Skandha v. Spencer

75 N.E.3d 1148 (Table)

Bodhisattva SKANDHA

v.Luis SPENCER ¹ & others.²

15-P-1450

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

Entered: January 12, 2017.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, an inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, brought this action in Superior Court alleging that he has been denied the free exercise of religion because, among other reasons, he is required to sign for his vegan meals. He also claims that the defendants did not properly follow required grievance procedures which, in turn, resulted in a violation of his right to due process. The amended complaint alleges violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act; arts. 1, 10, 12, and 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and due process rights. On cross motions for summary judgment, Skandha's complaint was dismissed and judgment entered for the defendants. We affirm.

Background . Skandha filed four grievances between January and March of 2014. The first grievance alleged that he was not receiving his religious meals according to the official vegan menu and he was not given notice of a change in the menu. This grievance was partially approved. The second grievance challenged the decision in the first grievance and alleged that institutional grievance coordinator Danielle Laurenti was biased. In his third grievance, Skandha alleged that Kevin Clement harassed him by forcing him to sign for his religious meals in advance of receiving the meals themselves. Skandha's fourth grievance alleged additional harassment based on Clement's statement to several inmates who receive special diets that they would receive a disciplinary report if they failed to sign the diet sheet.

Discussion . We review the allowance of a motion for summary judgment de novo. LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction , 88 Mass. App. Ct. 507, 508 (2015). In so doing, we "view the materials in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether all material facts have been established, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law." Bardige v. Performance Specialists, Inc ., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 102 (2009).

We note from the outset that Skandha has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. He did not appeal from the decision on his first grievance, and his other three grievances were pending administrative appeal when he filed his complaint in the Superior Court. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. See Ryan v. Pepe , 65 Mass. App. Ct. 833, 839 (2006).

To the extent that Skandha argues that he had, in fact, exhausted his administrative remedies because he filed his amended complaint after his pending administrative appeals had been denied, the argument is unpersuasive. Skandha cites no law, and we have found none, that would permit him to effectively bypass the exhaustion requirement simply by filing an amended complaint. Notwithstanding Skandha's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, we have reviewed his constitutional claims and conclude that they are without merit.

1. Free speech violation . Skandha first argues that his rights under the First Amendment and art. 16 were violated because the defendants intentionally refused to abide by the statutory language of G. L. c. 127, § 33E, and the regulatory language of 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 491 (2006). We disagree.

Skandha has failed to allege facts that would support his claim that the defendants rendered his "limited right to petition for redress of grievances ... elusive." Langton v. Secretary of Pub. Safety , 37 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 20 (1994). For example, he does not allege that the defendants attempted to prevent his filing a grievance or threatened, coerced, retaliated against, or attempted to silence him in response to his filing a grievance.⁴ Contrast ibid . As such, his claim fails as a matter of law.

2. Interference with religious freedom . Skandha next claims that the defendants infringed upon his right of free exercise of religion by requiring that he sign a diet sheet in advance of receiving a vegan meal, and that this interference resulted in a violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. We agree with the judge who, in addressing this claim, concluded that requiring an inmate to sign for a special meal does not burden the inmate's religious belief or practice and does not substantially burden his religious freedom. See Attorney Gen . v. Desilets , 418 Mass. 316, 322 (1994).

3. Equal protection . Next, Skandha argues that he was denied equal protection under law because the defendants denied him the ability to express his religious beliefs without fear of retaliation. This claim similarly fails.

Skandha's amended complaint does not assert that he "received disparate treatment from that afforded other similarly situated prisoners," Santiago v. Russo , 77 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 616 n.6 (2010), or that "any differences in his treatment were the result of a discriminatory intent," Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction , 446 Mass. 463, 478 (2006). Therefore, his equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. Ibid .

4. Qualified immunity . The defendants raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Although the judge did not address whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we briefly discuss the issue as a part of our de novo review.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability arising from discretionary actions so long as they do not "violate [a] clearly established statutory or constitutional [right] of which a reasonable person would have known." Clancy v. McCabe , 441 Mass. 311, 317 (2004), quoting from Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Determining whether a reasonable correction officer would have known that his conduct violated a clearly established right requires an "objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action." Ahmad v....