Smith v. Glasscock

ALLISON P. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. TOMMY GLASSCOCK, Defendants.

Civ. Act. No.: 2:18-cv-870-ECM (WO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

May 8, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Now pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed on January 6, 2020, by Defendant Tommy Glasscock ("Glasscock"). (Doc. 38).

The Plaintiff, Allison Smith ("Smith"), originally filed a complaint in this case on October 9, 2018, bringing claims against the Chilton County Board of Education, Glasscock, and Chilton County Board of Education members Lori Patterson, Linda Hand, Joe Mims, Keith Moore, Pam Price, James Shannon, and Curtis Smith. (Doc. 1). The parties subsequently filed a Joint Stipulation of Pro Tanto Dismissal as to the claims against the Chilton County Board of Education, Lori Patterson, Linda Hand, Joe Mims, Keith Moore, Pam Price, James Shannon, and Curtis Smith. (Doc. 36). The only Defendant remaining after dismissal, Glasscock, filed the motion for summary judgment which is currently pending.

Upon consideration of the briefs and applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows 'that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)). "[A] court generally must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat'l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). However, "conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value." Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924-25 (11th Cir. 2018). If the record, taken as a whole, "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," then there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant must identify the portions of the record which support this proposition. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The movant may carry this burden "by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case." Id. The burdenthen shifts to the non-moving party to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1311-12.

III. FACTS

The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, are as follows:

Smith was employed by the Chilton County Board of Education from February 2015 to April 2017. She began as a secretary to Glasscock, the Superintendent of the Chilton County Board of Education. In his position, Glasscock made recommendations regarding personnel actions to the Board of Education.

In June 2016, Chilton County Board of Education Personnel Director Walter Fenn resigned. Smith has testified that although her pay did not change, she began performing the job duties of the Personnel Director/Assistant Superintendent. (Doc. 39-1 at 185: 11-21). Smith requested a raise and requested overtime pay and her requests were denied by Glasscock.

In addition to her claims regarding pay and overtime, Smith provides evidence to support claims based on her working environment.¹ Smith states in her declaration that Glasscock gave her hugs, which were a "full frontal, tight embrace, face to face, that would last 5-10 seconds," that had sexual overtones, and that deeply offended and embarrassed her. (Doc. 42-1 at ¶¶36- 40). She testifies in her deposition that during the time she worked there Glasscock hugged her three or four times. (Doc. 39-1 at 119: 7-14). The last timethat Glasscock tried to hug Smith, he said that he loved her, and Smith pushed him away as he tried forcefully to pull her in. (Doc. 42-1 at ¶¶43, 44).

Smith has testified in a deposition that Glasscock made various comments which she characterizes as being of a sexual nature. Smith states in a declaration that Glasscock said that he would give her a raise but that first she had to "meet his needs." (Doc. 42-1 at ¶25). She states that she rebuffed Glasscock's sexual advances. (Doc. 42-1 at ¶26). Smith states that Glasscock called her into his office and told her she was one of the few people in his life that he felt this way about and would protect her, but she had to meet his needs. (Doc. 39-1 at 74: 2-19). She states that she understood this to be a sexual proposition and says that it was made in an aggressive and angry way. (Doc. 39-1 at 75: 1-13). She also states that Glasscock told her he felt like they were getting a divorce and that he did not "need to fuck you." (Doc. 39-1 at 93:15-17). Smith testifies in her deposition that Glasscock asked her to get on her hands and knees under his desk to change out the paper in her printer and commented on what it looked like with her being under the table. (Doc. 39-1 at 189: 9-20). Glasscock also told Smith that other employees were jealous of them and their relationship. (Doc. 42-2 at 108). Smith states that Glasscock said he wanted to show her children's teachers "who [Smith] belonged to." (Doc. 42-2 at 107).

Smith also provides evidence of comments or conduct by Glasscock regarding other people and employees. She states that Glasscock stood in her office and told Smith that another female employee was "just embarrassed because she had tried to give him a blow job at some point." (Doc. 39-1 at 42: 1-13). Smith also states that Glasscock stood in her office and discussed a sexual relationship he had had with a friend of Smith's and thefriend's mother. (Doc. 39-1 at 60: 3-18). Glasscock also referred to a female subordinate who gave him a "peep show" and told Smith that a Board member wore no panties. Smith provides evidence that Glasscock came into Smith's office to point out women vendors who were getting out of their cars because he liked their short skirts or low-cut blouses. (Doc. 39-1 at 64: 22- 65: 18). Smith states that Glasscock came into her office and showed her a video of a male monkey engaged in a sexual act. (Doc. 39-1 at 67: 20-68: 5). According to Smith's testimony, Glasscock also made suggestive comments about a student. (Doc. 42-2 at 109). Glasscock also told Smith about sexual relationships of a previous Superintendent. (Doc. 4-2 at 107). Smith further testifies to conduct by Glasscock including telling her about an employee who wanted to have sex with him and that he showed her a text message from an employee about her breasts. (Doc. 39-2 at 234:6-236:8).

Smith also provides evidence of aggressive or angry behavior by Glasscock which she claims contributed to a hostile working environment. She states that in the summer of 2016 he moved her from the front office to the back office where it was more private and that he began yelling at her more. (Doc. 39-1 at 189: 21-190: 11). Smith also states that Glasscock made her cry and she witnessed Glasscock make a Board member and other women cry. (Doc. 42-1 ¶¶49, 50). She states that Glasscock got angry with her over who cut her hair. (Doc. 42-2 at 108).

Ultimately, Smith states, Glasscock forced Smith to resign or be fired and told her that if she said a word about his conduct, he would see to it that she never worked in Chilton County again. (Doc. 42-1 at ¶54).

IV. DISCUSSION

Glasscock has moved for summary judgment as to the federal and state law claims against him. The Court begins with the federal claims.

A. Federal Claims

1. Equal Pay Act and Fair Labor Standards Act

Glasscock moves for summary judgment as to the claims under both the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") and Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") on the same grounds; namely, that a claim cannot be stated against a public official in his individual capacity under those statutes and that there is no claim remaining in this case under either statute against Glasscock in his official capacity.

With respect to the individual-capacity claims, the law in the Eleventh Circuit is settled. The Eleventh Circuit has clearly held that precedent "establishes as the law of this circuit that a public official sued in his individual capacity is not an 'employer' subject to individual liability under the FLSA," and that the "Equal Pay Act is simply an extension of the FLSA and incorporates the FLSA's definition of 'employer.'" Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1995)).

Smith contends that Welch and Wascura were wrong decided, citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). (Doc. 42 at 38). Hafer, however, is a case decided before Welch and Wascura. See Evans v. Georgia Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit is "bound to follow a binding precedent in this Circuit unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court."). Under bindingEleventh Circuit precedent, therefore, Glasscock in his individual capacity is not subject to suit under the EPA or FLSA and summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to those claims against Glasscock. See Lee v. City of Walthourville, 2019 WL 339631, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2019)(finding that Eleventh Circuit precedent is binding that a public official in his individual capacity is not an employer under the FLSA).

With regard to the official-capacity claims, Glasscock contends that because a claim against him in his official capacity is the same thing as a claim against the ...