Smith v. Internal Revenue Serv.

1

JOHN SMITH, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-00853

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

September 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Presently before the Court is a complaint filed by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff John Smith (“Smith”) on May 24, 2023, against Defendant the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Smith seeks relief related to economic impact payments (“IEPs”) allegedly owed but not received under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES”). (Doc. 1, at 1-17). At the time he filed his complaint, Smith was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Waymart (“SCI-Waymart”). (Doc. 1, at 2).

Having conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint, however Smith shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 1).

I. Background and Procedural History

Smith, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant action by filing a complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis on May 24, 2023. (Doc. 1; Doc. 2). On May 26, 2023, the Court denied Smith's motion to proceed in forma pauperis for failure to file a certified copy of his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement for the six-month period prior to the initiation of this civil action. (Doc. 5). On June 9, 2023, Smith filed a renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a copy of his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement. (Doc. 6; Doc. 7).^[1]

In his complaint, Smith alleges he timely filed his 2020 and 2021 tax returns with the IRD to obtain IEPs. (Doc. 1, at 12). On July 16, 2021, the IRS sent a Form 4883C letter to Smith, requesting that he verify his identity before the IRS is able to process his income tax return, issue a refund, or credit any overpayments on his account. (Doc. 1, at 13; Doc. 1-2, at 2). The IRS explained that he can verify his identity in one of three ways: (1) over the phone by calling; (2) in person by scheduling an appointment at a local IRS office; or (3) through an authorized representative by completing a Form 284B, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative. (Doc. 1-2, at 2). Smith contends he is not capable of using the methods provided by the IRS to verify his identity because: (1) he is incarcerated; and (2) the prison phone system is not available as “it takes hours to get through and the calls on the prison phones only last 15 minutes before the system hands up.” (Doc. 1, at 13). On November 12, 2021, Unit Manager Karlavage responded to Smith's Form DC-135A, stating that he sent an email to the IRS on Smith's behalf, stating that Smith received the IRS's letter on July 20, 2021. (Doc. 1, at 14; Doc. 1-3, at 2). On May 6, 2022, the IRS sent a second Form 4883C letter to Smith, again requesting that he verify his identity using one of the three methods noted above. (Doc. 1, at 14; Doc. 1-4, at 2-3). Smith alleges “the verification of identity was again done by Mr. Karlavage.” (Doc. 1, at 14). On June 6, 2022, the IRS sent a third Form 4883C to Smith, against requesting that he verify his identity using one of the three methods noted above. (Doc. 1, at 14; Doc. 1-5, at 2-4). On June 22, 2022, Unit Counselor Ms. Cush responded to Smith's Form DC-135A, stating that he again sent an email to the IRS on Smith's behalf. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 1-6, at 2). On January 23, 2023, Unit Counselor Mihol responded to Smith's Form DC-135A, stating: “On 05/18/2022 Ms. Cush sent the IRS the verification documents required. At this point there is nothing more I can do. Feel free to write the IRS for an update.” (Doc. 1, at 15; Doc. 1-7, at 2). On January 12, 2023, Smith sent a letter to the IRS, stating:

This letter is being written to inquire about the status of my stimulus checks. I filed the required tax forms and have on two occasions provided your office with the requested verification of my identity. As of today I have not received any of the three due checks. Please provide me with correspondence with the status of these funds and the reason for the delay in processing them. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

(Doc. 1, at 15; Doc. 1-8, at 2).

Smith contends the IRS has not responded to his letter. (Doc. 1, at 15). Finally, Smith asserts that he requested an administrative claim form, but no response has been received. (Doc. 1, at 16).

Liberally construing the complaint, Smith asserts the following causes of action: violation of due process pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; violation of equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; and violation of the CARES Act. (Doc. 1). As relief, Smith demands “monetary relief, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, nominal damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, $32,000.00, copying fees, $350.01 filing fee, and other relief this court deems fair necessary and appropriate, any other monetary relief [Smith] is entitled to due to violations secured by the constitution and statute.” (Doc. 1, at 5).

II. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed.Appx. 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). While such screening should be done “as soon as practicable after docketing,” the Court is not precluded from conducting such screening after an answer is filed. See Lair v. Purdy, 84 Fed.Appx. 413, 414 (5th Cir. 2003); Janowski v. Williams, No. 123144 (FLW), 2015 WL 4171727, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. July 10, 2015) (“A § 1915A dismissal may be made at any time, before or after service of process and before or after an answer is filed.” (quoting Loving v. Lea, No. 13-158, 2013 WL 3293655, at *1 (M.D. La. June 28, 2013))). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see generally Banks v. Cty. Of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards). In this case, because Smith is suing government officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) applies. In performing its mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks, 568 F.Supp.2d at 588.

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' ....” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal...