Skinner v. State

1

ZATAYMON TIMON SKINNER, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

No. 12-22-00113-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Twelfth District, Tyler

July 21, 2023

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the 159th District Court of Angelina County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2019-0801)

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GREG NEELEYL JUSTICE

Zataymon Timon Skinner appeals his conviction for aggravated kidnapping and robbery. Appellant presents seven issues on appeal. We affirm.

Background

Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated sexual assault aggravated kidnapping, and robbery. He pleaded "not guilty," and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury ultimately found Appellant "guilty" of aggravated kidnapping and robbery but "not guilty" of aggravated sexual assault. At the punishment phase Appellant pleaded "true" to the enhancement paragraphs regarding prior convictions. At the conclusion of the punishment phase, the jury sentenced Appellant to eighty years imprisonment for aggravated kidnapping and seventy years imprisonment for robbery. This appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his fifth issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Specifically, he urges that because he was found not guilty of the underlying crime, aggravated sexual assault, he cannot be guilty of aggravated kidnapping.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The Jackson v. Virginia^[1] legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16, 99 S.Ct. at 2686-87; see also Escobedo v State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet ref'd). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. This requires the reviewing court to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations, because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. A "court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 2793. A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2217-18, 72 L.Ed.2d 642 (1982).

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the state's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the state's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried." Id.

A person commits aggravated kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to inflict bodily injury on her or violate or abuse her sexually. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(a)(4) (West 2019). A person also commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if the person "intentionally or knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense." Id. § 20.04(b). "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent her liberation by (1) secreting or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found or (2) using or threatening to use deadly force. Id. § 20.01(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2022). "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person's liberty, by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person. Id. § 20.01(1)(A). Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception. Id.

Analysis

Appellant urges that because he was found "not guilty" of aggravated sexual assault, the evidence is insufficient to prove he intended to sexually abuse Jane Doe.^[2]

According to Doe, Appellant came to Burger King after her shift and asked her to take him to the store. After Appellant got into the vehicle, he insisted on driving and began threatening her. Doe claimed that Appellant threatened her several times that night. She described him as scary and testified to being afraid he would kill her. Doe testified that Appellant asked her for voluntary sex, but when she refused, he raped her. She subsequently asked if she could get dressed, and he told her to get into the trunk instead. Using the trunk's latch, Doe opened the trunk while the car was moving in an attempt to escape. She eventually escaped and called 911. After speaking with the police, Doe underwent a sexual assault examination.

Officer Cody Deal of the Lufkin Police Department responded to Doe's 911 call. Doe told Deal that a man was standing beside her vehicle when she got off work. The man threatened to kill her if she did not get into the vehicle. Doe stated that she was forced to drive from that location, and eventually told to stop so that he could drive. She alleged that he drove to a secluded location, raped her, and then basically threw her in the trunk and drove away with her in the trunk. Doe was very distraught and clearly in distress. Deal stated that he could tell that she just experienced some type of traumatic event. She was crying and hysterical.

Norma Sanford, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), testified that she performed a SANE exam on Doe after the incident. Sanford stated that Doe was nervous, scared, animated, talked quickly, and shook uncontrollably. However, she was articulate and a good historian. Sanford testified that Doe described what occurred the night in question. Doe told Sanford that Appellant was standing by her car when she got off work. He told her to get in the vehicle or he would kill her. According to Sanford, Doe stated that Appellant reached over, slapped her, and said he was going to drive, or he would kill her. At a stop sign, he got in the driver's side, pulled her out of the car, and made her get in the passenger seat. Appellant came to a dead end and tried to force her into the back seat, and she would not cooperate. Doe told Sanford that she opened the back door to get away, but he yanked her hair. Appellant made her remove her clothes by the trunk of the car and bend over the trunk, then raped her. He tied her hands behind her back and threw her naked in the trunk. Doe stated that she got loose, popped the trunk, jumped out, and took off running and naked down the street. Doe told Sanford that Appellant initially chased her, but then took the car and drove off. Sanford's examination showed evidence of vaginal intercourse. Sanford also noted abrasions on Doe's legs and left shoulder.

The police officer who inventoried Doe's vehicle found her pants, shoes, underwear, and purse strap in the trunk of the vehicle. And the forensic analyst testified that Appellant cannot be eliminated as a possible contributor of the vaginal samples taken from Doe.

Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to sexually abuse or violate Doe to support aggravated kidnapping, even if he was not guilty of aggravated sexual assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(a)(4); see also Uddin v. State, 503 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (stating that sexual assault is not an element of aggravated kidnapping and is distinct from element that defendant intend to violate or abuse sexually). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's fifth issue.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first and second issues, Appellant contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, in his first issue, Appellant urges trial counsel's dual role as surety on Appellant's bail bond resulted in a conflict of interest. And in his second issue, he urges that he received ineffective assistance at the punishment phase when evidence of his surrendered bond was admitted into evidence.

Governing Law

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees in all criminal prosecutions that the accused shall have the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Monreal v State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the United States Supreme Court's two-pronged test established in Strickland. Hernandez v State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must show that (1) trial counsel's representation was...