Sketchler v. Hernandez

326 So.3d 912

Erin and Owen C. SKETCHLER, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Son, Oliver Sketchler

v.Daniel HERNANDEZ, Octabio Hernandez, Louis C. Paxton, Audwin D. Finley, ADF Enterprises, Inc., Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, National General Insurance Company, Cooper Insurance & Associates, Inc., the State of Louisiana Through the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, Graco Children's Products, Inc. & American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

2020 CA 0292

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: MAY 19, 2021

Michael C. Darnell, Bruce Feingerts, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellants Plaintiffs—Erin and Owen C. Sketchier, individually and on behalf of their minor son, Oliver Sketchier

Jerry L. Saporito, Caitlin Spieker, New Orleans, Louisiana, Stephen M. Copenhaver, pro hac vice, Joseph J. Krasovec, III, pro hac vice, Chicago, Illinois, Counsels for Appellee Defendant—Graco Children's Products, Inc.

Before: Whipple, C.J., Welch, and Chutz, JJ.

WELCH, J.

Plaintiffs, Erin and Owen C. Sketchler, individually and on behalf of their minor son, Oliver, appeal a summary judgment in favor of defendant, Graco Children's Products, Inc. ("Graco"), dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against it with prejudice. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 18, 2014, in the eastbound lane of Interstate 12 in Tangipahoa Parish.¹ Daniel Hernandez, traveling westbound in the left lane on Interstate 12, collided with a vehicle driven by Louis C. Paxton.² The Hernandez vehicle then crossed the median and entered the eastbound left lane, whereupon it crashed into the rear of an 18-wheeler driven by Audwin D. Finley. After striking the Finley vehicle, the Hernandez vehicle struck the vehicle driven by Mr. Sketchier and in which Mrs. Sketchier and Oliver were passengers. Each member of the Sketchier family was seriously injured in the accident. Oliver, who was two-years old on the date of the accident, suffered serious injuries including multiple skull fractures, subarachnoid hemorrhage, subdural hematoma, traumatic encephalopathies, and two broken legs. At the time of the accident, Oliver was secured in the rear, right seat of the Sketchier vehicle in a Graco SnugRide® 30 child restraint system.

Plaintiffs filed suit against multiple defendants, including Graco, alleging a claim under the under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La. R.S. 9:2800.51, et seq. , for an allegedly defective child passenger restraint system. Graco filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs would be "unable to meet their burden of proving that the product at issue was defective or that it caused any injury to Oliver Sketchier." Specifically, Graco contended that the plaintiffs either disposed of or misplaced the child restraint, and without the ability for Graco to inspect the child restraint, there is no evidence in existence to establish that it was defective. Plaintiffs opposed the summary judgment, arguing that according to the opinions of their experts, the child restraint was defective, failed to perform as it should have, and that such failure caused injuries and damages to Oliver.

Following a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, the trial court issued reasons for judgment, finding that because the child restraint was disposed of or misplaced, spoliation of evidence occurred, rendering plaintiffs unable to present evidence sufficient to carry their burden of proof on one or more element of their LPLA claim. Accordingly, the trial court granted Graco's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against it, with prejudice. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its written reasons on June 25, 2018.

The plaintiffs now appeal, raising two assignments of error. They contend the trial court erred in granting Graco's motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Graco's child restraint was defective or that it caused any injury to Oliver Sketchier. Plaintiffs alternatively contend the trial court wrongly disregarded their expert's affidavit by determining that there was an insufficient basis for his opinion without following the procedures set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F).

LAW

After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts review evidence de novo using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Operations, LLC v. City of Baton Rouge, 2017-1553, 2017-1554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 255 So. 3d 16, 22, writ denied, 2018-1397 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 194.

The Code of Civil Procedure places the initial burden of proof on the party filing the motion for summary judgment, here Graco. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue raised in the motion for summary judgment, as in the instant matter, the mover is not required to negate all of the essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). See also Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana. Inc., 2000-0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So. 2d 37, 39. However, the mover must demonstrate the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). See also La. C.C.P. art. 966, Comments—2015, Comment (j).

Once the motion for summary judgment has been made and properly supported, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce factual support, through the use of proper documentary evidence attached to its opposition, which establishes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the non-moving party fails to produce sufficient factual support in its opposition which proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) mandates the granting of the motion for summary judgment. See Babin, 764 So. 2d at 40 ; Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-0874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/20), 305 So. 3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020-00835 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So. 3d 315.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Janney v. Pearce, 2009-2103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10), 40 So. 3d 285, 289, writ denied, 2010-1356 (La. 9/24/10), 45 So. 3d 1078.³ Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Operations, LLC, 255 So. 3d at 22.

The LPLA provides the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. See La. R.S. 9:2800.52. A claimant may not recover from a manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any theory of liability that is not set forth in the LPLA. See La. R.S. 9:2800.52 ; ExPert Riser Sols., LLC v. Techcrane Int'l, LLC, 2019-1165 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 320, 326-27.

To recover under the LPLA, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; (2) that the claimant's damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; (3) that this characteristic made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) that the claimant's damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or someone else. See La. R.S. 9:2800.54(A) ; Delahoussaye v. Boelter, 2019-0026 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/15/19), 290 So. 3d 669, 674.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.54(B) sets forth that a product is unreasonably dangerous if and only if:

(1) The product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition as provided in R.S. 9:2800.55 ;^[4]

(2) The product is unreasonably dangerous in design as provided in R.S. 9:2800.56 ;^[5]

(3) The product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about the product has not been provided as provided in R.S. 9:2800.57 ;^[6] or

(4) The product is unreasonably dangerous because it does not conform to an express warranty of the manufacturer about the product as provided in R.S. 9:2800.58.^[7]

A plaintiff suing a manufacturer on the basis of a claimed injury resulting from a defect in a product has the burden of proving the product was defective and the defect caused plaintiff's injury. United Fire Group v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2013-2115 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/18/14), 2014 WL 4067756, at *6 (unpublished). A plaintiff in a products liability action must prove that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use; that the product was in normal use at the time the injury occurred; that the defect caused the injury; and that the condition existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer or supplier. Plaintiff must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence exists when the evidence, direct or circumstantial, taken as a whole shows that the fact of causation sought to be proved is more probable than not. United Fire Group, 2014 WL 4067756 at *6.

DISCUSSION

Graco sought summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs would be unable to meet their burden of proving essential elements of their LPLA claim—that the child restraint was defective or caused any injury to Oliver. In their...