Smalls v. Collins

10 F.4th 117

Andrew SMALLS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Police Officer Richard COLLINS and Police Officer David Teta, Defendants-Appellees,City of New York, Police Officer Eric Cabrera, Police Officer Jessica Alvarado, Sergeant Brian Stamm and Police Officer Alvarez, Defendants.

Deshawn Daniel, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Detective Brian Taylor, Detective Neil Magliano, Detective James Cleary, Sergeant Wesley Fradera, Defendants-Appellees,City of New York, John and Jane Does 1-5, Neil C. Magliano, Defendants.

Docket Nos. 20-1099-cv/20-1331-cv

August Term, 2020

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: March 08, 2021

Decided: August 20, 2021

Joel B. Rudin (Matthew A. Wasserman, Jacob Loup, Law Offices of Joel B. Rudin, P.C., New York, NY, and Jon L. Norinsberg, Law Offices of Jon L. Norinsberg, New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant Andrew Smalls;

Gregory Antollino, Antollino, PLLC, New York, NY, and Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, New Paltz, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant Deshawn Daniel;

John Moore (Richard Paul Dearing, Devin Slack, on the brief), for James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

David A. Lebowitz, Douglas E. Lieb, Kaufman Lieb Lebowitz & Frick LLP, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Bronx Defenders, Cato Institute, Center for Appellate Litigation, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law at New York University School of Law, Legal Aid Society, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Police Accountability Project, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York State Chief Defenders Association, New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Office of the Appellate Defender.

Joshua L. Dratel, Lindsey A. Lewis, Joshua L. Dratel, P.C., New York, NY, for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Before: Sack, Menashi, Circuit Judges, and Kaplan, District Judge.^*

Sack, Circuit Judge:

Although these appeals come to us in different procedural postures, they present similar material facts and closely related legal questions and were therefore heard, and are decided, in tandem.

Plaintiffs-appellants Andrew Smalls and Deshawn Daniel were each prosecuted in state court for criminal possession of a weapon (and, in Smalls's case, also for trespass); in each case, the criminal proceedings terminated without an extant criminal conviction or any remaining pending charges. Smalls was initially convicted of three counts, two of which were later dismissed on appeal and the third on remand. Daniel's charge was resolved by an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, and his case was ultimately dismissed in its entirety.

Both subsequently filed civil suits against the defendants¹ (Smalls in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and Daniel in the Southern District). They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each alleging that the defendants-appellees had deprived him of a fair trial by fabricating evidence. Daniel also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for racial discrimination, unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, failure to intervene, for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and supervisory liability. Daniel further sought equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to his claims.

Smalls's section 1983 fabricated-evidence claim proceeded to trial and a jury found Police Officers Richard Collins and David Teta (the "Smalls defendants") liable. The Smalls defendants subsequently moved for an order vacating the judgment and entering judgment in their favor based on the Supreme Court's decision in McDonough v. Smith , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 204 L.Ed.2d 506 (2019), which held that section 1983 fabricated-evidence claims do not accrue (and therefore cannot be brought) until a criminal proceeding has ended in the defendant's favor or a resulting conviction has been invalidated within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). McDonough , 139 S. Ct. at 2158. The district court (Carol Bagley Amon, Judge ) granted the Smalls defendants' motion, reasoning that McDonough 's favorable-termination requirement for section 1983 fabricated-evidence claims is identical to that required for malicious-prosecution claims. In the context of malicious-prosecution claims, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates her innocence. See Lanning v. City of Glens Falls , 908 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2018). The district court concluded that Smalls could not meet this standard and that his claim was therefore barred.

Daniel's case proceeded through two rounds of motions to dismiss. Following the first such motion, the district court (Ronnie Abrams, Judge ) dismissed Daniel's section 1981 claims, dismissed Daniel's claims for failure to intervene, supervisory liability, and municipal liability, and dismissed as untimely Daniel's section 1983 illegal search and excessive force claims. The district court also denied Daniel's cross-motion for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to his claims. In the wake of the district court's decision, only Daniel's section 1983 fabricated-evidence claim remained. The Daniel defendants moved to dismiss this claim based on McDonough . The district court granted the motion. As in Smalls , the district court decided that the case law governing malicious-prosecution claims should guide its analysis. Because an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal does not constitute a favorable termination for malicious-prosecution claims, see Rothstein v. Carriere , 373 F.3d 275, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2004), the district court concluded that Daniel's adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was not a favorable termination within the meaning of McDonough and that his fabricated-evidence claim was therefore barred.

Smalls and Daniel both appeal. They contend that the district courts erred in dismissing their respective section 1983 fabricated-evidence claims because McDonough does not require a termination indicative of innocence, and their criminal proceedings terminated in their favor within the meaning of McDonough . Daniel also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his section 1981 claims and denying his motion for equitable tolling. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that (1) the district courts erred in dismissing Smalls's and Daniel's section 1983 fabricated-evidence claims and entering judgment for the defendants; (2) Daniel's section 1981 claims were properly dismissed; and (3) Daniel's equitable tolling motion was properly denied. We therefore reverse the district courts' judgments with respect to the fair-trial claims, affirm the dismissal of Daniel's other claims, and remand each matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. Smalls

A. Smalls's State Criminal Proceedings

Plaintiff-appellant Andrew Smalls was indicted in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County, on two counts of criminal possession of a weapon (a firearm) and one count of criminal trespass. Smalls filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the firearm from use as evidence.

At the suppression hearing, police officers testified that, while in uniform, they were on foot patrol at a New York City public housing project when they heard a gunshot. They walked to the rear of a building from or near which the gunshots appeared to emanate. There, they saw a group of five youths (four males and one female), including Smalls, walking away from the building. The officers followed them for several blocks. When, eventually, the youths became aware of the officers' presence, they began to run. The police gave chase and followed the group further into the public housing complex, which had "no trespassing" signs displayed, and up the stairs to the roof of one of the buildings. The officers testified that during the chase, they saw Smalls hand a pistol to a member of the group who turned out to be his brother, Ronnie; that the gun fell into the stairwell; and that the officers recovered the weapon one or two feet away from Ronnie. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Smalls's motion to suppress.

The case then proceeded to a jury trial. Smalls was convicted on all three counts. He was subsequently sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment on the first weapons charge for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, four years' imprisonment on the second weapons charge for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (to be served concurrently with the sentence for the first weapons charge), and time served on the trespass charge.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed Smalls's conviction. The court held that the trial court should have granted Smalls's motion to suppress the "physical evidence" – i.e., the firearm – because the police "lacked reasonable suspicion" to pursue Smalls. People v. Smalls , 83 A.D.3d 1103, 1104, 922 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 2011). The court further found that "there [wa]s no evidence that, during the pursuit, the police had any basis for believing that [Smalls] ... did not in fact live in the public housing complex." Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the two counts charging criminal possession of a weapon and ordered a new trial on the trespass count.

On remand, the trial court dismissed the remaining trespass count. After reopening the suppression hearing, the court concluded "that the observations made by the officers regarding [Smalls's] entry into and presence inside the subject public housing building, which were made during the illegal chase, are the fruits of an impermissible seizure." Smalls JA.36.² Because the court suppressed the officers' purported observations and...