Slone v. Racer

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OPAL R. SLONE, individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jacquline Hudson, and THE ESTATE OF JACQULINE HUDSON Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY RACER, individually & in his capacity as a Deputy for the Cabell County Sheriff's Office, and CABELL COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, a West Virginia political subdivision, and CHUCK ZERKLE, as the Elected Sheriff of Cabell County, West Virginia, and CABELL COUNTY COMMISSION, a West Virginia political subdivision, and JOHN DOE 1-5, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:23-0636

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Huntington Division

September 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant Jeffrey Racer's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 34) and a joint Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Cabell County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Chuck Zerkle, and the Cabell County Commission. ECF No. 41. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES the Cabell County Sheriff's Office as a Defendant in this matter, and GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, the remainder of the motions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiffs Opal R. Slone, individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jacquline Hudson and the Estate of Jackquiline Hudson filed a Complaint against Jeffrey Racer, the Cabell County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Chuck Zerkle, the Cabell County Commission and John Does 1-5. The named Defendants filed Answers and Motions to Dismiss. In response, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion to Amend their Complaint. The Court granted the motion and denied the pending Motions to Dismiss without prejudice. On January 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. The named Defendants then filed Answers to the First Amended Complaint and renewed Motions to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs allege in their First Amended Complaint that Jeffrey Racer was a Cabell County Deputy Sheriff who was acting within the scope and authority of his employment and under color of state law when he struck and killed thirteen-year-old Jacquiline “Laney” Hudson with his patrol cruiser. Am. Compl. ¶¶1, 28. At the time of the event, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Racer was driving above the speed limit in an outrageous, reckless, or negligent manner and Ms. Hudson's body was thrown approximately 150 feet from the point of impact. Id. ¶¶3, 6, 50, 66. In his Affidavit, which Plaintiffs quote and reference in the Amended Complaint, Deputy Racer further states that, when the accident happened, he was driving the cruiser to the Main Tri-State Transit Authority to refuel it. Id. ¶7; Aff. of Jeffrey Racer, Jr. ¶4 (Oct. 17, 2023), ECF No. 14-1. Although his shift had ended earlier in the day, Deputy Racer asserts the Cabell County Sheriff's Office had a policy that “tasks deputies such as [himself] with ensuring that their County-issued vehicles are properly maintained in a manner that will allow them to effectively discharge their duties during their shift,” which includes permitting off-duty deputies to drive their patrol vehicles for refueling purposes. Aff. of Racer ¶¶3, 5-7. Deputy Racer stated that his “plan was to refuel and then drive [his] County-issued vehicle to the residence at which [he] was staying that night so that [his] fully-fueled vehicle was ready for patrol immediately when [his] shift started the following morning.” Id. ¶4.

Plaintiffs further allege that, after Deputy Racer struck Ms. Hudson, he failed to render proper aid to her or place her in his cruiser and drive her to an emergency department that was one-half mile away. Am. Compl. ¶¶40-42. Plaintiffs claim that he also did not use his radio, his department-issued cellphone, or his personal cellphone to call 911. Id. ¶¶43, 44. Instead, he relied upon a bystander to call 911 to report the accident. Id. ¶44. Unfortunately, Ms. Hudson tragically died at the scene.

As a result of these events, Plaintiffs assert nine causes of action in their Amended Complaint against Defendants. In Count I, Plaintiffs assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all the named Defendants for violating the substantive due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count II, Plaintiffs state a claim of negligence against Deputy Racer and a claim of vicarious liability for his negligent acts against Defendants the Cabell County Sheriff's Office, the Cabell County Commission, and Sheriff Zerkle. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege Defendant Racer violated his duty to render aid to Ms. Hudson. In Count IV, Plaintiffs assert a claim for Wrongful Death under West Virginia law. In Count V, Plaintiffs assert a § 1983 claim against Defendants the Cabell County Sheriff's Office, the Cabell County Commission, and Sheriff Zerkle for failing to properly screen Deputy Racer when he was hired and for failing to properly train and supervise him. In Count VI, Plaintiffs state a claim for negligent hiring against Defendants the Cabell County Sheriff's Office, the Cabell County Commission, and Sheriff Zerkle. In Count VII, Plaintiffs assert a claim against Defendants the Cabell County Sheriff's Office, the Cabell County Commission, and Sheriff Zerkle for negligent retention. In Count VIII, Plaintiffs assert Defendants actions and/or inactions violated the West Virginia State Constitution. Lastly, in Count IX, Plaintiffs assert a claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants. Defendants now seek to have these claims dismissed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In both Deputy Racer's motion and the joint motion by Defendants the Sheriff's Office, the County Commission, and Sheriff Zerkle, the parties argue the claims against them should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the motion filed by the joint Defendants was filed after they filed their Answer and Deputy Racer's motion was filed contemporaneously with his Answer. Therefore, both motions technically are motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), rather than under Rule 12(b)(6). See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that because the answer and motion to dismiss were filed “simultaneously, it technically should have filed the motion under Rule 12(c) as one for judgment on the pleadings” (citations omitted)).

Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is nearly identical to one under Rule 12(b)(6), with the key difference being that under Rule 12(c) a court also may consider a party's Answer and attachments. See Pellegrino v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 709 F.Supp.3d 206, 211 (E.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2024) (stating that, “[i]n ruling on a motion under Rule 12(c), the court applies the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, [however,] [u]nlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts consider[ ] the pleadings (the complaint, answer, and any written instruments attached to those filings) and any documents that are integral to the complaint and authentic” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); cf. Morrison v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., Civ. Act. No. 3:23-0451, 2024 WL 3258213, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. July 1, 2024) (stating “a court reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion ‘may . . . consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic” without converting the motion into one for summary judgment'” (quoting United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014)). Here, similar to the Affidavit, Deputy Racer also states in his Amended Answer that, at the time of the accident, “he was going to refuel his vehicle” and “was acting within the scope of his employment.” Def. Jeffrey Racer, Jr.'s Ans. To Pls.' First Am. Compl. ¶¶1, 8, ECF No. 33. Deputy Racer further explained “he was required to insure [sic] that the routine and scheduled maintenance on his assigned vehicle was current and properly maintained and that he was permitted to utilize his assigned vehicle while not on duty to refuel his vehicle in preparation for returning to duty.” Id. ¶8. As the authenticity of Deputy Racer's Affidavit is not challenged and Plaintiffs specifically quote from it in the Amended Complaint to support their claims, the Court may consider both the Affidavit and Deputy Racer's Answer under Rule 12(c) without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.

Additionally, as a Rule 12(c) motion in other respects is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “However, the court need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts, and need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d 380, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations, brackets, and quotations omitted). This Court should grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if, “‘accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.'” Priority Auto Grp., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 757 F.3d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999)). It is under these standards the Court must consider Defendants' arguments.^[1]

III. DISCUSSION

A. Cabell County Sheriff's Office

Initially ...