Smalls v. Emanuel

840 F.Supp.2d 23

Linda M. SMALLS, Plaintiff,

v.Rahm EMANUEL, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 09–2313(BAH).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Jan. 4, 2012.

Linda M. Smalls, Upper Marlboro, MD, pro se.

Lynn Yuhee Lee, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Linda Smalls initiated the instant lawsuit alleging, inter alia, race-based employment discrimination, breach of contract, defamation, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against her former employer, the Office of Administration of the Executive Office of the President.¹ The defendant has moved to dismiss this case on grounds that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over all of the plaintiff's claims. As explained below, the Court agrees that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate any of the plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Linda Smalls was formerly employed as a Human Resources Specialist in the Office of Administration (“OA”) of the Executive Office of the President. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 6. On October 4, 2005, after thirty-six years of employment, the plaintiff filed an administrative Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint against the OA, alleging that she was discriminated and retaliated against because of her race, age, and gender. Compl. ¶ 3; Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A. On May 23, 2007, the plaintiff entered into a Settlement Agreement with OA settling her EEO claims. Compl. ¶ 9; Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 13, Ex. B.

The terms of the settlement agreement state that the plaintiff “agrees to be placed on paid administrative leave for 90 work days” ending on September 26, 2007, and “will knowingly and voluntarily accept early retirement at the close of business on September 26, 2007.” Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 13, Ex. B. The plaintiff alleges that although the defendant agreed in the settlement agreement to designate the termination of the plaintiff's employment as a voluntarily resignation, on September 1, 2007 the defendant noted the termination of the plaintiff's employment as an involuntary resignation, which subsequently appeared on the plaintiff's records as a “resignation [ ] in lieu of an involuntary action.” Compl. ¶ 9.

On November 8, 2007, the plaintiff sent a letter to the OA contending that it had breached the settlement agreement because the “official notification of personnel action states that [plaintiff] resigned in lieu of an involuntary action instead of retirement.” Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 13, Ex. C. The letter further stated that the plaintiff was “requesting that the agency resolve this matter within 30–days from the date of this notice by issuing a new personnel action stating ‘retirement’ and that the resignation personnel action be cancelled and expunged from all official government records.” Id. In response to the plaintiff's letter, on December 5, 2007, the OA issued a Final Agency Decision concluding that it was not in breach of the settlement agreement. Compl., Ex. 1, at 1. Plaintiff appealed this agency decision with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which affirmed the agency's decision on August 3, 2009.²Id. at 1–4. Specifically, the EEOC concluded that since the plaintiff was ineligible for voluntary retirement, in order to effectuate the settlement agreement allowing her to obtain retirement benefits, the agency had to state that her resignation was in lieu of an involuntary action. Compl., Ex. 1, at 3. The plaintiff subsequently initiated the instant lawsuit.³

The plaintiff asserts eight counts in her Complaint: race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Counts I and II), breach of contract (Counts III and IV), defamation (Count V), misrepresentation (Count VI), civil conspiracy (Count VII), and intentional inflictionof emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count VIII). Compl. ¶¶ 5–38. For the defendant's alleged illegal conduct, the plaintiff requests, inter alia, injunctive relief, specific performance, and compensatory and punitive damages. Compl., Prayer for Relief.

On April 23, 2010, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, respectively. For the reasons explained below, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over all of the plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must dismiss a case when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. McManus v. District of Columbia, 530 F.Supp.2d 46, 62 (D.D.C.2007). “Plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Am. Farm Bureau v. U.S. EPA, 121 F.Supp.2d 84, 90 (D.D.C.2000); accord Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). It is well established that, in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must construe the allegations in the Complaint liberally but “need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiffs if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint; nor must the Court accept plaintiffs' legal conclusions.” Speelman v. United States, 461 F.Supp.2d 71, 73 (D.D.C.2006); see also Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds,482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). The Court must be assured that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority and therefore must give the plaintiffs' factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003); Westberg v. FDIC, 759 F.Supp.2d 38, 41 (D.D.C.2011); Dubois v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 09–2176, 2010 WL 3463368, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2010); Hoffman v. District of Columbia, 643 F.Supp.2d 132, 135–136 (D.D.C.2009); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C.2001). In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the Court, when necessary, may look outside the Complaint to “undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sci., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 362 F.Supp.2d 138, 142 (D.D.C.2005).

III. DISCUSSION

The plaintiff asserts that the defendant discriminated and retaliated against her on account of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Counts I and II), breached the terms of the settlement agreement (Counts III and IV), and is liable for defamation, misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and IIED (Counts V–VIII). As explained below, the plaintiff's employment discrimination claims are barred by Title VII, which provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims against the federal government. The plaintiff's breach of contract claims must be dismissed because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear these claims. Finally, the plaintiff has failed to establish that she exhausted her administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and therefore may not assert her tort claims in this lawsuit.

A. Counts I and II Must Be Dismissed Because Title VII Provides the Exclusive Remedy for Employment Discrimination Claims against the Federal Government.

Counts I and II of the plaintiff's Complaint allege race discrimination and retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Compl. at 2–3. Specifically, Count I alleges that the defendant terminated the plaintiff because she is African American. Id. ¶ 7. Count II alleges that the defendant retaliated against her for filing an EEO complaint. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. The defendant, however, asserts that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims because the plaintiff's claims must be asserted under Title VII. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 13, at 6. The Court agrees that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's race discrimination and retaliation claims.

In Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976), the Supreme Court established that Title VII was the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in the context of federal employment. Id. at 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961 (“[T]he established principle leads unerringly to the conclusion that § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16; see also Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“The Title VII remedy declared exclusive for federal employees in Brown v. GSA precludes actions against federal officials for alleged constitutional violations as well as actions under other federal legislation.”) (internal citation omitted); Turner v. Shinseki, 824 F.Supp.2d 99, 112–13, No. 07–cv–643, 2011 WL 5526446, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2011) (dismissing employment discrimination claim under Section 1981 because Title VII provides the exclusive statutory remedy for an employee's racial discrimination claims against a federal government agency); Marcus v. Geithner, 813 F.Supp.2d 11, 19–20 (D.D.C.2011) (same). The plaintiff therefore may not assert her Section 1981 employment discrimination claims against the federal government.

The plaintiff incorrectly relies on CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008) for support of her argument that her retaliation claims are actionable in this Court, asserting that CBOCS “interpreted § 1981 to imply a private cause of action for race-based...