Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Case No. 15-737

387 F.Supp.3d 8

Maggie SMITH et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Case No. 15-737

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 16, 2019

Joseph A. Scrofano, Scrofano Law PC, William Charles Cole Claiborne, III, ClaiborneLaw, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Maggie Smith, Gerard Cassagnol, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew J. Saindon, Matthew Robert Blecher, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge

To stem the tide of violent crime, the District of Columbia has spent decades enacting some of the strictest gun control measures in the country. But despite these laudable ends, the District's means have precipitated repeated tugs-of-war against law-abiding citizens, with the federal courts as the referee and the Second Amendment as the touchstone.

The District has not been on a winning streak. In 2008, the Supreme Court struck down a D.C. law banning all handgun possession. See District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) [hereinafter Heller I ]. Subsequent litigation upheld some gun control measures (like a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, see Heller v. District of Columbia , 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Heller II ] ), but struck down others (like a triannual reregistration requirement and a ban on registering more than one handgun a month, see Heller v. District of Columbia , 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ). In 2014, the district court struck down D.C.'s carrying ban, D.C. Code § 22-4504. See Palmer v. District of Columbia , 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014) (invalidating § 22-4504 (2013) (repealed 2015)), appeal withdrawn , No. 14-7180, 2015 WL 1607711 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2015). But even without the carrying ban, misdemeanor statutes still criminalized possession of non–D.C.-registered firearms and related ammunition. See D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.01 (2012) (repealed 2015) (firearms), 7-2506.01 (2013) (ammunition). And since another provision effectively limited handgun registration to D.C. residents, see D.C. Code § 7-2502.02 (2012) (repealed 2015), non-D.C. residents remained barred from carrying a gun for self-defense, even if it was registered in their home state. Other statutes subjected non–D.C.-registered firearms and ammunition to seizure and destruction, D.C. Code §§ 22-4517, and exposed cars used to transport handguns to civil forfeiture, 7-2507.06a (1997) (repealed 2015). Almost a year after Palmer , the District updated those laws with new measures confining public carry to people with a special need for self-defense. See D.C. Code § 22-4506. But the D.C. Circuit eventually struck that down too. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia , 864 F.3d 650 (2017).

Here, the District manages a draw—for now. Four non-D.C. residents arrested and charged under §§ 22-4504 (before Palmer struck it down), as well as 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01 (before the District revamped its gun laws), who also had their firearms and ammunition seized under 22-4517, and (for one plaintiff) had a car subjected to civil forfeiture under 7-2507.06a bring a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting claims under the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The District asks the Court to dismiss the case, taking aim at this Court's jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and at plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Its 12(b)(1) motion misses the mark, because plaintiffs have standing and because their claims are neither moot nor precluded. But some of its scattershot 12(b)(6) motion hits the target: although a few of plaintiffs' claims are legally sufficient, most fail as a matter of law or are time barred. So the Court will deny the District's 12(b)(1) motion, but will grant-in-part and deny-in-part its 12(b)(6) motion.

I. Background¹

This matter began when D.C. police pulled-over Maggie Smith, a 34-year-old nurse from North Carolina without a criminal record who visited D.C. in June 2014. During the traffic stop, she told the officer—"as she had been taught [to do] in her gun ownership class"—that she was carrying a handgun licensed in her home state. 2d Am. Comp. ¶ 31, ECF No. 50. So police arrested her, seized her firearm under § 22-4517,² and took her to the D.C. jail, where they strip-searched and held her overnight until the U.S. Attorney charged her under §§ 22-4504,³ and then under 7-2502.01⁴ and 7-2506.01.⁵ A month later, when Palmer struck down § 22-4504, the U.S. Attorney dismissed the case. But pursuant to the division of prosecuting authority outlined in D.C. Code §§ 23-101, the D.C. Attorney General recharged Smith under 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01. Though the District dismissed those charge's seven months later, Smith's gun remains in police custody.

Soon after the District dropped her charges, Smith filed this suit seeking damages related to her arrest and prosecutions, an injunction expunging and sealing her criminal record, a declaration that her arrest and prosecutions violated her Second and Fifth Amendment rights, and attorneys' fees. And through successive amendments, her complaint grew to include more plaintiffs and claims.

Police arrested one new plaintiff, Cpl. Frederick Rouse, after housekeeping found two handguns and a scope in his D.C. hotel room. Both handguns were licensed in Maryland, where Rouse—a senior engineer at the Defense Information Systems Agency—resides. After Rouse spent two nights in jail, the D.C. Attorney General charged him with violating §§ 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01. The District eventually dismissed the charges without prejudice at a pretrial status conference, though it had earlier successfully opposed Rouse's motion to dismiss. Despite dismissing the charges, the District held his guns and scope—together worth $ 2050—for another two years before returning them. Thanks to his arrest, Rouse's top-secret security clearance was placed "under review." 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 183.

Police pulled-over another new plaintiff, Gerard Cassagnol, after receiving a tip he had a gun in the car. He volunteered the gun's location to the officers, which was unloaded and properly contained in a locked gun-safe. But he spent two nights in jail before the U.S. Attorney charged him with violating §§ 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504. When the United States dropped the charges post- Palmer , the D.C. Attorney General reinstated the charges for §§ 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01, and successfully opposed Cassagnol's motion to dismiss before nolle prossing the charges without prejudice. Before this incident, Cassagnol had no criminal record and worked fulltime for a telecommunications company. After his arrest, he lost his job, and D.C. continues to hold his ammunition and firearm, licensed in Maryland and worth approximately $ 500, despite Cassagnol's requests for its return.

Police arrested another new plaintiff, Virginia student Delontay Davis, after spotting his firearm during a traffic stop. The District confiscated his car and firearm, strip-searched him, and jailed him for four nights while the U.S. Attorney charged him with violating §§ 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504. When the U.S. Attorney dismissed those charges ten months later, the D.C. Attorney General recharged him under §§ 7-2502.01 and 7-2506.01, but dropped the case two months later. Even still, the year-long case against him wrought significant harm. First, police seized Davis's vehicle for civil forfeiture under § 7-2507.06a.⁶ Although they returned it two months later in response to Davis's motion under D.C. Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g),⁷ Davis had already been forced to drop out of school because he lacked transportation. Second, his $ 400 firearm remains in police custody, four years (and counting) after the District dismissed his charges.

* * *

Based on these facts, plaintiffs bring ten claims:

1. That §§ 7-2502.01, 7-2506.01, and 22-4504 —which together prohibited non-D.C. residents from having handguns and ammunition for self-defense while in the District—violated the Second Amendment;

2. That arresting and detaining people under those laws violated the Fourth Amendment;

3. That those laws violated the Fifth Amendment's right-to-travel and equal protection guarantees;

4. That seizing handguns (under § 22-4517 ) and the vehicles used to convey them (under § 7-2507.06a) violated the Second Amendment;

5. That the same handgun and vehicle seizure violated the Fourth Amendment;

6. That continuing to seize plaintiffs' handguns and ammunition after dismissing their charges violates the Fourth Amendment;

7. That seizing handguns and ammunition without notice and a hearing violated the Fifth Amendment's procedural due process protection;

8. That seizing cars after searching and processing them for evidence violated the Fourth Amendment;

9. That forfeiting cars used to transport guns violates the Second Amendment; and 10. That forfeiting cars used to transport guns violates the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiffs seek damages (compensatory, consequential, and nominal), declaratory relief, and injunctive relief sealing their arrest and prosecution records, ordering their property's return, and declaring their arrests legal nullities. Plaintiffs further seek attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

* * *

This is not the only case challenging a D.C. civil asset forfeiture law. In Hoyte v. District of Columbia , a putative class brought Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to D.C. Code § 48-905.02 (2012) (repealed 2015), a provision subjecting cars used to transport illegal drugs to civil forfeiture. In July 2015, Judge Cooper dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims and some Fifth Amendment claims. More recently, he allowed plaintiffs' procedural due process claims to proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), but declined to certify their challenges to the District's retention of forfeited property and to § 48-905.02 's bond requirement.

* * *

Now, the District moves to dismiss under Rule...