Smith v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr.

WILLIE B. SMITH, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 21-10348

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

February 10, 2021

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-01026-RAH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Willie B. Smith, III is an Alabama death-row prisoner in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) at Holman Correctional Facility.¹ Smith appeals the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction. This appeal presents the question of whether a death-row prisoner is entitled to have his religious advisor present inside the execution chamber at the time of execution. After careful review of the record, we reverse the District Court's denial of injunctive relief.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1991 an Alabama jury convicted Smith of murder. The jury recommended that Smith receive the death sentence, which the court imposed. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence. See Smith v. State, 838 So. 2d 413 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (per curiam). And the Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for certiorari. Smith v. Alabama, 537 U.S. 1090 (2002) (mem.). The Supreme Court also denied Smith's petitions for habeas corpus. See Smith v. Dunn, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020) (mem.).

The Alabama Supreme Court set Smith's execution for February 11, 2021. On December 14, 2020, Smith commenced this suit challenging the ADOC's execution policies.

The ADOC does not permit a death-row inmate to have anyone in the execution chamber with them when they are executed. This is a relatively new policy. While the ADOC has never permitted an outside spiritual advisor in the execution chamber, before April 2019, the ADOC required Holman's Christian chaplain—employed by ADOC—to be in the execution chamber during executions. The ADOC changed this policy in 2019 after an inmate challenged it and other inmates brought challenges to similar policies across the country. See Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) (mem.); Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (2019) (mem.). Now the ADOC does not allow any person into the execution chamber except for the condemned prisoner, members of the execution team, and certain medical personnel.

Smith filed this suit in the Middle District of Alabama, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to require the ADOC to allow Smith's religious advisor, Pastor Robert Paul Wiley Jr., in the execution chamber during his execution. Specifically, Smith alleged that the ADOC policy violates his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., the Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment (ARFA) to the Alabama constitution, Ala. Const. art. I, § 3.01, and the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Smith alsofiled a motion for a preliminary injunction. The ADOC opposed Smith's motion and moved to dismiss Smith's complaint.

After hearing oral arguments and considering the supplemental evidence submitted by the parties, the District Court issued an order that granted the ADOC's motion to dismiss as to Smith's Establishment Clause claim but denied its motion as to Smith's claims under RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and ARFA. And, as is most important to this case, the District Court also denied Smith's motion for a preliminary injunction. After weighing the parties' arguments, the District Court determined that Smith had failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

Smith now appeals the District Court's denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to his RLUIPA and ARFA claims.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court's decision to deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010). "In so doing, we review the findings of fact of the district court for clear error and legal conclusions de novo." Id. "This scope of review will lead to reversal only if the district court applies an incorrect legal standard, or applies improper procedures, or relies on clearly erroneous factfinding, or if it reaches a conclusion that is clearlyunreasonable or incorrect." Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding that the District Court's order denying injunctive relief could only be reversed on appeal "if there was a clear abuse of discretion").

III. Analysis

RLUIPA prohibits the government from "impos[ing] a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution" unless the government demonstrates that burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). Therefore, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he engaged in a religious exercise; and (2) that the religious exercise was substantially burdened. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). Once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, "the government must then demonstrate that the challenged government action 'is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest' and 'is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b)).

A party seeking injunctive relief must establish four elements: "(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest." Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225-26. "Controlling precedent is clear that injunctive relief may not be granted unless the plaintiff establishes the substantial likelihood of success criterion." Id. at 1226.

For the reasons explained below, we hold the District Court abused its discretion by finding Smith failed to demonstrate his religious exercise was substantially burdened. Because Smith has established a prima facie case, we reach the District Court's alternative grounds for finding that Smith failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Although we agree that the ADOC has a compelling interest in maintaining security, we believe the District Court abused its discretion in finding the ADOC's policy is the least restrictive means to further that compelling interest. We will now address the merits of his claims.²

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Prima Facie Case

Smith first contends that the ADOC's policy of not allowing his religious advisor in the execution chamber violates his rights under RLUIPA. RLUIPA prohibits the imposition of burdens on the ability of prisoners to worship as they please. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. The institutionalized-persons provisions provide "very broad protection" to prisoners' religious liberties, prohibiting state and local institutions from placing arbitrary or unnecessary restrictions on their practices. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015).

A successful RLUIPA claim must first pass a two-part test: the prisoner must show (1) he engaged in a religious exercise; and (2) that religious exercise was substantially burdened. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1276 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). A "religious exercise" is broadly defined under RLUIPA as "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

We begin our discussion of Smith's RLUIPA claim by noting that we do not in any way doubt Smith's sincerely held religious beliefs. In his complaint, Smith vows that he is a practicing Christian, that it is "integral to [his] faith that Pastor Wiley be physically present with him at the time of his execution," and that PastorWiley's presence in the execution chamber would provide Smith spiritual comfort in his final moments. Both Smith and Pastor Wiley submitted declarations to the District Court averring that Smith is a devout Christian who has a close, spiritual connection with Pastor Wiley. We thus agree with the District Court's conclusion "that Smith's practice of Christianity and his belief that his pastor should be physically present with him in the execution chamber constitute a 'religious exercise' for purposes of a RLUIPA claim."

Having met his initial burden of demonstrating that his observance of Christianity—and his belief that Pastor Wiley's presence will provide him comfort during his execution—constitutes "religious exercise" under the statute, we now address whether the ADOC's policy constitutes a "substantial burden" on Smith's religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

To prevail on a RLUIPA claim, a prisoner must first prove that the challenged practice places a substantial burden on his religious exercise. See Holt, 574 U.S. at 361. Evidence sufficient to show a substantial burden falls on a spectrum. See Thai Meditation, 980 F.3d at 830-31. At one end, Smith may show the ADOC policy substantially burdens the exercise of his religion by showing it "completely prevents [him] from engaging in religiously mandated activity, or requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion." See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). At the other end,Smith may show the ADOC policy requires him to modify his behavior. Id.; Thai Meditation, 980 F.3d at 831.

The District Court abused...