Sloat v. Camfil U.S.

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STEPHEN SLOAT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CAMFIL USA, INC., Defendant

No. 23 CV 5125

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

April 10, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEREMY C. DANIEL, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Stephen Sloat, a former employee of Camfil USA, Inc. (“Camfil”), alleges that Camfil required him to provide biometric fingerprint scans to clock in and out of work without first obtaining his consent. (R. 1 (“Compl.”).) He filed this putative class action lawsuit claiming that Camfil violated § 15(a) and § 15(b) of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Camfil now moves to dismiss Sloat's complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (R 15.) Camfil also moves to strike Sloat's class allegations. (Id.) For the reasons that follow, the defendant's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Camfil is a Delaware manufacturer of air filtration systems doing business in Illinois. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Sloat worked as an hourly employee at Camfil's facility in Crystal Lake Illinois from September 2019 to July 2021. (Id. ¶ 5). He alleges that Camfil implemented a timekeeping program that captured, collected, and used his fingerprints without his consent. (Id. ¶ 2.) Sloat states that he “[h]e was required to have his fingerprint collected and/or captured to track his time, record his attendance, and/or authenticate his identity.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) He estimates that his biometric information was captured without informed consent “over 1,000 times” and that, upon information and belief, all other hourly employees and workers were also required to have their fingerprints collected or captured. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) In addition, Sloat alleges that Camfil failed to maintain or publicize information about its practices or policies concerning the retention of biometric identifiers. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Sloat filed this putative class action on behalf of himself and other Camfil employees, alleging that Camfil violated § 15(a) of BIPA by failing to disclose its policy regarding the storage and destruction of employees' biometric information, and by failing to destroy employees' biometric information after they left the company. (Id. ¶¶ 35(e), 36.) Sloat also alleges that Camfil violated § 15(b) of BIPA by capturing employees' biometric information without informing them or obtaining their consent. (Id. ¶¶ 2 15.) In addition to class certification, Sloat seeks statutory liquidated damages, injunctive and equitable relief, and attorneys' fees, costs, and interest under 740 ILCS 14/20. (Id.) Camfil now moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety and strike Sloat's class allegations. (R. 15.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in response to a defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, the defendant argues that jurisdictional allegations in the complaint are inadequate, “the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan, 570 F.3d at 820. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). The allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While factual allegations are entitled to a presumption of truth, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

ANALYSIS

I. Subject matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction is “the first issue in any case,” so the Court begins there. Miller v. Sw. Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2019). This Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because Sloat has alleged that: (i) at least one putative class member is a citizen of a state different from Camfil; (ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive of interest and costs; and (iii) no relevant exceptions apply. (Compl. ¶ 6.)

Camfil does not dispute these allegations but contends that Sloat lacks standing under Article III of the Constitution. “Standing is an element of subjectmatter jurisdiction in a civil action.” Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 908 F.3d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 2018). To establish Article III standing, Sloat must plausibly allege that (1) he suffered an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) there is a causal connection between his injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) there is a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)). Only the first element-injury-in-fact-is at issue here.

To qualify as “concrete” for purposes of the injury-in-fact requirement, a plaintiff's injury must be “real, . . . not abstract.” Spoke o, 135 S.Ct. at 1548. “[A] bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” does not “satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. “Instead, the plaintiff must show that the statutory violation presented an ‘appreciable risk of harm' to the underlying concrete interest that [the legislature] sought to protect by enacting the statute.” Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Since Sloat alleges that Camfil has violated both § 15(a) and § 15(b) of BIPA, the Court must consider whether his allegations are sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement for each claim. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021) (“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must [have] standing for each claim that they press[.]”)

Section 15(a) of BIPA requires a private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information to develop a written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying the same “when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.” 740 ILCS 14/15(a). Fingerprints are “biometric identifiers” within the meaning of the statute. 740 ILCS 14/10.

Sloat alleges that Camfil violated this subsection by failing to “provide a publicly available retention schedule detailing the length of time biometric information is stored and guidelines for permanently destroying the biometric information it stores,” and “[b]y capturing, storing, and using Plaintiff's and the other Class members' biometric identifiers and/or biometric information” (i.e. their fingerprints) without destroying them. (Compl. ¶¶ 35(e), 36).

Sloat's first § 15(a) allegation-that Camfil failed to publish a publicly-available retention schedule regarding the storage and destruction of biometric information-is insufficient to establish Article III standing. The Seventh Circuit has held that “the duty to disclose [retention policies] under section 15(a) is owed to the public generally, not to particular persons whose biometric information the entity collects.” Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc, 958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, allegations that Camfil failed to publish a retention schedule are insufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. See id.

The complaint alleges more than generalized harm due to Camfil's failure to publicly disclose its retention policy, however. Sloat asserts that Camfil's retention of (and failure to destroy) his own biometric information violates § 15(a). (Compl. ¶ 36.) Viewing this allegation in the light most favorable to Sloat, the Court concludes that it is sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact. In Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, the Seventh Circuit held that allegations a defendant had “violat[ed] the full range of its section 15(a) duties by failing to develop, publicly disclose, and comply” with a data-retention schedule were sufficient to establish Article III standing. 980 F.3d 1146, 1154 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit stated that Bryant was limited to the specific theory invoked-the failure to publicly disclose a retention policy-“and did not address other provisions in Section 15(a).” Id. at 1148-49.

Like the plaintiff in Fox, Sloat alleges that Camfil unlawfully retained his biometric information and failed to destroy it even after the “initial purpose” for obtaining that information- “timekeeping and payroll”-had been accomplished due to his departure from the company. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 36.) These allegations are sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. See Neals v. ParTech, Inc., No. 19 C 5660, 2021 WL 463100, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2021) (concluding that allegations that biometric data was unlawfully retained in violation of § 15(a) were sufficient to establish Article III standing).

Camfil resists this conclusion, arguing that because less than three years have passed since Sloat left Camfil, any claim that the company violated § 15(a) by failing to destroy his information is not yet ripe. (R. 16 at 5-6.) The ripeness doctrine “arises out of [Article III's] case or controversy...