Smith v. City of Phila.

147 A.3d 25

R. Anthony J. Smith

v.City of Philadelphia, Appellant

No. 2563 C.D. 2015

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs July 15, 2016

Decided September 6, 2016

Bryan L. Heulitt, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER

The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from the November 12, 2015, Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas) that granted the appeal of R. Anthony J. Smith (Mr. Smith) from the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication of the Office of the Director of Finance for the City of Philadelphia (BAA). Common pleas held that Mr. Smith is not liable for the cost of impounding his vehicle and for 31 outstanding parking violations because he was a victim of identity theft and lacked notice of the parking violations. On appeal, the City argues that common pleas erred and abused its discretion by permitting Mr. Smith to participate at oral argument when Mr. Smith did not file a brief, by concluding that it had jurisdiction to make a determination of liability when its scope of review precluded such a determination, and by holding that BAA's process violated Mr. Smith's due process rights.¹ Because we conclude that common pleas did not follow the correct procedures under the Local Agency Law² for reviewing BAA's determination, we vacate common pleas' Order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mr. Smith's vehicle was impounded by the Philadelphia Parking Authority (Parking Authority) on April 28, 2015 after being “live stopped.”³ (Common pleas Op. (Op.) at 1.) Mr. Smith appeared before a BAA hearing officer later that day. (Id.) The City was not represented at this “hearing.” According to the transcript,⁴ the hearing officer informed Mr. Smith that his vehicle was impounded and that following the impoundment, the City discovered that Mr. Smith owed $3,620.75 in unpaid parking tickets and penalties. (R.R. at 16a-17a.) At some point prior to the hearing, Mr. Smith was given documentation allegedly showing the outstanding violations. (Id. at 18a.) Mr. Smith argued that the vehicles for which the parking violations and penalties are associated “are not my cars” and that he was a victim of identity theft in 1991 that was never fully resolved. (Id. at 17a.) Mr. Smith stated that he was going to call the Pennsylvania State Police (State Police) to have his story confirmed and would attempt to relay that information to the hearing officer's supervisor. (Id.)

Mr. Smith met with a different hearing officer (Hearing Officer), again without the presence of representatives of the City, the following day. (Id. at 21a.) The transcript shows that Mr. Smith once again argued that he was a victim of identity theft and that the parking tickets and penalties did not belong to him.⁵ Mr. Smith presented Hearing Officer with documentation from the State Police and the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court showing that he was the victim of identity theft in 1991. (R.R. at 23a.) After taking a short break to consult with a supervisor, Hearing Officer told Mr. Smith:

The only thing we can do at this point in order to get your car out, you would have to pay the fees and that would be $335.00 and these red light tickets which would be $350.00. You would need $685.00 and we would put you on a payment plan for the rest of the tickets.

(Id. at 24a.) Mr. Smith asked Hearing Officer how, if he paid the $650.00 and accepted a payment plan, he could still appeal the fees assessed against him because the cars that were ticketed were not his. The Hearing Officer responded: “You don't have too much of a choice here.” (Id.) The “hearing” ended, and Mr. Smith was provided with notice that he was not eligible for a hearing to determine whether he was responsible for the 31 outstanding violations because the violations entered into default more than one year before the hearing. (Id. at 51a.)

Mr. Smith filed a statutory appeal with common pleas. Common pleas issued a scheduling order on June 23, 2015, that set a due date of September 8, 2015, for Mr. Smith's brief. (Id. at 10a.) Mr. Smith did not file a brief in support of his appeal. (Op. at 3.) The City filed a Motion to Quash Appeal, alleging that Mr. Smith's appeal should be quashed pursuant to Rule 2188 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure⁶ because he violated common pleas' scheduling order and the City was unable to prepare a defense. (R.R. at 54a-55a.) Common pleas denied the City's Motion to Quash Appeal and proceeded to hear oral argument.

At oral argument, Mr. Smith, appearing pro se,⁷ argued that he is the victim of identity theft.⁸ (Id. at 75a-76a.) The City argued that there was some confusion, and that all of the vehicles at issue “were registered to Mr. Smith at his home, and they received parking tickets over the last 15 years.” (Id. at 80a.) Mr. Smith argued in response that while the cars for which the parking tickets were associated were registered in his name, “some of them are [registered at] addresses that I've never lived at.” (Id. at 80a.) Mr. Smith argued that he did not know about the tickets until he went to the Parking Authority to inquire about his car. (Id. at 81a.) After reviewing the record, common pleas issued an Order on November 16, 2015, granting Mr. Smith's appeal and finding him not liable for the costs of impoundment and the 31 outstanding violations. (Order.)

The City filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and common pleas ordered the City to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Concise Statement) pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.⁹ (Order, November 23, 2015, C.R. at Item 10.) In its Concise Statement, the City argued that common pleas erred: (1) “when it denied the City's Motion to Quash Appeal and allowed [Mr. Smith] to participate in oral argument despite never filing a brief”; (2) “when it concluded that it had jurisdiction to make a determination of liability for the outstanding [31] parking citations”; and (3) “by ignoring the standard of review in an appeal from an administrative agency.” (R.R. at 87a-88a.)

Common pleas issued an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure¹⁰ responding to the City's arguments in its Concise Statement. Therein, common pleas responded to the City's argument that the Motion to Quash Appeal should have been granted and that Mr. Smith should not have been permitted to participate in oral argument by reasoning:

[T]he trial court's decision as to whether to grant or deny a Motion to Quash for failure to file a brief is within the court's discretion. King v. City of Philadelphia, 102 A.3d 1073, 1077 (Pa.C[mwlth.] 2014). In the instant case, [Mr. Smith] averred he was unrepresented and did not know that he needed to file a brief.

[The City] did not plead nor prove that it suffered any prejudice in [Mr. Smith]'s failure to file a brief. ... Consequently, this court exercised its discretion in denying [the City]'s Motion to Quash and allow[ed] [Mr. Smith] to participate in oral argument.

(Op. at 6.)

With regard to the City's argument that it ignored the standard of review in an agency appeal, common pleas reasoned as follows.

As there were no findings of fact and conclusions of law provided to this court, it was impossible for this court to determine whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. [The City] provided a certified record containing only E-tims reports ^{[11 ]}and hearing dates. [The City] argued that [Mr. Smith] could not contest any tickets older than one year, despite [Mr. Smith]'s arguments that the tickets were not accrued by him and that the car registrations linked to those violations were not his cars, and despite the fact that the car was impounded due to said unpaid violations, of which [Mr. Smith] testified he had no notice. This court found [Mr. Smith]'s oral argument persuasive and credible, and consequently exercised its equitable powers to resolve [Mr. Smith]'s tickets.

(Op. at 5.)

Finally, common pleas responded to the City's argument that common pleas lacked authority to rule on Mr. Smith's liability for the parking violations. Common pleas held that the “procedure before the [BAA] was perfunctory,” and that Mr. Smith's due process rights were violated by being “effectively denied the ability to contest the tickets, to fully understand the charges against him, or provide a meaningful defense in any way” “despite having no knowledge of [the parking tickets].” (Op. at 6-7.) Common pleas concluded that in light of this due process violation, the court has equitable powers to resolve the outstanding tickets. (Op. at 7.)

On appeal to this Court, the City makes the same arguments it raised in its Concise Statement, and it argues that common pleas erred by concluding that Mr. Smith's due process rights were violated.¹²

Motion to Quash Appeal

First, the City argues that common pleas erred by denying its Motion to Quash Appeal pursuant to Rule 2188 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 2188. According to the City, Mr. Smith's failure to comply with common pleas' scheduling order, setting a timetable for briefing the case, placed the City in a “diminished strategic position, as it had no way of knowing the basis of [Mr.] Smith's appeal.” (City's Br. at 14.) The City contends that even though Mr. Smith proceeded in the appeal pro se, he must be held to the same standard as a counseled appellant and not given an advantage over the City solely due to his lack of knowledge.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to a court of common pleas providing appellate review of a local agency decision under the Local Agency Law unless the court has specifically adopted the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Kin...