Smith v. Annucci

1

JUA SMITH, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, et al., Defendants.

No. 9:17-cv-00558 (AMN/TWD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

February 28, 2023

JUA SMITH Plaintiff, pro se Great Meadow Correctional Facility

HON LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General Attorney for Defendants The Capitol

OF COUNSEL: MATTHEW GALLAGHER, ESQ. BRITTANY M. HANER, ESQ.

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter has been referred for a report and recommendation by the Honorable Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c).^[1] Plaintiff Jua Smith, proceeding pro se in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) civil rights action, alleges wrongdoing while he was incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility (“Coxsackie C.F.”). (Dkt. No. 159.) Discovery is now closed, and the named Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 197.^[2]) Plaintiff has opposed the motion, and submitted record evidence in support of his opposition, including a declaration. (Dkt. No. 202.^[3]) Defendants filed a reply and, with permission from the Court, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply. (Dkt. Nos. 205, 206.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY^[4]

In May of 2017, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint asserting claims pursuant to Section 1983, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 3.) On October 20, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 9.) The following claims survived 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) review: (1) a request for injunctive relief against Martuscello and Annucci in their official capacities with respect to restoration of Plaintiff's privileges; (2) Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims against Martuscello, Smith, Miller, Baldwin, and Rizzi; (3) Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Martuscello and Smith; (4) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Martuscello and Smith regarding Plaintiff's infirmary confinement; (5) First Amendment retaliation claims against Barringer, Kenneweg, Raymond, Arvidson, Wagner, Jackson, Barnes, Martuscello, Smith, Miller, Baldwin, Rizzi, Annucci, and Almasi; (6) First Amendment free exercise claims against Annucci, Martuscello, Smith, Miller, Baldwin, and Rizzi; (7) First Amendment retaliation claim against Almasi for denying him access to general library materials; (8) state assault and battery claims against Martuscello, Smith, and Miller; and (9) a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim against the State of New York. Id. at 39-40.^[5] Upon Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the Court construed the complaint to also make out a claim for negligence as an alternative cause of action to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment claims. (Dkt. No. 31.)

On January 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Dkt. No. 34.) The Court reviewed the FAC and found all of the claims asserted in the original complaint that survived initial review and the negligence claim survived along with the (1) Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Slaven; (2) Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Barringer regarding Plaintiff's infirmary confinement; and (3) First Amendment retaliation claim against Slaven. (Dkt. No. 39.) On June 5, 2018, the named Defendants, except Barnes, filed their answer to the FAC. (Dkt. No. 52.) Barnes filed an answer to the FAC on August 24, 2018. (Dkt. No. 72.)

Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the FAC on September 27, 2018. (Dkt. No. 77.) The motion was granted on January 11, 2019, to the extent that it sought to “(1) add allegations related to equitable tolling and assert an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Huff; (2) broaden his First Amendment free exercise claims and assert them against Barringer, Kenneweg, Martuscello and Smith based on their alleged denial of access to legal materials to Plaintiff; (3) amend his First Amendment retaliation claims against Martuscello, Barringer, Kenneweg, Smith, Wagner, Jackson, Barnes, Almasi, Arvidson, Annucci, Baldwin, Miller, Rizzi, and Slaven; (4) withdraw [certain claims]^[6];[] and (5) maintain the other claims in the FAC that Plaintiff has reasserted, and which were found to survive sua sponte review,[] with the exception of Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim . . ., which is dismissed.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 17-18.) The second amended complaint (“SAC”) became the operative pleading on January 11, 2019. (Dkt. No. 92.) Defendants, excluding Huff, filed their answer to the SAC on January 28, 2019. (Dkt. No. 93.) Huff filed an answer to the SAC on June 3, 2019. (Dkt. No. 115.)

Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the SAC on December 19, 2019, which was granted on March 12, 2020. (Dkt. Nos. 137, 158.) The third amended complaint (“TAC”) only replaced “Barnes” with “Davies”. (Dkt. Nos. 158, 159.) Consequently, Plaintiff's claims against Barnes were dismissed, and Barnes was terminated as a party to the action. Id. All other Defendants and claims remained. See id. The TAC was filed and became the operative pleading on April 6, 2020, and remains the operative pleading at this time. (Dkt. Nos. 158, 159.)

Detailed summaries of Plaintiff's allegations were included in the Court's October 20, 2017, and March 13, 2018, Orders. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 39.) A brief recitation of Plaintiff's SAC was provided in the January 11, 2021, Order, which is excerpted at length below. (Dkt. No. 91.^[7]) To the extent additional facts were developed through discovery, and included in the summary judgment motion, the Court will discuss them in the analysis of the pending claims. References to undisputed facts are to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts and are incorporated herein. (Dkt. No. 197-5.^[8])

Plaintiff was sentenced in 1997 to a prison term of twenty-five years to life for second degree murder, and became eligible for parole on April 24, 2021. (Dkt. No. 91 at 1-2.) As he neared his parole eligibility date, Plaintiff was reclassified from a maximum security A inmate to a maximum security B inmate, which entailed conditions that Plaintiff found unacceptable for his mental health and well-being. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff claimed “actual innocence” and stated that he wanted to die by starvation rather than accept parole, and further, that he would rather die by starvation than be classified as a maximum B prisoner. Id. He alleged that he has a right to die via starvation in accordance with his sincerely held beliefs. Id.

In May of 2013, Plaintiff started a hunger strike. Id. The Coxsackie C.F. obtained a force feed order in June of 2013, which Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed in the state courts. Id. at 5-7. After Plaintiff started his hunger strike, he was transferred to the Coxsackie C.F. infirmary (hereafter “infirmary”), where he alleges the room was cold and he was deprived of sufficient clothing, blankets, and personal property. Id. at 8. Medical personnel also used feeding tubes that were too large in order to cause Plaintiff pain. Id. Plaintiff further alleged retaliatory restrictions on certain privileges, including access to his property, his mail, the general and law libraries, and recreation without any type of hearing or deprivation order. Id. at 9-11. Plaintiff claimed these restrictions and harassment were in retaliation for his hunger strike and for filing grievances and complaints. Id.

Construed liberally, Plaintiff asserts: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Baldwin, Martuscello, Miller, Rizzi, and Smith arising out of the use of certain nasogastric tubes during force feedings; (2) Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Huff, Martuscello, and Smith for the conditions he was subject to while in the infirmary; (3) First Amendment retaliation claims against Almasi, Annucci, Arvidson, Baldwin, Barringer, Davies, Kenneweg, Jackson, Martuscello, Miller, Rizzi, Slaven, Smith, and Wagner as a result of alleged conduct by these defendants in the infirmary during his hunger strike; (4) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Barringer, Martuscello, and Smith for his confinement to the infirmary; and (5) First Amendment free exercise claims against Annucci, Barringer, Kenneweg, Martuscello, and Smith for obtaining the force feed order and administering force feedings in violation of his sincerely held religious beliefs. Id.; see also Dkt. Nos. 158, 159, 160.

Generally in their memorandum of law, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because: (1) the conditions Plaintiff experienced during his confinement in the prison infirmary were not sufficiently serious and there is no evidence Huff, Martuscello, and Smith acted with a culpable state of mind; (2) Baldwin, Martuscello, Miller, Rizzi, and Smith were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs and the claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiff's confinement to the infirmary did not implicate a liberty interest, and, even if it did, Barringer, Martuscello, and Smith are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) Plaintiff's retaliation claims against Almasi, Annucci, Arvidson, Baldwin, Barringer, Davies, Kenneweg, Jackson, Martuscello, Miller, Rizzi, Slaven, Smith, and Wagner premised upon his hunger strike fail as a matter of law because a hunger strike is not a constitutionally protected activity, the alleged retaliatory actions do not constitute adverse actions, and they...