatened him previously, entered his cell and stabbed him twelve times with a homemade shank. ECF No. 31 at 8. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from being attacked by other inmates. ECF No. 31 at 8-9. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. ECF No. 31 at 10.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 81, 82. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.

Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue they are entitled to relief because, inter alia, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies.^[1] The undersigned agrees Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies.

A. Failure to exhaust under the PLRA

Defendants argue they are entitled to relief because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit under § 1983 to challenge prison conditions. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory.” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed.Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The exhaustion requirement is mandatory, and courts lack the authority to waive that requirement.”). Section 1997e mandates “proper” exhaustion; thus, a “procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” does not satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirement. Woodfordv. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006).

The PLRA “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Baxley v. Jividen, 508 F.Supp.3d 28, 46 (S.D. W.Va. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “However, if a defendant makes a threshold showing of failure to exhaust, the burden of showing that administrative remedies were unavailable falls to the plaintiff.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Defendants have met their burden in showing failure to exhaust.

Defendants submitted the affidavit of Felecia McKie, who is the Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch of SCDC, and SCDC's “Inmate Grievance System,” which contains the inmate grievance procedure. ECF No. 81-6; ECF No. 101-1. Defendant Berry, separately, submitted a summary of the grievances filed by Plaintiff between August 29, 2018, and February 12, 2022. ECF No. 82-3.

As Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch, McKie's duties include overseeing and monitoring the inmate grievance process at all SCDC facilities. ECF No. 101 at 1, ¶ 2. In her affidavit, McKie detailed the grievance system and noted the steps an inmate must take to properly exhaust the administrative process. ECF No. 101 at 2-8. SCDC has a three-step grievance process.^[2]First, an inmate must submit a Request to Staff Member Form (“RTSM”) or Automated Request to Staff Member (“ARTSM”) in an effort to resolve the grievance informally. ECF No. 101 at 23. Second, if informal resolution fails, the inmate must file a Step 1 Grievance Form (10-5), setting forth the issue grieved. ECF No. 101 at 3-4. Third, inmates may then appeal an SCDC decision as to the Step 1 Grievance by filing a Step 2 Grievance Form (10-5A). ECF No. 101 at 4. SCDC's response to a Step 2 Grievance is considered the final agency decision on the issue. ECF No. 101 at 6-7; ECF No. 81-6 at 10-11.

McKie reviewed Plaintiff's grievance history and attested that Plaintiff did not follow and/or use all of the options available to him through SCDC's Inmate Grievance System to address...