Slaughter v. Bd. of Supervisors of Southern Univ.

275 Ed. Law Rep. 479

76 So.3d 465

Dr. Ralph SLAUGHTER

v.BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE.

No. 2010 CA 1114.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Aug. 2, 2011.Rehearing Denied Aug. 31, 2011.

Jill L. Craft, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff–Appellant Dr. Ralph Slaughter.

Lewis O. Unglesby, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant–Appellee Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Agricultural & Mechanical College.

Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.

KUHN, J.

[1 Cir. 2] Dr. Ralph Slaughter (Dr. Slaughter) appeals the trial court's judgment ordering him to pay monetary sanctions, attorney fees, and costs. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Slaughter, the former President of the Southern University System, filed suit in September 2009 against the Board of Supervisors of the Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College System (Board) for past due wages. After a trial, the judge orally rendered judgment in favor of the Board.¹ A few days later, but before the written judgment was signed, Dr. Slaughter filed a motion to recuse the trial judge, Judge Timothy Kelley (Judge Kelley). The motion alleged that Judge Kelley was biased and prejudiced against Dr. Slaughter and his counsel, Jill Craft (Ms. Craft), and failed to disclose on the record that his wife, Angele Davis (Ms. Davis), was the Louisiana Commissioner of Administration.

The motion to recuse was supported by Dr. Slaughter's affidavit, verifying that all the facts and allegations in the motion and accompanying memorandum were true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. Dr. Slaughter's affidavit further expressly stated that “[a]t no time prior or during trial ... did Judge Kelley disclose to me that he is the spouse of Commissioner of Administration, Angele Davis”; that at the trial, Ms. Davis' name was mentioned by the last two witnesses, including a state employee who “ultimately reports” to [1 Cir. 3] Ms. Davis; and that Judge Kelley mocked Ms. Craft and “openly expressed contempt toward” Dr. Slaughter and Ms. Craft during the trial.

The Board opposed the motion, arguing that the record did not reflect the facts alleged in support of the claim of bias and that Ms. Craft knew about the relationship between Judge Kelley and Ms. Davis before the trial, but failed to tell Dr. Slaughter. The Board further argued because neither the State of Louisiana nor the Division of Administration is a party to the suit, the motion's second ground was invalid, and the motion was frivolous.

Judge Kelley ordered that the motion to recuse be referred to another judge for hearing; the motion was allotted to Judge Janice Clark (Judge Clark). Prior to the recusal hearing, Dr. Slaughter filed a motion to recuse Judge Clark on the basis that the Board's attorneys (the law firm of DeCuir, Clark & Adams, as well as Winston G. DeCuir, Sr. and Winston G. DeCuir, Jr.) were representing Judge Clark and her husband in a pending lawsuit in city court.

The Board maintained that the motion to recuse Judge Clark was untimely because before the motion was filed, Ms. Craft knew the DeCuir firm, as well as Winston G. DeCuir, Jr. and Sr., had withdrawn as counsel of record for the Board.² The Board also asserted that Ms. Craft had knowledge of Judge Clark's legal representation by the DeCuirs as far back as 2007. At that time, Ms. Craft was representing Dr. Slaughter in a different lawsuit against the Board, and Judge Clark, who was presiding over the matter, disclosed that the Board's attorney, the DeCuirs, also represented her.

[1 Cir. 4] Judge Clark denied the motion to recuse herself. The next day, Judge Clark denied the motion to recuse Judge Kelley and concluded that motion was untimely. In her oral reasons, Judge Clark reasoned that the evidence produced at the hearing showed before the lawsuit for past due wages was filed Ms. Craft was aware Ms. Davis was married to Judge Kelley. Judge Clark further found that the evidence failed to support the ground of bias.

Dr. Slaughter filed an application for supervisory writs in this court, seeking review only as to Judge Clark's ruling denying the motion to recuse herself and her failure to refer that motion to another judge.³ The record does not reflect that a request for a stay of the proceedings was made to the trial court or this court.

While the writ application was pending, the Board filed a motion for sanctions, arguing that both motions to recuse were frivolous and that the Board was entitled to an award of sanctions, attorney fees, and costs against Dr. Slaughter and Ms. Craft. After argument at the March 15, 2010 hearing, Judge Kelley ordered Dr. Slaughter to pay sanctions in the amount of $500 to the district court, attorney fees in the amount of $7,500 to the Board's attorney, Mr. Lewis Unglesby (Mr. Unglesby), and to pay “all sums with interest from the date of judgment and all further costs that may be incurred as a result of the sanctions.” ⁴ Judge Kelley did not issue sanctions against Ms. Craft; nor was she cast in [1 Cir. 5] judgment.

On April 22, 2010, this court granted Dr. Slaughter's application for writs in Slaughter v. Board of Supervisors, 2010–0231 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/22/10), pertaining to Judge Clark's ruling denying the motion to recuse herself. The action was as follows:

WRIT GRANTED. The Judge's ruling of January 25, 2010, denying plaintiff's motion to recuse her is reversed and judgment is entered remanding this matter for reallotment of the motion to recuse Judge Clark to another division for consideration. Plaintiff has presented sufficient grounds to require such reallotment.

The record reflects that on May 24, 2010, Dr. Slaughter filed a motion to vacate the January 25, 2010 ruling by Judge Clark denying the motion to recuse Judge Kelley. Dr. Slaughter argued that Judge Clark's ruling as to the recusal of Judge Kelley became null and void by this court's writ action reversing Judge Clark's ruling on motion to recuse herself. The Board opposed the motion to vacate, arguing that the writ action only applied to the issue of whether Judge Clark should have referred for reallotment the motion to recuse herself. The Board asserted the proper procedure would be to hold the motion to vacate in abeyance until a decision on the motion to recuse Judge Clark was rendered.

The appellate record does not reveal the disposition of the motion to vacate, but on June 17, 2010, another judge of the district court signed a judgment, stating that the motion to recuse Judge Clark was moot and ordering the reallotment of the motion to recuse Judge Kelley. The motion to recuse Judge Kelley was realloted to Judge Wilson Fields (Judge Fields). After a hearing, Judge Fields denied the motion to recuse Judge Kelley. Judge Fields reasoned that prior to the trial of the wage suit, Ms. Craft knew that Judge Kelley was married to Ms. Davis, that Ms. [1 Cir. 6] Davis' name was only mentioned during the testimony of the last two witnesses at the trial, that a review of the trial transcript did not indicate any bias against Dr. Slaughter or Ms. Craft, and that it appeared Judge Kelley made his ruling in the wage suit based on the law.⁵ On August 3, 2010, Judge Fields signed the written judgment denying the motion to recuse Judge Kelley.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Dr. Slaughter contends that the issue of whether the motions to recuse Judges Kelley and Clark were frivolous, is a question of law, and thus, warrants a de novo review. The Board argues that because the issue involves the imposition of sanctions, the applicable standard is manifest error.

A trial court's determination regarding the imposition of sanctions is subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Once the trial court finds a violation of La. C.C.P. art. 863 and imposes sanctions, the determination of the type and/or the amount of the sanction is reviewed on appeal utilizing the abuse of discretion standard. Stroscher v. Stroscher, 2001–2769 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/14/03), 845 So.2d 518, 526; Connelly v. Lee, 96–1213 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/9/97), 699 So.2d 411, 414, writ denied, 97–2825 (La.1/30/98), 709 So.2d 710.

APPLICABLE LAW

To impose sanctions, a trial court must find that one of the affirmative duties imposed by Article 863 has been violated. Connelly, 699 So.2d at 414. Article 863 provides, in pertinent part:

[1 Cir. 7] B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he has read the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all of the following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual assertion, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is warranted by the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief....

D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the court determines that a certification has been made in violation of the provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party the amount of the...