Smith v. Brewco, Inc.

JEFFERY SMITH, Plaintiff, v. BREWCO, INC., Defendant.

No. 5:16-cv-01288-DCN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ORANGEBURG DIVISION

March 9, 2018

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on defendant Brewco Inc.'s ("Brewco") motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff Jeffrey Smith's ("Smith") claims. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part Brewco's summary judgment motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of a workplace accident on a large, industrial multi-head trim saw ("trim saw") that occurred on March 16, 2013 at a facility owned and operated by North American Container ("NAC"). Brewco is a company engaged in the business of manufacturing industrial saws for saw mills and wood fabrication facilities and manufactured the trim saw at issue in this case. The trim saw was used to cut lengths of lumber from which to construct pallets. Smith was an employee of NAC when this accident occurred, and worked in a position as a "catcher/stacker." Brewco delivered the trim saw to NAC's facility in Rowesville, South Caroline in 2012. NAC installed the trim saw.

On March 16, 2013, Smith was stacking wood that came out of the trim saw when he observed that a piece of wood had become jammed inside of the blades of the trim saw. He walked around to the input side of the trim saw and reached into the blade to pull out the piece of jammed wood. Once Smith removed the wood jammed in the blades, the trim saw restarted its rotation and Smith's fingers got caught in the trim saw blades, severely injuring two fingers on his right hand. As a result of this accident, Smith alleges that he has sustained severe and permanent injury, incurred medical expenses, lost income and will incur future medical costs.

Smith filed this suit against Brewco alleging three products liability causes of action: negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. On November 20, 2017, Brewco filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Smith responded on January 3, 2018. Brewco replied on January 17, 2018. The court held a hearing on March 6, 2018. The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the district court enter judgment against a party who, 'after adequate time for discovery . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Any reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Webster v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 421 (4th Cir. 2012). However, to defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify an error of law or a genuine issue of disputed material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); see also Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003).

Although the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Stone, 105 F.3d at 191. Rather, "a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 522 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2002) (amended 2010)). If the adverse party fails to provide evidence establishing that the factfinder could reasonably decide in his favor, then summary judgment shall be entered "regardless of '[a]ny proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

III. DISCUSSION

Smith brings this products liability case against Brewco on a number of theories, including negligence, strict liability, and warranty. The court first addresses Brewco's overarching arguments that Smith has failed to establish that the trim saw was the proximate cause of his injury and then moves on to discuss the remaining claim in this case, the design defect claim.¹

1. Brewco's Overarching Arguments

Brewco makes a number of arguments that attack the sufficiency of Smith's products liability action as a whole. The court addresses each of these arguments before moving on to assess the contours of each of Smith's theories of defects in this products liability action. Specifically, Brewco contends that: (1) Smith's own failure to follow the proper lockout/tag out procedures was the proximate cause of his injury as opposed to the trim saw; (2) NAC's defective training of Smith on the proper lockout/tag out procedures was the proximate cause of Smith's injury; and (3) the trim saw was materially altered after Brewco delivered it to NAC so Smith is barred from recovery.

A plaintiff must establish three elements for a products liability case based on the theory of strict liability: (1) he was injured by the product; (2) the injury occurred because the product was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user; and (3) the product, at the time of the accident, was in essentially the same condition as when it left the hands of the defendant. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). While under any products liability theory the plaintiff must show that a product defect was a proximate cause of his injuries, "proximate cause does not mean the sole cause" and a "defendant's conduct can be a proximate cause if it was at least one of the direct, concurring causes of the injury." Small v. Pioneer Mach., Inc., 494 S.E.2d 835, 842 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). The court rejects each of Brewco's arguments on causation.

a. Smith's Comparative Negligence

Brewco contends that even if there is a viable products liability claim here, it should be barred as a matter of law because Smith's comparative negligence was the proximate cause of his injury and that, as a matter of law, Smith's negligence outweighsany negligence attributable to Brewco. ECF No. 30 at 6. Smith does not make a specific argument as to comparative negligence but does argue that the opinion of Brewco's expert Brian Boggess ("Boggess") that the accident was caused by Smith's comparative negligence in not following proper lockout/tagout procedures is not dispositive on this issue. Specifically, Smith points to the testimony of his own expert Bryan Durig ("Durig") that it was the trim saw's defective design, including Brewco's failure to design the trim saw with additional safety features or provide written instructions with the trim saw, that contributed to the accident occurring. ECF No. 34 at 6. The court finds that comparative negligence—which is generally a question best left for the jury—should be left to the fact-finder here. Certainly, a large part of the causation argument is based on dueling expert opinions. The question of which expert to believe is one that is within the province of the jury, not this court. See Electro-Mech. Corp. v. Power Distribution Prod., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d 822, 838 (W.D. Va. 2013) (recognizing that a party's "disagree[ments] with the substance of [an] expert's opinions . . . are best addressed on cross-examination.").

South Carolina ascribes to a modified version of comparative negligence known as the "less than or equal to" approach, where the plaintiff in a negligence action can recover damages if his negligence does not exceed 50%. Singleton v. Sherer, 659 S.E.2d 196, 206 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008). The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that comparative negligence is a jury question. Hurd v. Williamsburg County, 611 S.E.2d 488, 492 (S.C. 2005) ("The determination of respective degrees of negligence attributable to the plaintiff and the defendant presents a question of fact for the jury, at least where conflicting inferences may be drawn.") That being said, where evidence of the plaintiff'snegligence is "overwhelming," courts have granted summary judgment to a defendant based on comparative negligence. For example, in Bloom v. Ravoira, 529 S.E.2d 710, 713 (S.C. 2000), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that where a pedestrian "entered the street quickly [in the middle of the block from between two parked cars] and without any warning to drivers" and was struck by a motorist who was driving no more than 25 miles per hour and was not driving recklessly as the pedestrian attempted to cross a street, the district court was correct in granting the motorist summary judgment on the basis of comparative negligence. In relevant part, the Bloom court stated:

Here, the undisputed facts establish that [the pedestrian] attempted to cross the street but did not do so in a safe, reasonable manner. Any factual issues that might exist as to [the motorist's] fault in this accident cannot alter the inescapable conclusion that, as a matter of law, [the pedestrian's] fault exceeded fifty percent. Where evidence of the plaintiff's greater negligence is overwhelming, evidence of slight negligence on the part of the defendant is simply not enough for a case to go to the jury.

Id. at 713. But that is not the case before the court.

Here, there is evidence that Smith was never given any training on the proper lock-out/tag out safety procedure to deenergize the trim saw. For example, Smith testifies that he did not know how the trim saw was shut down, how to make sure that was no power to the trim saw, that he had never even heard of the term "lockout, tagout," and that no employee at Brewco had...