Slaughter v. United States

DONALD SLAUGHTER, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 4:16-CV-915 CAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

March 31, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on movant Donald Slaughter's amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Johnson held that the Armed Career Criminal Act's¹ ("ACCA") residual clause is unconstitutional. The government opposes the motion, arguing that Johnson does not affect movant's sentence and he remains an armed career criminal because his ACCA predicate offenses were enumerated clause convictions, not residual clause violent felonies. The government also argues that movant's motion is not cognizable in a successive habeas action because it actually seeks relief based on statutory interpretation principles set forth in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and does not rely on a new rule of constitutional law, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant movant's motion.

I. Background

On October 7, 2009, movant was indicted and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Slaughter, No. 4:09-CR-643 CAS (E.D. Mo.) (Doc. 1).

Movant pleaded guilty on December 29, 2009. (Docs. 16, 17, No. 4:09-CR-643.) A presentence investigation report ("PSR") was prepared after the guilty verdict. (Doc. 38, No. 4:09-CR-643.) The PSR stated that movant met the Armed Career Criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because he "has prior crime of violence felony convictions including Burglary First Degree under Docket No. 22991-04108 and Burglary Second Degree under Docket Nos. 2100R-00224, 2100R-00219, 2101R-002059, and 2012R-00750[.]" (Id. at 5.)

On July 27, 2010, the Court sentenced movant to 180 months, and a three-year period of supervised release. Movant appealed, arguing that the Court erred in refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. United States v. Slaughter, 407 F. App'x 83 (8th Cir. 2011).

Movant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on August 8, 2014. The Court dismissed the motion as time barred and denied a certificate of appealability. Slaughter v. United States, No. 4:14-CV-1389 CAS (E.D. Mo.) (Mem. and Order of Sept. 23, 2014). Movant did not appeal the dismissal.

After the Supreme Court decided Johnson, movant filed a petition for authorization to file a successive motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted. Slaughter v. United States, No. 15-3678 (8th Cir. June 7, 2016). The instant case was then filed.

II. Legal Standard

A district court may vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence if "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Movant bears the burden to show he is entitled to relief. Day v. United States, 428 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1970). In a case involving an ACCA conviction such as this one, "the movant carries the burden of showing that the Government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction fell under the ACCA." Hardman v. United States, 149 F.Supp.3d 1144, 1148 (W.D. Mo. 2016); see also Hardman v. United States, 191 F.Supp.3d 989, 992-93 (W.D. Mo. 2016) (denying government's motion for reconsideration on the issue of the burden of proof).

III. Discussion

In the amended motion, movant asserts that none of his Missouri second-degree burglary convictions qualify as predicate offenses now that Johnson has declared the ACCA's residual clause unconstitutional. In his reply memorandum, movant refines his argument to be that his Missouri burglary convictions for burglary of an inhabitable structure no longer qualify as crimes of violence. See Reply at 2, 5, 8-9. The government opposes the motion, responding that despite Johnson, movant is still subject to the armed career criminal enhancement because his status does not rest on the ACCA's residual clause. The government asserts that movant's burglary convictions were classified as violent felonies under the enumerated clause of the ACCA, not the residual clause.

The government also asserts that movant's claims are not cognizable in a successive § 2255 habeas action, as his motion fails to meet 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)'s requirement that a successive motion be based on a new rule of constitutional law. The government argues that movant "attacks his second degree burglary convictions based on Missouri's definition of 'inhabitable structure'"which "demonstrates reliance on the statutory interpretation principles espoused in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), not the constitutional holding in Johnson." Gov't Response at 6.

Movant replies that his motion meets the requirements of § 2255(h)(2) as it is based on Johnson's new rule of constitutional law that is retroactive to cases on collateral review, Welch v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and which was previously unavailable to him. Movant states that because the definition of inhabitable structure used in Missouri's burglary statute is broader than generic burglary as defined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), see United States v. Bess, 655 F. App'x 518, 519 (8th Cir. 2016) (unpublished per curiam), his burglary conviction does not qualify as an ACCA enumerated predicate offense, but at the time of sentencing it qualified under the ACCA's residual clause based on Eighth Circuit precedent such as United States v. Hascall, 76 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Bell, 445 F.3d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2006). Movant correctly observes that at sentencing, the Court did not specify the basis on which it found the burglary convictions to be ACCA violent felonies.

A. The Armed Career Criminal Act

Movant's claim for relief relies on the interaction of recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the ACCA. Ordinarily, the crime of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is subject to a maximum punishment of fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a). The ACCA enhances the sentence and requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence if a person who violates § 922(g) has three previous convictions for a "violent felony." The statute defines violent felony as any felony that: "(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physicalinjury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The italicized language, commonly known as the "residual clause," is the portion of the statute invalidated by Johnson, see 135 S. Ct. at 2556-57. The remaining clauses, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (the "elements clause"), and the first clause of § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) (the "enumerated offenses clause"), are still effective. Id. at 2563. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268.

B. Movant Meets the Requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255(h)(2)

Section 2244(b)(4) of Title 28 states that a "district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeal has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section." Separately, Section 2255(h)(2) requires that a second or successive habeas motion must contain "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."

The government argues that movant's motion does not present a cognizable claim because it is not based on a new rule of constitutional law as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). The government contends that movant attacks his burglary convictions using a means/elements analysis of the Missouri burglary statute, and is therefore based on statutory interpretation principles set forth in Mathis, and not on the constitutional holding in Johnson that announced a new rule of federal law.

In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that in determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate, the modified categorical approach of analysis cannot be used if the statute itemizes various factual means of committing a single element of a crime, instead of listing multiple elements disjunctively. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248-53. Specifically, the Court held that because theelements of Iowa's burglary statute - which applies to "any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle" - are broader than those of generic "burglary" - which requires unlawful entry into a "building or other structure" - prior convictions under the Iowa burglary law cannot give rise to a sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Id. at 2256, 2257.

As this Court and other courts have recognized, it is Johnson, and not earlier Supreme Court decisions such as Mathis, that may offer persons such as movant relief from his status as an armed career criminal. See United States v. Winston, ___ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 977031, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 2017); Redd v. United States, 2017 WL 633850, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2017); Darden v. United States, 2017 WL 168458, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 17, 2017); Givens v. United States, 2016 WL 7242162, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2016); Taylor v. United States, 2016 WL 6995872, at *3-5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2016); Hayes v. United States, 2016 WL 4206028, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2016); see also United States v. Ladwig, 192 F.Supp.3d 1153, 1159-60 (E.D. Wash. 2016).

This is because without Johnson's invalidation of the residual clause, movant would...