Siracusa v. Marriott Int'l Inc.

319 F.Supp.3d 596

Jean SIRACUSA, Plaintiff,

v.MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC., Luxury Hotels International of Puerto Rico d/b/a Ritz Carlton Hotel Casino, Defendants.

Civil No. 17–1145 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed July 5, 2018

Enrique J. Mendoza–Mendez, Mendoza Law Office, San Juan, PR, Luis E. Correa–Gutierrez, Correa Business Consulting Group, LLC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Ivy Mercado–Ramos, Corporate Legal Advisors, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendant Marriott International Inc. ("Marriott") and Luxury Hotels International of Puerto Rico d/b/a Ritz Carlton Hotel Casino ("Ritz Carlton") (collectively, "defendants")'s motion to compel arbitration and dismiss pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 4, and Marriott's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (" Rule 12(b)(6)"). (Docket No. 53.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Ritz Carlton's motion to compel arbitration, and DENIES Marriott's motion to compel arbitration. (Docket No. 53.) The Court GRANTS Marriott's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 53.)

I. BACKGROUND

Jean Siracusa ("Siracusa") worked for Ritz Carlton from February 2005 through November 2015. (Docket No. 47 at p. 2.) Siracusa alleges that, as Ritz Carlton's parent company, Marriott was also her employer during this time. Id. In November 2015, Siracusa suffered a work-related accident, which caused her anosmia (the loss of smell and taste). Id. at pp. 2–3. She reported the incident to the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund ("State Insurance Fund"), which ordered her "to rest starting on November 23, 2015." Id. at p. 3. The State Insurance Fund later allowed Siracusa to return to work on the condition that Ritz Carlton would provide her with certain accommodations. Id. In December 2015, Siracusa "advised Ritz Carlton that the State Insurance Fund had indicated that she needed an accommodation to viabilize [sic] her return to work." Id. at p. 4. According to Siracusa, "Ritz Carlton in an unjustified manner delayed and failed to provide the necessary reasonable accommodation[s] needed by Siracusa." Id. at p. 3. Siracusa was never reinstated, and eventually Ritz Carlton terminated her employment, claiming that Siracusa had abandoned her job. Id. at p. 6.

Siracusa claims that Ritz Carlton's actions violated federal and local anti-discrimination statutes. (Docket No. 47 at pp. 1 and 6; see 42 U.S.C. § 1201 ; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 501.) On January 18, 2017, Siracusa requested in writing that Ritz Carlton commence an arbitration action to resolve her employment claims against the defendants pursuant to the Ritz Carlton Employee Agreement's "Open Appeal and Issue Resolution Process." (Docket No. 47 at p. 6; Docket No. 53, Ex. 1, at pp. 6, 12–13.) According to Siracusa, Ritz Carlton refused to submit the dispute to arbitration. (Docket No. 47 at p. 6.)

On February 1, 2017, Siracusa commenced this civil action against the defendants alleging that Ritz Carlton's conduct was discriminatory and retaliatory, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1201, and Puerto Rico Law 44 ("Law 44"). (Docket No. 1; see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 501.)² On November 9, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss Siracusa's claims and compel arbitration. (Docket No. 53 at p. 1.)

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

The defendants move to dismiss Siracusa's claims for lack of jurisdiction, contending that Siracusa "is contractually bound to arbitrate her discrimination, retaliation and unjust dismissal claims." (Docket No. 53 at p. 6.) The defendants maintain that, "[p]ursuant to the FAA, this [ ] Court must compel [Siracusa] to comply with her contractual obligation to arbitrate her claims." (Docket No. 53 at p. 6.)

A. Standard of Review

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") establishes the validity and enforceability of written arbitration agreements. 9 U.S.C. § 2. "Whether or not a dispute is arbitrable is typically a question for judicial determination." Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 375 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010) ). "The court ‘shall’ order arbitration ‘upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.’ " Rent–A–Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 ).

For the Court to compel arbitration, a party must demonstrate "[1] that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, [2] that the movant is entitled to invoke the arbitration clause, [3] that the other party is bound by that clause, and that [4] the claim asserted comes within the clause's scope." Dialysis Access Ctr., 638 F.3d at 375 (quoting InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003) ). "[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitrations." HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ). "[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25, 103 S.Ct. 927.

A party can expressly or implicitly waive its arbitral rights. See Joca–Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, 772 F.3d 945, 948 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[P]arties to a contract normally are free to waive the right to arbitration. Such a waiver may be either express or implied.") (internal citation omitted). To determine whether a party to an arbitration agreement has waived its right to arbitrate, the Court considers the following factors:

whether the party has actually participated in the lawsuit or has taken other action inconsistent with his right, ... whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit by the time an intention to arbitrate was communicated by the defendant to the plaintiff, ... whether there has been a long delay in seeking the stay or whether the enforcement of arbitration was brought up when trial was near at hand.... whether the defendants have invoked the jurisdiction of the court by filing a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings, ... whether important intervening steps (e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration ...) had taken place, ... and whether the other party was affected, misled, or prejudiced by the delay.

Jones Motor Co., Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local Union No. 633, 671 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1982) (alterations in original) (quoting Reid Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 614 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 1980) ). "In considering whether a party has waived its arbitration right, courts are consistently mindful of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration." Carrión–Concepción v. First Fed. Fin. Corp., No. 10–1617, 2011 WL 5059192, at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120203, at *12 (D.P.R. Aug. 3, 2011) (Vélez–Rivé, Mag. J.) (citing Creative Sols. Grp., Inc. v. Pentzer Corp., 252 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2001) ).

"[W]aiver is not to be lightly inferred, and mere delay in seeking [arbitration] without some resultant prejudice to a party cannot carry the day." Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 293 (1st Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted). "[I]n order for plaintiffs to prevail on [a] claim of waiver, they must show prejudice." Carrión–Concepción, 2011 WL 5059192, at *7, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120203, at *13 (citations omitted). "Prejudice is relevant to waiver when it is the product of a defendant's failure to timely invoke the arbitration procedure." Creative Sols., 252 F.3d at 33. "When determining whether a defendant prejudicially failed to invoke arbitration in a timely manner, [courts] consider the larger context of the litigation." Lomas v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 376 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

B. Discussion

1. Arbitration Agreement with Ritz Carlton

It is uncontested that "a valid agreement to arbitrate exists" between Siracusa and Ritz Carlton, that Ritz Carlton is "entitled to invoke the arbitration clause," and that both Siracusa and Ritz Carlton are "bound by that clause." See Dialysis Access Ctr., 638 F.3d at 375 ; Docket No. 47 at p. 1; Docket No. 53, Ex. 1 at p. 12; Docket No. 53, Ex. 2; Docket No. 57 at pp. 2 and 5. Siracusa signed the Ritz Carlton employment agreement with the arbitration clause, making her a party to the arbitration dispute. (Docket No. 53, Ex. 2.) Ritz Carlton is entitled to invoke the arbitration clause as party to the employment contract. See Johnson & Johnson Int'l v. P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc., 258 F.Supp.3d 255, 261 (D.P.R. 2017) (Besosa, J.) ("The second requirement ... that the parties moving to compel arbitration be entitled to invoke the arbitration clause.... is satisfied where the movants are signatories or parties to the agreement containing the arbitration provision.").³ Siracusa does not challenge the validity of the arbitration clause, nor does she deny her or Ritz Carlton's status as being parties to the agreement. Indeed, Siracusa maintains that she attempted to invoke the arbitration clause, despite Ritz Carlton's alleged denial of her request to arbitrate. (Docket No. 47 at pp. 6–7.)

It is also undisputed that Siracusa's claims "come[ ] within the clause's scope." See Dialysis Access Ctr., 638 F.3d at 375 ; Docket No. 47. The arbitration agreement's scope...