Smith v. Dir., Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice

1

CRUISE K. SMITH, ID # 220920, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

No. 3:20-CV-1139-D-BH

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

April 7, 2023

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATETODGE^[1]

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, received on April 22, 2020 (doc. 1), should be DENIED with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Cruise K. Smith (Petitioner), an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2018 conviction and 30-year sentence in the 203rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.^[2] (See doc. 1 at 2.)^[3] The respondent is the Director of TDCJ-CID (Respondent). (See id. at 1.)

A. State Court Proceedings

Petitioner was charged by indictment with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, enhanced with a prior felony conviction for burglary of a habitation. (See doc. 18-3 at 4.) He pleaded guilty, and on August 24, 2018, the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison. (See id. at 7-13.) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction. (doc. 1 at 3.)

Petitioner filed his first state habeas application on May 6, 2019. (See doc. 18-3 at 32.) While that application was still pending in the trial court, Petitioner filed another state habeas application in September 2019. (See doc. 18-2 at 15.) On November 27, 2019, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the May application without written order based on the findings of the trial court. (doc. 18-4); Ex parte Smith, No. WR-90,617-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 2019). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the September application without written order the same day. (See doc. 18-1); Ex parte Smith, No. WR-90,617-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 27, 2019).

B. Substantive Claims

The § 2254 petition asserts the following grounds for relief:

(1) The trial court denied Petitioner's right to appeal and right to appellate counsel;

(2) Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for not preparing an appeal;

(3) Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an acquittal;

(4) The prosecution suppressed evidence; and

(5) The trial court denied Petitioner's right to appellate counsel for the purposes of filing a motion for a new trial.

(doc. 1 at 6-8.) Respondent filed a response on December 16, 2020. (doc. 17.) Petitioner did not file a reply.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, on April 24, 1996. Title I of the Act applies to all federal petitions for habeas corpus filed on or after its effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Because Petitioner filed his petition after its effective date, the Act applies.

Title I of AEDPA substantially changed the way federal courts handle habeas corpus actions. Under § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain relief

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “In the context of federal habeas proceedings, a resolution (or adjudication) on the merits is a term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case was substantive, as opposed to procedural.” Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).

Section 2254(d)(1) concerns pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2001). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). As for the “unreasonable application” standard, a writ may issue “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.; accord Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). Likewise, a state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if it “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. “[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; accord Penry, 532 U.S. at 793. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). A petitioner must show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Id. at 98.

A federal district court must be deferential to state court findings supported by the record. See Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142,149-52 (5th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA has “modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bellv. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 403-04). A state application that is denied without written order by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is an adjudication on the merits. See Singleton v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1999); Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a denial signifies an adjudication on the merits while a “dismissal” means the claim was declined on grounds other than the merits).

Section 2254(d)(2) concerns questions of fact. See Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2000). Under § 2254(d)(2), federal courts “give deference to the state court's findings unless they were ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.'” Chambers v. Johnson, 218 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2000). The resolution of factual issues by the state court is presumptively correct and will not be disturbed unless the state prisoner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DENIAL OF APPELLATE RIGHTS

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims that the trial court denied his right to appeal and to have court-appointed appellate counsel for that appeal. (doc. 1 at 6.) Similarly, in his fifth ground for relief, Petitioner claims that the trial court denied his right to “appell[ate] counsel” to file a motion for a new trial raising a “no evidence” argument. (See id. at 8.) He appears to allege that he was not informed of his right to appeal and that the trial court ignored his request to appeal and refused to appoint appellate counsel even though he was indigent. (doc. 1 at 6.); see also (doc. 18-3 at 22-23, 30) (state habeas application with further factual allegations).

Texas provides criminal defendants a right to appeal by statute, and when a state affords such a right, to ensure that it is more than a “meaningless ritual,” it must supply an indigent appellant in a criminal case with an attorney. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 44.02 (AFFORDING RIGHT TO APPEAL MOST CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS).

In the state habeas proceedings, Petitioner's trial counsel submitted an affidavit addressing Petitioner's claims, including the allegations that Petitioner was denied appellate counsel and the right to appeal. He explained:

On February 19, 2018, I was appointed to represent [Petitioner]. He was charged with 1 count of Aggravated Robbery. The offense was caught on video which was viewed by [Petitioner] before he made the decision concerning his case. [Petitioner] went open to the court on the issue of punishment. This is called an open plea where a defendant pleads guilty to the offense as charged and goes to the Court for punishment. [Petitioner] pled guilty to the Court on August 24, 2018 and was sentenced. [Petitioner] not only did this voluntarily, he was admonished in open court and on the record as to the consequences of an open guilty plea the week before on August 17, 2018. After [Petitioner] was sentenced we spoke in the holdover cell where I expressed sympathy and, although I don't remember the exact conversation, I would have told him that he could appeal his case. I also would have told him that I do not do appellate work but that the Court would appoint him a lawyer to do his appeal. This is what I tell every client who gets sentenced to prison time. This I know I did because I do it with every client.

Response to Ground One^[4]: I am not clear about [Petitioner's] complaint but [Petitioner] did not plead not guilty

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