Sinha v. United States

SANJAY SINHA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Criminal No. 1:14cr9-HSO-JCG-1

Civil No. 1:17cv337-HSO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION

April 1, 2020

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT SANJAY SINHA'S MOTION [419] TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Sanjay Sinha's Motion [419] to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After due consideration of the issues, the record, and relevant legal authority, the Court is of the opinion that Sinha's Motion [419] should be denied without an evidentiary hearing.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Defendant's Guilty Plea

On February 29, 2014, a grand jury returned an Indictment [3] charging Defendant Dr. Sanjay Sinha ("Sinha" or "Defendant") with six counts of distributing various controlled substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Indictment alleged that Sinha distributed and dispensed controlled substances to various individuals outside the scope of professional practice. Indictment [3]. The Government returned a fourteen-count Superseding Indictment [87] on August 19, 2014, followed by a seventeen-count Second Superseding Indictment [197] on January 21, 2015. Finally, a grand jury returned the Third Superseding Indictment [254] on April 7, 2015, charging Sinha with forty counts of distributing a controlled substance outside the scope of professional practice. See Third Superseding Indictment [254].

The Court initially appointed Defendant counsel on March 20, 2014. Order [42]. Shortly thereafter, Sinha retained counsel, attorneys Benjamin Black Alper and Howard Jarrett Weintraub, who were admitted pro hac vice with local counsel Donald J. Rafferty. Text Order, May 13, 2014. Over a period of time, the Court granted numerous continuances of the trial date to accommodate Sinha and his retained counsel. See Text Order, April 14, 2014; Text Order, June 2, 2014; Text Order, August 20, 2014. Defendant's retained counsel later withdrew, at which point the Court granted a thirty-day continuance and Sinha ultimately chose to retain attorneys Christopher E. Smith and G. Morgan Holder. Tr. [373] at 9; Notice of Attorney Appearance [191] [194]. The Court then granted an almost three-month continuance after new counsel enrolled, followed by another three-month continuance on April 10, 2015. Minute Entry, January 13, 2015; Text Order, April 10, 2015.

Ultimately, on June 22, 2015, Sinha pled guilty to Count 27 of the Third Superseding Indictment [254], which charged him with distribution of a controlled substance outside the scope of professional practice under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).Plea Agreement [291] at 1; Third Superseding Indictment [254] at 10. Specifically, Count 27 charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally prescribing a Schedule IV non-narcotic drug controlled substance, Clonazepam, to Tonie Mattina, other than for a legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course of professional practice. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Third Superseding Indictment [254] at 10. At the conclusion of a two-day sentencing hearing held on October 26 and 27, 2015, the Court sentenced Sinha to sixty months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, as well as a $15,000 fine. Sentencing Tr. [366] at 93-94; Judgment [354].

Defendant's guilty plea was made pursuant to a Plea Agreement [291] with the Government, which provided in relevant part that Defendant expressly waived the following rights:

a. the right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed in this case, or the manner in which that sentence was imposed, on the grounds set forth in Title 18, Unites States Code, Section 3742, or on any ground whatsoever, and

b. the right to contest the conviction and sentence or the manner in which the sentence was imposed in any post-conviction proceeding, including but not limited to a motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 . . .

Plea Agreement [291] at 5-6. At the plea hearing and in the Plea Agreement [291], Sinha and his attorney declared that the terms of the Plea Agreement were read by or to Sinha, explained to Sinha by his attorney, understood by Sinha, voluntarily accepted by Sinha, and agreed to by Sinha. Id. at 6; Plea Hearing [328] at 8-9. Sinha nevertheless filed a direct appeal on November 5, 2015. Notice of Appeal[355]. The Fifth Circuit held that the Defendant's appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Sinha, 655 F. App'x 1015, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 2016).

B. Defendant's Motion [419] to Vacate, Set aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody

Sinha timely filed this Motion [419] under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on December 4, 2017, raising several grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). First, Defendant asserts that he was deprived of his right to counsel of his choice in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Ground One). Mot. [419] at 4. He argues that that the Court "issued an ultimatum that forced [him] with only 5 minutes to choose between trial with 'ineffective' counsel or relinquishing his counsel of choice." Id.

Second, Sinha contends that his later plea was not voluntary and knowing because his counsel "gave erroneous advice and incorrectly modified the proposed 'factual basis' at the plea hearing" (Ground Two). Id. at 6. He claims that despite no federal or state law requiring a physician with a doctor-patient relationship to perform a re-check physical exam prior to authorizing a prescription refill, his attorney stated in a proposed modification at the plea hearing that Defendant "did not meet with [Tonie Mattina] in the immediate months preceding June - - the subject of Count 27, which would be outside the scope of professional practice for purposes of writing that prescription." Id.

Third, Defendant argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to: (1) comprehend the governing law concerningrequired examinations between refills of Schedule IV medication; (2) properly investigate the facts of Count 27, Tonie Mattina, and the Government's main witnesses; (3) secure the Government's representation to limit relevant conduct to Count 27; (4) accurately estimate the sentencing guideline range; and (5) proceed to trial with exculpatory evidence (collectively Ground Three). Id. at 8. Sinha states that had he been properly advised, he would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. Id.

In a later-filed Affidavit [429], Sinha also claims that his attorneys were ineffective at sentencing and induced his guilty plea with unkept promises. Def.'s Aff. [429] at 8, 10. Finally, Sinha asserts that he was deprived of "true probable cause" when the case agent allegedly erroneously testified to the grand jury that Sinha had not performed any physical exams, and because the indictment "lacked the essential element of the requisite language 'without a legitimate medical purpose'" (Ground Four). Id. at 9.

Sinha's trial and appellate counsel have filed affidavits in response to Sinha's Motion [419]. Barrett Aff. [421]; Smith Aff. [422]; Holder Aff. [423]. The Government filed its Response [424] on January 12, 2018. Government's Resp. [424]. The Government's brief Response [424] argues that because of Sinha's appeal waiver, he is barred from collaterally attacking his conviction. Id. at 2-3. The Government contends that Sinha has not met his burden of establishing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 3-4. Defendant subsequently filed a Rebuttal to the Government's Response [428] and an Affidavit [429] in Support ofhis Motion [419] on March 30, 2018.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Relevant law

Once finally convicted, there are four narrow and separate grounds upon which a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the Court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1992). "[O]n collateral attack, a defendant is limited to alleging errors of a 'constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude.'" United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991)).

Upon conviction and exhaustion of any right to appeal, courts are entitled to presume that a defendant stands fairly and finally convicted. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982); Shaid, 937 F.2d at 231-32. Relief under § 2255 is therefore reserved for violations of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries which could not have been raised on direct appeal and which, if condoned, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice. United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992).

Sinha entered a plea of guilty to Count 27 of the Third Superseding Indictment on September 29, 2015, and was sentenced on October 27, 2015. TheSupreme Court denied certiorari on November 28, 2016. After conviction and exhaustion of his right to appeal, it is presumed that Defendant now stands fairly and finally convicted. Samuels, 59 F.3d at 528 (internal citation omitted).

B. Sinha's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (Ground Two of the Motion).

Defendant asserts that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Def.'s Mot. [419] at 6.¹ "The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law . . . ." United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1997)). "A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid...